SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY -10

THE

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA

OR

REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS

OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY

MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.

TRANSLATED BT

K B. COWELL,  

228 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

their severally possessing the same attributes of colouring,

manifesting, and concealing.

Here, however, it may be objected,

" But will not your

unintelligent Nature, without the superintendence of something

intelligent, fail to produce these effects, intellect,

&c. ? therefore there must be some intelligent superintendent;

and hence we must assume an all-seeing,

supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since

even unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an

impulse; and experience shows us that an unintelligent

thing, without any intelligent superintendent, does act for

the good of the soul, just as the unintelligent milk acts for

the growth of the calf, or just as the unintelligent rain acts

for the welfare of living creatures ; and so unintelligent

Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it has

been said in the Karika ( 57)

" As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of

the calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul/'

But as for the doctrine of " a Supreme Being who acts

from compassion," which has been proclaimed by beat of

drum by the advocates of his existence, this has well-nigh

passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet

either of the two alternatives. For does he act thus before

or after creation ? If you say

"

before," we reply that as

pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will

be no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to

free living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic

of compassion] ; and if you adopt the second alternative,

you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand

you will hold that God created the world through compassion

[as this is His motive in acting at all], and on

the other hand 1 that He compassionated after He had

created. Therefore we hold that the development of

unintelligent Nature [even without any intelligent superi

In other words on the one on the other hand it was the existhand

the existing misery of beings ence of a created world which caused

induced God to create a world in their misery at all

order to relieve their misery, and

THE SANKHYA-DARSANA. 229

intendent] in the order of the series intellect, self-consciousness,

&c., is caused by the union of Nature and

Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just

as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity

of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a

movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved

Soul"; and this union of Nature and Soul is caused by

mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and

the blind man. N.ature, as the thing to be experienced,

depends on Soul the experiencer ; and Soul looks to final

bliss, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain,

which, though really apart from it, have fallen upon it by

its coming under the shadow of intellect through not

recognising its own distinction therefrom.1 This final

bliss [or absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination

of Nature and Soul, nor is this end possible without it;

therefore Soul depends on Nature for its final bliss. Just as

a lame man and a blind man,2

travelling along with a caravan,

by some accident having become separated from

their companions, wandered slowly about in great dismay,

till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame

man mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind

man, following the path indicated by the lame man,

reached his desired goal, as did the lame man also, mounted

on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is effected by

Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually dependent.

This has been said in the Karika ( 21)

"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its

final separation the union of both takes place, as

of the lame man and the blind man. By that

union a creation is formed."

"

Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place

for the good of the soul, but how do you account for its

1 Bondage, &c., reside in the in- pieoe of folk-lore. It is found in

tellect, and are only rejected upon the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrim,

soul through its proximity (cf. Sdn- fol. 91, 6, and in the Gesta Romankhyapravachanabhdthya,

i. 58). orum.

* This apologue is a widely spread

230 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

ceasing to act ?

"

I reply, that as a wilful woman whose

faults have once been seen by her husband does not return

to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, retires

from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said

in the Karika ( 59)

"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,

desists from the dance, so does Nature desist,

having manifested herself to Soul."

For this end has the doctrine of those who follow

Kapila, the founder of the atheistic Saftkhya School, been

propounded. E. B. C.

( 231 )

CHAPTEE XV.

THE PATANJALI-DARSiNA.

WE now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes

the opinions of such Munis as Patanjali and others,

Tvho originated the system of the Theistic Sa&khya philosophy.

This school follows the so-called Yoga Sastra

promulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four chapters,

which also bears the name of the "Saftkhya Pravachana," or

detailed explanation of the Sankhya.1 In the first chapter

thereof the venerable Patanjali, having in the opening

aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration"

(yoga), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Sastra,

proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of

his subject,

" Concentration is the hindering of the modifications

of the thinking principle," and then he expounds

at length the nature of Meditation (samddhi). In the

second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing,

"The practical part of Concentration is mortification,

muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds

the practical part of yoga proper to him whose mind is not

yet thoroughly abstracted (in. 9), viz., the five external subservients

or means,

"

forbearance," and the rest. In the

third chapter, in the series commencing

"

Attention is the

fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the

three internal subservients attention, contemplation, and

meditation, collectively called by the name "

subjugation

"

(saifiyama), and also the various superhuman powers which

* On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Saukhya Pr. Bh&h., p. 20 ; S. Sfra, p. 1 1.

