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Saturday, September 1, 2012

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY -11


















THE
SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA
OR
REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS
OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
BY
MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.
TRANSLATED BT
K B. COWELL,  



THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 253
" the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"
l
[i.e.,
in its opposite] ; as, for instance, the imagining the "
eternal
"
in a " non-eternal
"
thing, i.e., a jar, or the imagining
the "
pure
"
in the "
impure
"
body,
2 when it has been
declared by a proverbial couplet
8
"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its
original place [the womb], from its primal seed,
from its composition [of humours, &c.], from perspiration,
from death [as even a Brahmin's body
defiles], and from the fact that it has to be made
pure by rites."
So, in accordance with the principle enounced in the
aphorism (ii. 15), "To the discriminating everything is
simply pain, through the pain which arises in the ultimate
issue of everything,
4 or through the anxiety to secure
it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent impressions
which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
opposition of the influences of the three qualities
"
[in the
form of pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference], ignorance
transfers the idea of "pleasure" to what is really
"
pain," as, e.g., garlands, sandal-wood, women, &c. ; and
similarly it conceives the "
non-soul," e.g., the body, &c.,
as the "
soul." As it has been said
" But ignorance is when living beings transfer the
notion of ' soul '
to the ' non-soul/ as the body, &c. ;
" This causes bondage ; but in the abolition thereof is
liberation."
Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.6
" But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds
of ignorance should there not be given some general definition
applying to them all, as otherwise their special
1 Cf. Yoga Sut., i 8. his explanation of it ; he calls it
9 In p. 166, line 4 infra, read vaiydsaki gdtkd.
Icdyddau for kdryddau.
4 Since the continued enjoyment
* This couplet is quoted by Vyasa of an object only increases the desire
in his Oomm. on Yoga Sutras, ii. 5, for more, and its loss gives corresponand
I have followed Vachaspati in dent regret (cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).
5
Literally,
"
it has four feet."
254 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
characteristics cannot be established? For thus it has.
been said by Bhatta Kumarila
' Without some general definition, a more special defi*
nition cannot be given by itself ; therefore it must
not be even mentioned here/
"
This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently
met by the general definition of misconception, already adduced
above, as
" the imagining of a thing in its opposite."
"
EgoiJLn
"
(asmitA) is the notion that the two separate
things, the soul and the quality of purity,
1 are one and the
same, as is said (ii. 6),
"
Egoism is the identifying of the
seer with the power of sight/
1 " Desire
"
(rdga) is a longing,
in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment,
preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of
one who has known joy.
" Aversion "
(dvesha) is the feeling
of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded
by the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who
has known it. This is expressed in the two aphorisms,
" Desire is what dwells on pleasure ;
" " Aversion is what
dwells on pain
"
(ii. 7, 8).
Here a grammatical question may be raised,
" Are we
to consider this word anuSayin (' dwelling ') as formed
by the Jcrit affix nini in the sense of ' what is habitual/
or the taddhita affix ini in the sense of matup ? It cannot
be the former, since the affix nini cannot be used after
a root compounded with a preposition as anu&i; for, as
the word supi has already occurred in the Siitra, iii. 2, 4,
and has been exerting its influence in the following siitras,
this word must have been introduced a second time in the
Stitra, iii. 2, 78, supy ajdtau ninis tdchchkilye? on purpose
to exclude prepositions, as these have no case terminations
; and even if we did strain a point to allow them, still
it would follow by the Siitra, vii 2, 115, acho ftniti* that
1 Thus "sight/' or the power of a root in the sense of what is habitual,
seeing, is a modification of the qua- when the upapada, or subordinate
lity of sattva unobstructed by rajas word, is not a word meaning 'genus
'
and tamos. and ends in a case."
8 " Let the affix nini be used after * "Let vjriddhi be the substitute
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 255
the radical vowel must be subject to vriddhi, and so the
word must be anu$dyin, in accordance with the analogy
of such words as ati&dyin, &c. Nor is the latter view
tenable (i.e., that it is the taddhita affix ini 1
), since ini is
forbidden by the technical verse
' These two affixes 2 are not used after a monosyllable
nor a krit formation, nor a word meaning
'
genus/
nor with a word in the locative case ;
'
and the word anusaya is clearly a krit formation jfe it ends
with the affix ach 3 [which brings it under this prohibition,
and so renders it insusceptible of the affix ini]. Consequently,
the word anuayin in the Yoga aphorism is one
the formation of which it is very hard to justify."
4 This
cavil, however, is not to be admitted ; since the rule is
only to be understood as applying generally, not absolutely,
as it does not refer to something of essential importance.
Hence the author of the Vritti has said
" The word iti, as implying the idea of popular acceptation,
is everywhere connected with the examples
of this rule 6
[i.e., it is not an absolute law]."
Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as
kdryin, kdryika [where the affixes are added after a krit
formation], tandulin, tandulika [where they are added
after a word meaning "genus"]. Hence the prohibition is
only general, not absolute, after krit formations and words
meaning
"
genus," and therefore the use of the affix ini is
justified, although the word anu&aya is formed by a krit
affix. This doubt therefore is settled,
of a base ending in a vowel, when vdn; (4.) dandavati sold (i.e., dandd
that which has an indicatory ft orn axydip, santi).
follows ;
"
nini has an indicatory .
* By iii. 3, 56.
1 Sc. anusaya + ini = anusayin.
4 It is curious to see the great
2 Ini and than, which respectively grammarian's favourite study obleave
in and ika ; thus danda gives truding itself here on such a slender
daiujin and dandika. The line is pretext.
quoted by Boehtlingk, voLiLp.217, 5 See the KdtikA on Pn. v. 2,
on Pdn. v. 2, 115, and is explained 115. For vivakshdrtha (meaning
in the Kdsikd, ad loc. The different "
general currency "), compare Comprohibitions
are illustrated by the mentary on Pdn. ii 2, 27. The ediexamples:
(i.) evavdn, Ichavdn; (2.) tion in the Benares Pandit reads
kdrakavdn; (3.) vydghravdn, tiijifa- vuhayaniyamdrtha.
256 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane
existence" (abhinivefa), is what prevails in the case of
all living beings, from the worm up to the philosopher,
springing up daily, without any immediate cause, in the
form of a dread,
" May I not be separated from the body,
things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression
left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which
were suffered in previous lives, this is proved by universal
experience, since every individual has the wish,
" May I not cease to be,"
" May I be." This is declared
in the aphorism,
"
Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing
on through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of
the philosopher
"
[ii. 9]. These five,
"
ignorance," &c., .are
well known as the "
afflictions
"
(kle&a), since they afflict
the soul, as bringing upon it various mundane troubles.
[We next describe the karmd&aya of ii. 12, the "stock
of works "
or " merits
"
in the mind.]
" Works "
(karman)
consist of enjoined or forbidden actions, as the jyotishtoma
sacrifice, brahmanicide, &c. " Stock
"
(dSayd) is the
balance of the fruits of previous works, which lie stored
up in the mind in the form of
" mental deposits
"
of merit
or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].
Now " concentration
"
[yoga] consists [by i. 2] in " the
suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle,"
which stops the operation of the "afflictions," &c. ; and
this
"
suppression
"
is not considered to be merely the nonexistence
of the modifications [i.e., a mere negation],
because, if it were a mere negation, it could not produce
positive impressions on the mind ; but it is rather the site
of this non-existence,1 a particular state of the thinking
principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
described hereafter], madhumati, madhuprattkd, wokd,
and scwfiskdraSeshatd. The word nirodha thus corresponds
to its etymological explanation as " that in which the modifications
of the thinking principle, right notion, miscon-
1
i.e., Thus nirodha is not Vfitter abhdvah, but abhdvatydfryab.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 257
ception, &c., are suppressed (nirudhyante). This suppression
of the modifications is produced by
" exercise
" and
"
dispassion
"
[i. 12].
" Exercise is the repeated effort that
the internal organ shall remain in its proper state
"
[i. 13],
This "
remaining in its proper state
"
is a particular kind
of development, whereby the thinking principle remains in
its natural state, unaffected by those modifications which
at different times assume the form of revealing, energising,
and controlling.