232 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the

series commencing,

" Perfections spring from birth, plants,

spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the

highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account

of the five so-called

"

perfections

"

(siddhis). This school

accepts the old twenty-five principles [of the Safikhya],

"

Nature," &c. ; only adding the Supreme Being as the

twenty-sixth a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit,

or stock

r

of desert, who of His own will assumed a body

in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic

traditions,

1 and is gracious towards those living beings who

are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.

" But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the

[glossy] leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should

need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?"

To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself

as the understanding, arid it is this which is, as it were,

burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the

influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this

suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the

teachers have declared

"

It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the

understanding and the substances belonging to

Activity which torment,

2

And it is through the modification of Darkness, as

wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as

suffering."

It has been also said by Patanjali,

3 " The power of the

enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of

transference, in an object which is developed and transferred

experiences the modifications thereof."

Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence,

and this is the soul ; and in an object which is

i i.e., he revealed the Veda, and a I read ye for te with Dr. Hall's

also originated the meanings of MS. Tapya means rather "

susoepwords,

as well as instructed the tible of suffering."

first fathers of mankind in the arts 8 This is really Vya*sa's comxn.

of life. on Sut., iv. 21.

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 233

"developed" and "transferred," or reflected, i.e., in the

thinking principle or the understanding, it experiences

the modifications thereof, i.e., the power of intelligence,

being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the

shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications

of it. Thus the soul, though in itself pure, sees

according to the idea produced by the understanding ; and-,

while thus seeing at secondhand, though really it is different

from the understanding, it appears identical therewith.

It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the

practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious

observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a

long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme

Being, at length there is produced an unclouded recognition

of the distinction between the quality Goodness and

the Soul; and the five "afflictions," ignorance, &c., are

radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert,"

fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the

undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation

is accomplished.

The words of the first aphorism,

" Now is the exposition

of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which

lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into

practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the

connection [between the treatise and the object], and the

person properly qualified to study it. The word " now "

(atha) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,

[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced],

"

But," it may be objected,

" there are several possible

significations of this word atha ; why, then, should

you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular

'inceptive* meaning? The great Canon for nouns and

their gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many

such meanings.

' Atha is used in the sense of an auspicious

particle, after, now (inceptive), what? (interrogatively),

and all (comprehensively)/ Now we willingly

surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensive234

THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

ness ; but since there are four senses certainly suitable,

i.e.,

'

after/

' an auspicious particle/

' reference to a previous

topic/ and ' the inceptive now/ there is no reason

for singling out the last." This objection, however, will not

stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you

maintain the sense of

"

after," then do you hold that it

implies following after anything whatever, or only after

some definite cause as comprehended under the general

definition of causation,

1

i.e. y

"

previous existence [relatively

to the effect]

"

? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance

with the proverb that " No one stands for a single

moment inactive," everybody must always do everything

after previously doing something else ; and since this is at

once understood without any direct mention at all, there

could be no use in employing the particle atha to convey

this meaning. Nor -can it be the latter alternative ; because,

although we fully grant that the practice of concentration

does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity,

&c., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries

to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have

that avowed predominance [which the presumed cause

should have],

" But why should we not hold that the

word atha implies that this very exposition is avowedly

the predominant object, and does follow after previous

tranquillity of mind, &c. ?

" We reply, that the aphorism

uses the term "

exposition

"

(anuSdsana), and this word,

etymologically analysed, implies that by which the yoga

is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and

detailed means and results ; and there is no rule that such

an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind,

&c., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is

concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the

truth and a desire to impart it to others ; for it is rather

the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge,

which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,

in accordance with the words of Sruti :

" Therefore

* Gf. BKd^-parickMeda, 15, a.

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 235

having become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent,

patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in

the soul." * Nor can the word atha imply the necessary

precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the

truth and a desire to impart it to others ; because, even

granting that both these are present, they need not to be

mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in

themselves to produce the necessary intelligence ajid effort

in the student. Still [however we may settle these points]

the question arises, Is the exposition of the yoga ascertained

to be a cause of final beatitude or not ? If it is, then it is

still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions

should be absent ; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable,

whatever conditions may be present.

2 But it is

clear that the exposition in question is such a cause, since

we have such a passage of the ruti as that [in the Katha

Upanishad, ii. 12]: "By the acquirement of yoga or intense

concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man

having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and

again, such a passage of the Smriti as that [in the Bhaga-

Tad Gita, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation

will then attain yoga" Hence we conclude that it

is untenable to interpret atha as implying that the exposition

must follow "

after

"

a previous inquiry on the part

of the student, or " after

"

a previous course of ascetic

training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body

strong].

But in the case of the Vedanta Siitras, which open with

the aphorism,

" Now, therefore, there is the wish to know

Brahman," aftkara Acharya has declared that the inceptive

meaning of atha must be left out of the question, as

the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at

will] ; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean

"after," i.e., that this desire must follow a previous

1

datapaths Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28. different conditions which atha is

* I read in the second clause tad- supposed to assume as being neces-

Vkdvefpi, understanding by tad the sarily present.

236 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

course of tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known

rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control,

indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object

being to communicate the teaching to a proper student

as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called

'means/' 1

"

Well, then, let us grant that atha cannot mean '

after;

'

but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle ?

"

But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection

between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness

implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and

desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the

attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain ; but this

auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of yoga,

since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of

pain.

2 Therefore it cannot be at all established that the

meaning of the aphorism is that " the exposition of the

yoga is auspicious ;

"

for auspiciousness cannot be either

the primary meaning of atha or its secondary meaning by

metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself

auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like

that of a drum. " But why not say that just as an implied

meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a

sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may

also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far

as the actual words are concerned ?

" 8 We reply, that in

the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between

the meaning of one word and that of another ; otherwise

we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of

the grammarians has set, that " verbal expectancy

4 can be

fulfilled by words alone."

* These are, i., the discrimination * Granting that atka does not

of the eternal from the phenomenal ; here mean "

auspicious," why should

ii, the rejection of the fruit of ac- not this be the implied meaning,

tions here or hereafter ; iii, the pos- as all allow that the particle atha

session of the six qualities, tranquil- does produce an auspicious influlity,

&c. ; and, iv., the desire for ence?

liberation. 4

*.., a word's incapacity to oon-

* It may be sukha-janaka, but it vey a meaning without some other

is not itself tukha. word to complete the construction.

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 237

" But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement

to be put at the beginning of a $astra, in order to

lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion

of the work which the author desires to begin,

and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good,

since it has been said by the wise,

' Those 6astras become

widely famous which have auspicious commencements,

auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and their

students have long lives and are invincible in disputation

'

?

* Now the word atha implies

'

auspiciousness/

since there is a Smriti which says,

" ' The word Om and the word atha, these two in the

ancient time,

" '

Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth ; therefore

they are both auspicious/

" Therefore let the word atha stand here as signifying

'

auspiciousness/ like the word ' vriddhi ' used by Panini

in his opening siitra ' vriddhir dd aich.'

" 2 This view,

however, is untenable; since the very word atha, when

heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be

employed to convey some other special signification, just

as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is auspicious

for one starting on a journey]. If you still object,

" How can the particle atha have any other effect, if it is

specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning

of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced ?

" we

reply that it certainly can have such other additional

effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some

other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement

of a journey.

3 Nor does this contradict the smriti,

1 This is found with some varia- as "the second strengthening of a

tions in the Maha'bh&hya (p. 7, vowel."

Kielhorn's ed.)

8 In the old Bengali poem Chan-

8 The commentators hold that the di, we have an interesting list of

word vriddhih is placed at the be- these omens. The hero Chandraginning

of the first sutra, while ketu, starting on a journey, has the

gunah in the second is placed at the following good omens : On his right

end (ad en gunah), in order to ensure hand a cow, a deer, a Bra*hman, a

an auspicious opening, vriddhi mean- full-blown lotus ; on his left, a jackal

ing "increase," "prosperity," as well and a jar full of water. He hears

23& THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

since the smriti will still hold good, as the words "

they

are both auspicious" mean only that they produce an

auspicious effect.

Nor can the particle atha have here the meaning of

"

reference to a previous topic/' since the previously mentioned

faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning

really involves that of

"

after

"

[which we have already discussed

and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as

this, as t6 whether this particular atha means "the inceptive

now "

or "

after," if another topic had been previously suggested,

then " reference thereto

" would be a possible meaning

; but in the present case [where no other topic has been

previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore,

by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for

the atha of the sutra, the remaining meaning of "the

inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Tandya Brahmana,

xvi. 8, I ; xvi. 10,1], "Now this is the Jyotis,"

"Now this is the ViSvajyotis,"

* the particle atha is

accepted as signifying the commencement of the description

of a particular sacrifice, just as the atha in the

commencement of the Mahabhashya,

" now comes the

exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the

Institutes of Grammar. This has been declared by

Vyasa in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms,

"the atha in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"

and Vachaspati has similarly explained it

in his gloss ; therefore it may be considered as settled

that the atha here indicates a commencement and also

signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view

on his right hand the sound of fire omen according to all Mstr&s, and

and a cowherdess calling

" milk "to BO is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the

buyers. He sees a cow with her calf,, tuberous root of the water-lily, and

a woman calling "jaya," duT^wt grass, a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a

rioe, garlands of flowers, diamonds, kite, a lizard, and a woodman carrysapphires,

pearls, corals ; and on the ing wood are called bad omens,

left twelve women. He hears drums * These are the names of two out

and cymbals, and men dancing and of the four sacrifices lasting for one

singing

" Hari." It is, however, all day, in which a thousand cows are

spoiled by seeing a guana (godhikd). given to the officiating Brahmans.