1 " Exercise
"
is an effort directed
to this, an endeavour again and again to reduce the internal
organ to such a condition. The locative case, sthitau,
in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, as
in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for
its skin." 2
"Dispassion is the consciousness of having
overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the
objects that are seen nor those that are heard of in revelation"
[i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the reflection,
" These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
who feels no interest in the things of this world or the
next, from perceiving the imperfections attached to them.
Now, in order to reduce the "
afflictions
" which hinder
meditation and to attain meditation, the yogin must first
direct his attention to practical concentration, and " exercise
" and "
dispassion
"
are of especial use in its attainment.
This has been said by Krishna in the Bhagavad
Gita [vi. 3]
" Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
yoga ;
" But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to
be the means."
Patanjali has thus defined the practical yoga :
"
Practical
concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and
resignation to the Lord" [ii. i]. Yajnavalkya has described
"mortification"
1 I read in p. 168, last line, prakdiapravrittiniyamartipa, from Bhoja's
comment on L 12.
* See E&ika, ii. 3, 36.
B
258 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
* l By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
chandrayana fast, &c.,
" Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
mortifications." 1
" Recitation of texts
"
is the repetition of the syllable
Om, the g&yatri,&G. Now these mantras are of two kinds,
Vaidik and Tantrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds,
those chanted and those not chanted. Those chanted are
the sdmans; those not chanted are either in metre, i.e.
9
the richas, or in prose, i.e., the yaj^shi, as has been said
by Jaimini,
2 " Of these, that is a rich in which by the force
of the sense there is a definite division into pddas [or
portions of a verse] ; the name sdman is applied to chanted
portions ; the word ycijus is applied to the rest." Those
mantras are called Tantrik which are set forth in sacred
books that are directed to topics of voluntary devotion ;
8
and these are again threefold, as female, male, and neuter ;
as it has been said
" The mantras are of three kinds, as female, male, and
neuter :
" The female are those which end in the wife of fire
(i.e., the exclamation svdhd) ; the neuter those
which end in namas ;
" The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."
They are called "
all-powerful
"
(siddha) because they
counteract all defects in their performance, and produce
their effect even when the ordinary consecrating ceremonies,
as bathing, &c., have been omitted.
Now the peculiar
"
consecrating ceremonies
"
(saijisJcdra)
are ten, and they have been thus described in the draddtilaka
11 There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which
give to mantras efficacy :
1 This passage probably occurs in 9 Mlm&psa* Sutras, ii. I, 35-37.
the Td^awUkyctffUd of Yogi-yijfta-
* The tantras are not properly
valkya. See Colebrooke's Essays concerned with what is nil}a cr
(ed. 2), voL L p. 145, note. ^ natmttttfo; they are kdmya.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 259
" These mantras are thus made complete ; they are
thoroughly consecrated.
" The *
begetting,' the '
vivifying/ the '
smiting/ the
'
awakening/
" The '
sprinkling/ the *
purifying/ the '
fattening/
" The '
satisfying/ the '
illumining/ the '
concealing/
these 'are the ten consecrations of mantras.
" The '
begetting
'
(janana) is the extracting of the
mantra from its vowels and consonants. I
" The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
mantra, each united to Om,
"According to the number of the letters. This they
call the '
vivifying
*
(jivana).
"
Having written the letters of the mantra, let him
smite each with sandal-water,
"
Uttering at each the mystic
' seed ' of air.1 This is
called the '
smiting
'
(tddana).
"
Having written the letters of the mantra, let him strike
them with oleander flowers,
" Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
' awakening
'
( bodhana).
" Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
own special tantra,
"
Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the '
sprinkling'
(dbhisheka).
"
Having meditated on the mantra in his mind, let him
consume by the jyotir-mantra
"The threefold impurity of the mantra. This is the
'
purification
'
(vimali-karana).
" The utterance of the jyotir-mantra, together with Om,
and the mantras of Vyoman and Agni,
" And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a
bunch of ku6a grass,
" With the mystical seed of water 2
duly muttered, this
is held to be the '
fattening
'
(dpydyana).
1 The vija of air ia the syllable jaip*
3 The vija of water is the syllable barji.
260 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
" The satiating libation over the mantra with mantrahallowed
water is the '
satisfying
'
(tarpana).