The author adds, "This id a bad

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 239

that this atha implies a commencement, let the student be

left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of

the 6astra' through the attainment of the yoga, which is

its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation

of its entire purport. But here some one may say,

"Does not the smriti of Yajnavalkya say,

'

Hiranyagarbha

is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no other ancient

sage ?

' how then is Patanjali the teacher thereof ?

" We

reply that it was for this reason that the venerabl Patanjali,

1 that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult

it was to'grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up

and down in the Puranas, &c., and wishing to collect

together their essence, commenced his anu&sana, the

preposition any, implying that it was a teaching which

followed a primary revelation and was not itself the

immediate origin of the system.

Since this atha in the aphorism signifies

" commencement,"

the full meaning of the sentence comes out as

follows :

" be it known that the institute for the exposition

of the yoga is now commenced." In this institute

the "

object-matter," as being that which is produced by

it, is yoga [or the " concentration of the mind "], with its

means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;"

supreme absorption (kaivalya) is the highest

" end "

of the

yoga when it is produced. The "connection" between

the institute and yoga is that of the producer and the

thing to be produced ; the " connection

"

between yoga

and supreme absorption is that of the means and the

end ; and this is well known from ruti and Smjiti,

as I have before shown. And it is established by the

general context that those who aim at liberation are the

duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need

any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be

adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedanta siitras,

"

Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman;

" and

1 He IB here called phanipati* thor of the Mahrfbhfthya, being re-

"

lord of snakes/' Pataftjali, the au- presented as a snake in mythology.

240 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general

context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly

qualified students of the Vedanta. For the word atha, as

there used, signifies

" succession

"

[or/' after "] ; and it is a

settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted

through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and

consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any

other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has

been saifa,

" When 6ruti comes [as the determining authority]

' the subject-matter

' and the rest have no place."

l

The full meaning of this is as follows : Where a thing is

not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "

subjectmatter

" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not

otherwise ; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a

direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are

irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the

Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the " subject-

matter

" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion

or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the

authority which would establish this contrary conclusion

is [by the very nature of

"

&ruti "] already precluded from

having any force ; and in the latter it is useless. This is

all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14] ; "A definite

text, a '

sign/ the '

sentence/ the '

subject-matter/ the

' relative position/ or c the title/ when any of these come

into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its

meaning is more remote

" 2

[and therefore less obvious],

It has been thus summed up .

1 Of. sSankara, Veddnta-Sut, iii. must be a liquid like ghee, since a

3,49. ladle could not divide solid things

c This is the Mim&nsa* rule for like the baked flour cakes. 3.

settling the relative value of the Vdkya, "the being mentioned in

proofs that one thirig is ancillary to one sentence," i.e., the context,

another. I. A-utf,

" a definite text," as in the text "'(I cut) thee for

as " let him offer with curds,"where food,' thus saying, he cuts the

curds are clearly an ancillary part of branch ;" here the words "

(I cut)

the sacrifice. 2. Litga,

" a sign," or thee for food

"

are ancillary to the

" the sense of the words," as leading action of cutting ; or in the text,

" I

to an inference, as in the text " he offer the welcome (oblation) to

divides by the ladle ;" here we in- Agni," the words "the welcome

for 4hat the thing to be divided (oblation) to Agni," as they form

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 241

' A text always precludes the rest ; the ' title

'

is always

precluded by any of the preceding modes ;

"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or

itself precludes, depends on circumstances."

Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now

considered as settled that, since it has an "

object,"

as well

as the other preliminaries, the study of the Sastra, which

teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like th|t of the

Vedanta, which discusses the nature of Brahman. "

But,"

it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to be

the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced,

not the Sastra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal

object, as that which is to be produced ; but since it is

produced by the Sastra, especially directed thereto, this

Sastra is the means for its production, and, as a general

rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the

means rather than with the end. Just as the operations

of Devadatta the woodcutter, i.e., his lifting his arm up

and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, i.e., the

axe, than to the object, i.e., the tree, so here the speaker,

Patanjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means

the Yoga-^astra as his primary object, while he intends

the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of "denotation."

In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is

that the commencing the Yogalastra is that which primarily

one sentence with the words " I divine work," in connection with the

offer," are ancillary to the act of mention of the sdnndyya vessel?,

offering. 4. Prakarano,,

" the sub- where this position proves that the

ject-matter viewed as a whole, with hymn is ancillary to the action of

an interdependence of its parts," as sprinkling those vessels. 6. Samdin

the dar&a-purnamdsa sacrifice, khyd,

" title ;

" thus the Yajurveda

where the praydja ceremonies, which is called the special book for the

have no special fruit mentioned, adhvaryu priests ; hence in any rite

produce, as parts, a mystic influ- mentioned in it they are primu

ence (aptii-va) which helps forward facie to be considered as the priests

that influence of the whole by which employed. The order in the aphorthe

worshippers obtain heaven, ism represents the relative weight

Here the prakarana proves them to to be attached to each ; the first,

be ancillary. 5. Sthdna (or krama), truti, being the most important ; the

"relative position" or "order," as last, samdkhyd, the least. Of. Jaithe

recital of the hymn Sundka- mini's Sutras, iii. 3, 14 ; Mimdmtddhvam,

&c.,

" Be ye purified for the paribhdehd, pp. 8, 9.

242 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

claims our attention ; while the "

yoga," or the restraint of

the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded

in this Sa^tra.

" But as we read in the lists of roots that

the root yuj is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the

word yoga, its derivative, mean '

conjunction,

1 and not 'restraint*

? And indeed this has been said by Yajnavalkya :

l

'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme

souls is called yoga'

"

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility

of any such action,

2

&c., in either as would produce this

conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an

explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of

other philosophical schools] ; for the notion of the conjunction

of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines

of the Vaigeshika and Nyaya schools [and therefore they

would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted

the explanation in accordance with the Mimamsa [or

Vedanta], our Yoga^astra would be rendered nugatory by

this concession [and the very ground cut from under our

feet]; because the identity of the individual and supreme

souls being in that school something already accomplished,

it could not be regarded as something to be produced by

our $astra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are

used in many different senses, the root yuj may very well

be used here in the sense of

"

contemplation."

s Thus it

has been said

"

Particles, prepositions, and roots these three are all

held to be of manifold meaning ; instances found in

reading are their evidence."

Therefore some authors expressly give yuj in this sense,

and insert in their lists

"

yuj in the sense of samddhi"

Nor does this contradict Yajnavalkya's declaration, as

the word yoga, used by him, may bear this meaning; and

he has himself said

* /.., Yogi-Yajnavalkya, the an- Icriyd, which properly belongs only

thor of the YdyftavaLkya-gitd. See to the body, as the soul is draak{ri.

HaU, Bibl. Index, p. 14 ; Aufrecht, * Sett, samddhi, or the restraining

Eodl. Catal,, p. 87 6. the mind and senses to profound

* Karman seems here used for contemplation.

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 243

" Samddhi is the state of identity of the individual and

supreme souls ; this abiding absolutely in Brahman

is the samddhi of the individual soul."

It has been also said by the venerable Vyasa [in his Commentary

on the Yoga-siitras, i. i],

"

Yoga is samddhi."

An objection, however, may be here raised that " the

term samddhi is used by Patanjali [in ii. 29] in the sense

of one of the eight ancillary parts

1 of the eightfold concentration

(or yoyo) ; and the whole cannot be thus itself

a part as well as a whole, since the principal and the

ancillary must be completely different from each other, as

all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as

we see in the dars'aptirnamdsa sacrifices and their ancillary

rites the praydjas, and therefore samddhi cannot be the

meaning of yoga!' We however reply that this objection

is incorrect ; for although the term samddhi is used for

etymological reasons z to express the ancillary part which

is really defined [in iii. 3] as " the contemplation which

assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of

any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to

describe the principal state is justified by the author's

wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as

the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor

can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a

word can be used ; because if so, as the word go,

" a bull,"

is derived by all 'grammarians from the root gam,

"

to go,"

we ought never to use the phrase

" a standing bull

"

[as

the two words would be contradictory], and the man

Devadatta, when going, would properly be called go,

" a

bull ;

"

and, moreover, the Sutra, i. 2, distinctly gives us

a definite justification for employing the word in this

sense when it declares that " concentration (yoga) is the

suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle."

[The second or principal sense of samddhi will therefore

be quite distinct from the first or inferior.]

i Sett, "forbearance, religious ob- plation, and meditation (samddhi)."

servance, postures, suppression of the 2 See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, samyay

breath, restraint, attention, contem- ddhiyate mano yatra sa samddhih.