" The joining of the mantra with Om and the ' seeds
'
of Maya 1 and Kama 2 is called its 'illumining'
(dipana).
*
"The non-publication of the mantra which is being
muttered this is its '
concealing
'
(gopana).
" These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in
"And the adept who practises them according to the
tradition obtains his desire ;
" And ruddha, kilita, vichhinna, supta, Sapta, and the rest,
" All these faults in the mantra rites are abolished by
these excellent consecrations."
But enough of this venturing to make public the tantra
mysteries connected with mantras, which has suddenly led
us astray like an unexpected Bacchanalian dance.i
The fhird form of practical yoga, "resignation to the
Lord" (tevara-pranidhdna^is the consigning all one's works,
whether mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the
Supreme Lord, the Supremely Venerable. As it has been
said
" Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
" That is all made over to thee ; I act as impelled by thee."
This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as " the
surrender of the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a
peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a
selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is sung in the Bhagavad
Gfta [ii. 47]
" Let thy sole concern be with action and never with
the fruits ;
" Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
attached to inaction."
The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action
has been declared by the venerable Nflakantha-bharatf
*
2V*9<fatt la the frantic dance of the god Siva and his votaries.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 261
"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but
vitiated by desire,
" Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk
which has been licked by a dog."
Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation,
and resignation is itself called yoga, because it is a
means for producing yoga, this being an instance of the
function of words called
"
superimponent pure Indication,"
as in the well-known example,
" Butter is longevity."
" Indication
"
is the establishing of another meaning of a word
from the incompatibility of its principal meaning with the
rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on
notoriety or on a motive. This has been declared in the
Kdvya-prakdSa [ii. 9]
"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection
with it, another meaning is indicated through notoriety
or a motive, this is
'
Indication/ the superadded
function of the word."
Now the word "this"t[i.e., tat in the neuter, which the
neuter yat in the extract would have naturally led us to
expect instead of the feminine sd] would have signified
some neuter word, like
"
implying," which is involved as a
subordinate part of the verb "is indicated." But sd is
used in the feminine [by attraction to agree with lakshand],
"this is indication," i.e. t the neuter "this" is put in the
feminine through its dependence on the predicate. Thia
has been explained by Kaiyata,
" Of those pronouns which
imply the identity of the subject and the predicate, the
former takes the gender of the former, the latter of the
latter." l Now "
expert (ku&ala) in business
"
is an example
of Indication from notoriety ; for the word kudala, which is
1
Literally "they take severally in providum, acutum, plenum rationia
order the gender of one of the two." et consilii, quern vocamuci hominem,"
Of. " Thebee ipsse quod Bceotiae caput die., Legg, \. 7.
eat," Livy, xlii. 44; "Animal hoc
262 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
significant in its parts by being analysed etymologically as
kuSarfi+ldti,
" one who gathers ku6a grass for the sacrifice,"
is here employed to mean "expert
"
through the relation of
a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment;
and this does not need a motive any more than
Denotation does, since each is the using a word in its recognised
conventional sense in accordance with the immemorial
tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said
" Some instances of ' indication ' are known by notoriety
from their immediate significance, just as is the
case in 'denotation* [the primary power of a
word]."
Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard
to any motive. Although a word, when it is employed,
first establishes its principal meaning, and then by that
meaning a second meaning is subsequently indicated, and
so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning and
not to the word ; still, since it is superadded to the word
which originally established the primary meaning, it is
called [improperly by metonymy] a function of the word.
It was with a view to this that the author of the KavyaprakaSa
used the expression, "This is 'Indication/ the
superadded function of the word." But the indication based
on a motive is of six kinds : I. inclusive indication,
1 as
"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men with the
lances "] ; 2. indicative indication, as
" the benches shout
"
[where the spectators are meant without the benches] ; 3.
qualified
*
superimponent indication, as " the man of the
Panjab is an ox" [here the object is not swallowed up in
the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive indication, as
"that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile] ;
5. pure superimponent indication, as "ghi is life ;" 6. pure
1 I have borrowed these terms from his stupidity ; pure indication
from Ballantyne's translation of the from any other relation, as cause and
Stfhitya-darpana. effect, &o., thus batter is the cause of
*
Qualified indication arises from longevity,
likeness, as the man is like an oz
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 263
introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This
has been all explained in the Kavya-praka^a [ii. 10-12].