244 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

" But surely if yoga is helcl to be the suppression of the

modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications

abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the

nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words

their '

destruction/ would also abide in the soul, since it is a

principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction

abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to

these negations;

1 and consequently in accordance with the

maxim, ' This newly produced character will affect the subject

in which it resides/ the absolute independence of the

soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not

allow ; because we maintain that these various modifications

which are to be hindered,

2 such as

"

right notion/'

"misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and "memory" (i. 6),

are attributes of the internal organ (chitta), since the power

of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become

the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you

object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent

soul 3 has not been proved, since there is an argument to

establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable

from the fact that it always knows, while that

which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the

internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were susceptible

of change, then, as this change would be occasional,

we could not predicate its always knowing these

modifications. But the true view is, that while the

intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness,

there is another essentially pure substance 4 which abides

always the same ; and as it is this which is affected by

any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which

is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces an

1 Thug, e.g., the antecedent non- ' I T^dniroddhavydndmfoTniroexistence

and the destruction of the dhdndm.

pot are found in the two halves in * Chit - takti and chtti - Midi

which the pot itself (the counter- soul

entity to its own non-existence) re- 4 The sattva of the buddld or the

sides by intimate relation \tamavdya- internal organ.

tambandha).

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 245

impression ;

l and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own

proper independence, and it is maintained to be the

always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon

it. That object by which the understanding becomes

affected is known ; that object by which it is not affected

is not known ; for the understanding is called "susceptible

of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible

of being affected or not by the influence or want of

influence of the object which resembles the magfiet, this

influence or want of influence producing respectively

knowledge or the want of knowledge.

" But inasmuch as

the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism

are all-pervading, are they not always connected with

all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should

be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things ?

"

We reply that even although we grant that they are allpervading,

it is only where a given understanding has

certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects

are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of

these objects only, and none other, is produced to that

understanding ; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute,

we hold that objects are just like magnets, and

affect the understanding just as these do iron, coming

in contact with it through the channels of the senses.

Therefore, the " modifications

"

belong to the understanding,

not to the soul ; and so says the Sruti,

"

Desire, volition,

doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,

all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage PaBcha&kha

declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul,

" The power that enjoys is unchangeable ;

" and so Patanjali

also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the understanding

are always known, this arises from the unchangeableness

of the Euling Soul." The following is

the argument drawn out formally to establish the change-

1 This second substance,

" mind "

the image of the object on a second

or "

understanding

"

(buddki, chitta), looking-glass (*c. soul).

is like a looking-glass, which reflects

246 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

ableness of the understanding. The understanding is

susceptible of change because its various objects are now

known and now not known, just like the organ of hearing

and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is notoriously

threefold, i.e., a change of "property," of "aspect/'

1

and of

"

condition." When the subject, the understanding,

perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of

"

property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a

bracelet,& diadem, or an armlet ; there is a change of

"

aspect"

when the property becomes present, past, or future ;

and there is a change of

" condition

" when there is a manifestation

or non-manifestation2 of the perception, as of blue,

&c. ; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] newness or oldness

[at two different moments] would be its change of condition.

These three kinds of change must be traced out by

the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus

we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our

thesis that, since "

right notion

" and the other modifications

are attributes of the understanding, their

"

suppression

"

will also have its site in the same organ.

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection

to what we have said above.]

" But if we accept your

definition that '

yoga is the suppression of the modifications

of the chitta,' this will apply also to ' sound sleep/

since there too we may find the suppression [or suspension]

of the modifications found in kshipta, vikshipta,

mtidha? &c. ; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible

for the ' afflictions

' to be abolished so long as

those states called kshipta, $c., remain at all, and because

they only hinder the attainment of the summum bonum.

Let us examine this more closely. For the understanding

is called kshipta,

'

restless/ when it is restless [with

1 V&haspati explains latehana as of the lafohana-parindma. Of. the

Jaflabheda.

'

Commentaries on iii. 13.

* I take ddi as meaning avphu-

* These are generally called the

jatva. The change of state takes five states of the thinking principle,

place between the several moments chittabhiimaya* or avasthdt. Of. Commentary,

L 2, 1 8.

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 247

an excess of the quality rajas], as being tossed about

amidst various objects which engage it. It is called mtidha,

'

blinded/ when it is possessed by the modification '

sleep

'

and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the

quality tamos']. It is called vikshipta,

'

unrestless/ when

it is different from the first state 1

[as filled with the

quality sattva]. We must here, however, note a distinction ;

for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gita (vi.