But enough of this churning of the depths of rhetorical
discussions.
This yoga has been declared to have eight things ancillary
to it (anga) ; these are the forbearances, religious observances,
postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention,
contemplation, and meditation [ii. 29], Patanjali
says,
" Forbearance consists in not wishing to kill, veracity,
not stealing, continence, not coveting
"
[ii. 30]. *Keligious
observances are purifications, contentment, mortification,
recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
32] ; and theses are described in the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7,
36-38]-
"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for
attaining Brahman, practises, void of all desire,
"
Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
and non-coveting ;
"
Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
purification, contentment, and austerity,
"And then he should make his mind intent on the
Supreme Brahman.
" These are respectively called the five * forbearances '
and the five '
religious observances ;
'
"They bestow excellent rewards when done through
desire of reward, and eternal liberation to those
void of desire."
" A '
posture
'
is what is steady and pleasant
"
[ii. 46] ;
it is of ten kinds, as the padmay lhadra, mrat swastika,
dandaka, sopd&raya, paryanka, krauftchanishadana, ushfranishadana,
samasaijisthdna. Yajnavalkya has described
each of them in the passage which commences
"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two
hands, but in reverse order,
"
Having placed the soles of his feet, chief of Brdhmans,
on his thighs ;
" This will be tbepadma posture, held in honour by all"
264 THE SARVA-DARSANA3ANGRAHA.
The descriptions of the others must be sought in that
W0rk. When this steadiness of posture has been attained,
"
regulation of the breath
"
is practised, and this consists
in " a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration
"
[ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of the
external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within
the body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation
of activity in both movements. " But [it may be
objected] *his cannot be accepted as a general definition
of 'regulation of breath/ since it fails to apply to the
special kinds, as rechaka, ptiraka, and kumbhaka" We
reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
"
cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration"
is found in all these special kinds. Thus rechaka,
which is the expulsion of the air within the body, is
only that regulation of the breath, which has been mentioned
before as "expiration;" and ptiraka, which is
the [regulated] retention of the external air within the
body, is the "
inspiration ;
" and kumbhaka is the internal
suspension of breathing, when the vital air, called prdna,
remains motionless like water in a jar (kumbha). Thus
the "
cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration
"
applies to all, and consequently the objector's
doubt is needless.
Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two
ghatikds and a half 1 in each artery
2
(nddi), like the revolving
buckets on a waterwheel.3 Thus in the course
of a day and night there are produced 21,600 inspirations
i /.., an hour, a ghafikd being tras repeated with the offerings to
twenty-four
minutes. the seasons, is discussed. "The
9 The nddis or tubular vessels are seasons never stand still ; following
generally reckoned to be 101, with each other in order one by one, as
ten principal ones ; others make spring, summer, the rains, autumn,
sixteen principal ndfU. They seem the cold and the foggy seasons, each
taken afterwards in pain. consisting of two months, and so
9 Mddhava uses the same fllus- constituting the year of twelve
tration in his commentary on the months, they continue revolving
passage in the Aitareya Brahmana again and again like a waterwheel
(iiL 29), where the relation of the (ghatiyantravat) ; hence the c
vital airs, the seasons, and the man- never pause in their course."
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 265
and expirations. Hence it has been said by those who
know the secret of transmitting the mantras, concerning
the transmission of the ajapdmantra l
"Six hundred to GaneSa, six thousand to the selfexistent
Brahman,
" Six thousand to Vishnu, six thousand to
" One thousand to the Guru (Brihaspati), one thousand
to the Supreme Soul,
" And one thousand to the soul : thus I mak| over the
performed muttering."
So at the time of the passing of the air through the
arteries, the elements, earth, &c., must be understood,
according to their different colours, by those who wish to
obtain the highest good. This has been thus explained
by the wise
" Let each artery convey the air two ghafis and a half
from sunrise.
" There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries 2
to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.
" Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air
take place [in the hour],
" And all combined produce the total of twenty-one
thousand six hundred in a day and night
" The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six guna
letters,
8
" That time elapses while the air passes along in the
interval between two arteries.
" There are five elements in each of the two conducting
arteries,
1 This refers to a peculiar tenet of 8 I cannot explain this. We
Hindu mysticism, that each invo- might read guruvarndndm for gunaluntary
inspiration and expiration varndndip, as the time spent 'in
constitutes a mantra, as their sound uttering a guruvarna is a vipala,
expresses the word to'faup (Le., sixty of which make a pala, and two
hcn?uah\
*' I am he." This mantra and a half polos make a minute ; but
is repeated 21,600 times in every this seems inconsistent with the other
twenty-four hours ; it is called the numerical details. The whole pasajapdmantra,
i.e., the mantra uttered sage may be compared with the
without voluntary muttering. opening of the fifth act of the Mdla-
9
I.e., that which conveys the in- timddhava.
baled and the exhaled breath.
266 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
"They bear it along day and night; these are to be
known by the self-restrained.
" Fire bears above, water below ; air moves across ;
" Earth in the half-hollow ; ether moves everywhere.
"
They bear along in brder, air, fire, water, earth, ether ;
" This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
arteries.
" The palas
l of earth are fifty, of water forty,
" Of
fii^ thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.
" This is the amount of time taken for the bearing ; but
the reason that the two arteries are so disturbed
" Is that earth has five properties,
2 water four,
" Fire has three, air two, and ether one.
" There are ten palas for each property ; hence earth has
fifty palas,
" And each, from water downwards, loses successively.
Now the five properties of earth
" Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness ;
and these decrease one by one.
"The two elements, earth and water, produce their
fruit by the influence of '
quiet,'
" But fire, air, and ether by the influence of '
brightness/
'
restlessness/ and '
immensity.'
8
" The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
ether are now declared ;
" Of the first steadfastness of mind ; through the coldness
of the second arises desire;
"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth
fickleness of mind ;
" From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
impressions of latent merit.
" Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a
middle finger in each nostril,
1
Sixty polo* make a gkafikd
* Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, voL i.
(50 + 40 4- 30 + 20 + 10 = 150, t.e^ p. 256.
the polat in two and a half gha^ikdt Literally "the being erer more,"
or one hour).
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 267
"And the little finger and the one next to it in the
corners of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers
in the corners of his eyes,
" Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of
the earth and the other elements within him,
"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark
blue spots,
1 the ether has no symbol."
When the element air is thus comprehended and its
restraint is accomplished, the evil influence of works
which concealed discriminating knowledge is aestroyed
[ii. 52]; hence it has been said
"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
breath." 2
And again
" As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,
" So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation
of the breath." 3
Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "
forbearances"
and the other things subservient to concentration,
the devotee is to attain
"
self-mastery
"
(samyama)
4
and " restraint
"
(pratydhdra).
" Eestraint
"
is the accommodation
of the senses, as the eye, &c., to the nature of the
mind,6 which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature, while
they abandon all concernment with their own several objects,
which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the
senses are drawn to it (d + hri), away from them (pratipa).
" But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the
soul and not the senses, since these are only adapted for
external objects, and therefore have no power for this
supposed action ? How, therefore, could they be accommoi
For these colours cf. Chhdndogya 4 This is defined in the Yoga Sut,
Up., viii. 6; Maitri Up., vi. 30. Hi. 4, as consisting of the united
* This is an anonymous quotation operation towards one object of conin
Vyasa's Comm. temptation, attention, and medita-
* This seems a variation of Sloka tion.
7 of the Amrtia-ndda Up. See *
Lc., the internal organ (chitta).
Weber, Induchc Stud., iz. 26.
268 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
dated to the nature of the mind ?