34), 'The mind, Krishna, is fickle, turbulent, violent,

and obstinate/ the mind, though naturally restless, may

occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its

objects ; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced

in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former

actions ; as it is said [in the Yoga Sutras, i. 30],

*

Sickness,

languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects,

erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and

instability, these distractions of the mind are called

' obstacles V Here ' sickness ' means fever, &c., caused

by the want of equilibrium between the three humours ;

'

languor

'

is the mind's want of activity ;

' doubt '

is a

sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives ;

' carelessness '

is a negligence of using the means for

producing meditation ;

' laziness

'

is a want of exertion

from heaviness of body, speech, or mind ;

' addiction to

objects

'

is an attachment to objects of sense ;

' erroneous

perception* is a mistaken notion of one thing for another;

' failure to attain some stage

'

is the failing for some

reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation

;

'

instability

'

is the mind's failure to continue there,

even when the state of abstract meditation has been

reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of

the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition

of yoga!'

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as

regards the three conditions of the mind called kshipta,

1 These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and gods.

248 THE SARVA'DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

m&dha, and vikshipta, which [as being connected with

the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states,

the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is

itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called

yoga], this does not apply to the other two conditions

called ekdgra and niruddha, which are to be pursued and

attained ; and therefore the suppression of the modifications

in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to

be considered as yoga. Now by ekdgra we mean that

state when the mind, entirely filled with the sattva

quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation ; and

by niruddha we mean that state when all its developments

are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or

potentialities] remain.

Now this samddhi,

" meditation "

[in the highest sense],

is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition"

(samprajndta), and " that in which distinct recognition

is lost" (asamprajftdta) [Yoga S., i. 17, iS].

1 The former

is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent

on its own object, and all the "modifications," such

as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external

things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the

term, it is where the intellect 2

is thoroughly recognised

(samyakprajftdyate) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold

division, as savitarka, savichdra, sdnanda, and sdsmita.

Now this

" meditation

"

is a kind of "pondering" (bhdvand),

which is the taking into the mind again and agaib, to the

exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered.

And that which is thus to be pondered is of two

* jkinds,

being either I6wara or the twenty-five principles.

And these principles also are of two kinds senseless and

not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect,

egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul.

Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when,

having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth,

1 Much of this is taken from borrowed Ballantyne's translation.

Bhoja*s Commentary, and I have 8 Can chtita mean " soul "Jiere?

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 249

&c., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation

as to which is antecedent and which consequent,

1 or in

the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the

idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42] ; then the meditation

is called "argumentative" (savitarka). When, having

taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile

elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in

relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called

" deliberative

"

(savichdra). When the mind, coAmingled

with some "passion" and "

darkness," is pondered, then the

meditation is called

"

beatific

"

(sdnanda), because "

goodness

"

is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation

of joy.

2 When pondering is pursued, having as

its object the pure element of

"

goodness," unaffected by

even a little of

"

passion

"

or "

darkness," then that meditation

is called

"

egoistical

"

(sdsmita), because here personal

existence 8

only remains, since the intellectual faculty

becomes now predominant, and the quality of

"

goodness

"

has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to

higher things].

But the "

meditation, where distinct recognition is lost,"

consists in the suppression of all

" modifications

"

whatever.

" But "

[it may be asked]

" was not ' concentration '

defined as the suppression of all the modifications ? How,

then, can the c meditation where there is distinct recognition

' be included in it at all, since we still find active in

it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness

predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness

as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,

because we maintain that concentration is the suppression

of the " modifications

"

of the thinking power, as

especially stopping the operation of the "

afflictions," the

"actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts." 4

1

I.e., as, e.gr., whether the senses 8 In p. 164, line 2 infra, read

produce the elements or the elements sattdmdtra for sattva-. Bhoja well

the senses, &c. distinguishes asmitd from aharjikdra.

9 In p. 164, line 4 infra, read 4 For these see infra, and cf. Yoga

tukhaprak<tiamaya*ya. S., ii. 3, 12, 13.

250 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

The "afflictions" (kleia) are well known as five, viz.,

ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane

existence.

" But here a question is at once raised, In

what sense is the word avidyd, "ignorance," used here ? Is

it to be considered as an avyayibhdva compound, where the

former portion is predominant, as in the word " aboveboard"?