" What you say is quite
true ; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having
an eye to their want of power for this, introduced the
words "as it were," to express "resemblance." " Restraint
is, as it were, the accommodation of the senses to the
nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with
each one's own object" [it 54]. Their absence of concernment
with their several objects for the sake of being
accommodated to the nature of the mind is this
" resemblance"
which we mean. Since, when the mind is restrained,
the eye, &c., are restrained, no fresh effort is to
be expected from them, and they follow the mind as bees
follow their king. This has been declared in the Vishnupurana
[vi 7, 43, 44]
" Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
ever tend to pursue external objects,
" Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable
to the mind ;
" By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
senses ;
"
If they are not controlled, the yogin will not accomplish
his yoga"
l
" Attention
"
(dhdranfi) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing
it from all other objects, on some place, whether
connected with the internal self, as the circle of the
navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of the sushumnd
artery, &c., or something external, as Prajapati, Vasava,
Hiranyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,
" ' Attention '
is the fixing the mind on a place
"
[iiL i] ;
and so, too, say the followers of the Puranas
" By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and
by restraint the senses,
" Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwellingplace
of his mind." *
i This couplet is corrupt in the *
Vishnu-pur., vl 7, 45, with one
text I follow the reading of the or two variations. The "perfect
Bombay edition of the Puraga (only asylum
"
is Brahman, formless or
reading in line 3 ckaldtmandm). possessing form.
THE PATANJALLDARSANA. 269
The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on
the object to be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous
thoughts, is
"
contemplation
"
(dhydna) ; thus it
is said,
" A course of uniform thought there, is
* contemplation
' "
[iii. 2]. Others also have said
" A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects
of that kind and desiring no other,
"This is 'contemplation/ it is thus effected by the
first six of the ancillary things." 9
We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed
the remaining eighth ancillary thing,
" meditation
"
(samddhi, see p. 243). By this practice of the ancillary
means of yoga, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted
earnestness, the "
afflictions
" which hinder meditation are
abolished, and through
"
exercise
" and "
dispassion
"
the
devotee attains to the perfections designated by the names
Madhumati and the rest.
" But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown
and monstrous words from the dialects of Karnata,
Gauda,1 and Lata ?
" 2 We do not want to frighten you,
but rather to gratify you by explaining the meaning of
these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.
i. The Madhumati perfection, this is th*e perfection of
meditation, called "the knowledge which holds to the
truth/* consisting in the illumination of unsullied purity
by means of the contemplation of
"
goodness," composed of
the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
"
passion
"
or
" darkness
"
abolished by
"
exercise/'
"
dispassion/' &c.
Thus it is said in the aphorisms,
" In that case there is
the knowledge which holds to the truth
"
[i. 48]. It holds
" to the truth," i.e., to the real ; it is never overshadowed
by error.
" In that case," i.e., when firmly established, there
arises this knowledge to the second yogin. For the yogins
1 The old name for the central and part of Guzerat ; it is the Aapucj
part of Bengal. of Ptolemy.
2 A country comprising Khandesh
270 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
or devotees to the practice of yoga are well known to be
of four kinds, viz.,
I. The prdthamaTcalpika, in whom the light has just
entered,
1 but, as it has been said,
" he has not won the light
which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts,
&c.;" 2. The madhubhtimika, who possesses the knowledge
which holds to the truth ; 3. The prajftdjyotis, who has
subdued the elements and the senses ; 4. The atikrdnta-
Ihdvantyn, who has attained the highest dispassion.
ii The Madhupratika perfections are swiftness like
thought, &c. These are declared to be " swiftness like
thought, the being without organs, and the conquest of
nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like thought" is the attainment
by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion, like
thought ;
" the being without bodily organs
" 2 is the attainment
by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers
directed to objects in any desired place or time ;
" the conquest
of nature
"
is the power of controlling all the manifestations
of nature. These perfections appear to the full
in the third kind of yogin, from the subjugation by him of
the five senses and their essential conditions.8 These perfections
are severally sweet, each one by itself, as even a
particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second state
is called Madhupratikd [i.e., that whose parts are sweet],
iii The Vi6ok& perfection consists in the supremacy
over all existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms,
" To him who possesses, to the exclusion of all other ideas,
the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness
and the soul, arises omniscience and the supremacy over
all existences" [iii 50]. The "supremacy over all existences
"
is the overcoming like a master all entities, as
these are but the developments of the quality of
"
goodness
"
in the mind [the other qualities of
"
passion
" and
1 In p. 178, 1. 2, infra, read pro- aspati explains it as " vidchdndm invfitto
for pravfitti. Cf. Yoga &, driydndrp, icaranabhdvah."
iii. 52 in Bhoja'a Comm. (50 in * Vyaea has karanapaflchakartipa-
Vyasa's Comm.) jaya; Vaohaspati explains rdpa by
a Bead i&aranabhdvah ; Vdoh- groha^ddi (of. iii 47).