1 or is it a tatpurusha [or karmadfidraya] compound,

where the latter portion is predominant, as in the

word "

tdforn-clerk

"

? or is it a bahuvrihi compound', where

both portions are dependent on something external to the

compound, as "

blue-eyed

"

? It cannot be the first; for if

the former portion of the compound were predominant, then

we should have the negation the emphatic part in avidyd

(i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express

negation, or prasajya-pratishedha) ;

2 and consequently, as

avidyd would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be

unable to produce positive results, as the "

afflictions," &c.,

and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but

neuter. It cannot be the second ; for any knowledge, whatever

thing's absence it may be characterised by (a + vidyd),

opposes the "

afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their

source. Nor can it be the third ; for then, in accordance

with the words of the author of the Vritti,

8 " there is a

bahuvr{hi compound which is formed with some word

meaning

' existence ' used after ' not/ with the optional

elision of this subsequent word" 4 we must explain this

supposed bahuwihi compound avidyd as follows: "That

luddhi is to be characterised as avidyd (sc. an adjective),

i I have ventured to alter the (a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a

examples, to suit the English trans- funeral note."

lation. (6.) Unwatched the garden bough 1 Where the negation is promi- shall sway."

nent it is called prasajya-prati- The former corresponds to the logishedha;

but where it is not promi. clan's atyantdbhdva, the latter to

nent, we have the paryuddta nega- anyonydbhdva or bheda.

tion. In the former the negative

* Cf. the vdrUilca in Siddhrfnta

is connected with the verb ; in the Kaum., i. 401.

latter it is generally compounded 4 Thus adhana stands for avidyawith

some other word, as, e.g. mdnadhana, with vidyamdna omitted

in the compound*

THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 251

of which there is not a mdyA existing." But this explanation

is untenable ; for such an avidyd could not become the

source of the "

afflictions ;

" l and yet, on the other hand,

it ought to be their source,

2 even though it were associated

with the suppression of all the "

modifications,"

8 and were

also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the

soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in the

sdsmita meditation],

" Now it is said [in the Yoga Siitras, ii. 4],

"

Ignorance is

the field [or place of origin, i.e., source] of the others, whether

they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They

are said to be " dormant " when they are not manifested

for want of something to wake them up ; they are called

" extenuated

"

when, through one's meditating on something

that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert ; they are

called

"

intercepted

" when they are overpowered by some

other strong

"

affliction ;

"

they are called

"

simple

" when

they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of

what co-operates with them. This has been expressed by

Vachaspati Migra, in his Gloss on Vyasa's Commentary,

in the following memorial stanza :

" The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which

are absorbed in the tattvas [i.e., not embodied, but

existing in an interval of mundane destruction];

the 'extenuated' 4 are found in yogins; but the

'

intercepted

' and the '

simple

' in those who are in

contact with worldly objects."

" No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound

avidyd as a dvandva compound,

6 where both portions are

equally predominant, because we cannot recognise here

two equally independent subjects. Therefore under any

1 As its subject would confessedly

4 I read tanvavasthdtcha with the

be bwddhi. printed edition of Vdchaspati's Gloss.

8 Aa it is avidyd after all If tanudagdhdJcha is correct, it must

8 In p. 165, lines 16, 1 7, read (with mean tanutvcna dagdMk.

my MS. of Vaj&haspati's Gloss),

B As in rdmalalcshmanau, Kdma

snrvavrittinirodhasampanndyd api and Lakshmana.

tathdtvapratangdt.

252 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

one of these three admissible alternatives 1 the common

notion of ignorance as being the cause of the ' afflictions

'

would be overthrown."

[We do not, however, concede this objector's view],

because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation

called paryuddsa [where the affirmative part is emphatic],

and maintain that avidyd means a contradictory

[or wrong] kind of knowledge, the reverse of vidyd ; and

so it ha^been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has

been said

" The particle implying

'

negation

' does not signify

' absence'

[or 'non-existence'] when connected with

a noun or a root ; thus the words dbrdhmana and

adharma respectively signify,

' what is other than

a Brahman ' and ' what is contrary to justice/"

And again

" We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom

of the ancient writers ; therefore a word must not

be wrested from the use in which it has been

already employed."

Vachaspati also says,

2 "The connection of words and

their meanings depends on general consent for its certainty;

and since we occasionally see that a tatpuruslw

negation, where the latter portion is properly predominant,

may overpower the direct meaning of this latter portion

by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even here too

[in avidyd] the real meaning is something contrary to

vidyd

"

[i.e., the negative

"

non-knowledge

" becomes ultimately

the positive

"

ignorance

" 3

]. It is with a view to

this that it is said in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5],

"

Ignorance

is the notion that the non-eternal, the impure, pain,

and the non-soul are (severally) eternal, pure, pleasure,

and soul." Vipw~yayat "misconception," is defined as

1 I read pakthatrayt for pakska- nor, on the other hand, a "nondvaye.

friend," but something positive, an

9 In hie Comm. on Sut., ii. 5.

"

enemy." So agoshpada in said to

8 Thua tmmfau IB not a friend," mean " a forest'1

Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)

(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to

Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)