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 271
" darkness
"
being already abolished], and exist only in
the form of energy and the objects to be energised upon.
1
The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
modes "
subsided,"
"
emerged," or " not to be named/1 2 is
"
omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36],
" Or
a luminous immediate cognition, free from sorrow 8 [may
produce steadiness of mind]."
iv. The SamsTcdra&shatd state is also called asamprajftdta,
i.e.,
" that meditation in which distinct recognition of an
object is lost;" it is that meditation " without a seed" [i.e.,
without any object] which is able to stop the "afflictions"
that produce fruits to be afterwards experienced in the
shape of rank, length of life, and enjoyment; and this
meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of all
modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
"
dispassion."
" The other kind of meditation [i.e., that
in which distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded
by that exercise of thought which produces the entire
cessation of modifications ; it has nothing left but the
latent impressions
"
[of thought after the departure of all objects]
[i.e., santskdraesha, i. 1 8]. Thus this foremost of men,
being utterly passionless towards everything, finds that the
seeds of the "afflictions," like burned rice-grains, are bereft
of the power to germinate, and they are abolished together
with the internal organ. When these are destroyed, there
ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded "
discriminative
knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
into the primal prakriti ; and the soul, which is the power
of pure intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and
escaped from all connection with the phenomenal understanding
(buddhi), or with existence, reaches "absolute
isolation" (kaivalya). Final liberation is describedby Patanjali
as two perfections :
" Absolute isolation is the repressive
absorption
4 of the 'qualities' which have consummated
1 I read in p. 179, L II, vyava-
* Viiokd.
fdyavyawateydtmdkdndm, fromVya- * This is explained by Vdchaspati,
sa's Gomm. " The latent impressions produced
8
/.e., as past, present, or future, by the states of the internal organ
272 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
the ends of the soul, i.e.t enjoyment and liberation, or the
abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature
"
[iv. 33], Nor should any one object, "Why, however,
should not the individual be born again even though this
should have been attained ?
"
for that is settled by the
well-known principle that "with the cessation of the
cause the effect ceases," and therefore this objection is
utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor decision
;
fc$ otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the
absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding
jewels, and such like absurdities ; and the popular proverb
for the impossible would become a possibility. And so,
too, says the Sruti, "A blind man found a jewel; one
without fingers seized it ; one without a neck put it on ;
and a dumb man praised it."
l
Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on
medicine, the Yoga-^astra consists of four divisions; as
those on medicine treat of disease, its cause, health, and
medicine, so the Yoga-6astra also treats of phenomenal
existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. This existence
of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from ;
the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our
having to experience this existence ; the absolute abolition
of this connection is the escape ; and right insight is the
cause thereof.2 The same fourfold division is to be similarly
traced as the case may be in other Sastras also. Thus all
has been made clear.
called vyutthdna (when it is chiefly ment of these '
qualities
' when one
characterised by '
activity,
' or ' dark- or another becomes '
predominant.
ness,
1
iii. 9) and nirodha (when it is 1 This curious passage occurs in
chiefly characterised by the quality the Taittiriya - Aranyaka i. 1 1, 5.
of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the M&dhava in his Comment, there
internal organ itself ; this in 'egoism* explains it of the soul, and quotes
(owwfci); 'egoism' in the 'merely the&vet&v. Up., iii. 19. Mddhava
once resolvable' (i.c., buddhi); and here takes avindat as "he pierced
buddhi into the 'irresolvable' (i.e., the jewel," but I have followed MB
prakriti)" Prafytoi consists of the correct explanation in the Gomm.
three '
qualities
' in equilibrium ; and * This is taken from V&haspati's
the entire creation, consisting of Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Of. the
causes and effects, is the develop-
" four truths
"
of Buddhism.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 273
The system of ankara, which comes next in succession,
and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained
by us elsewhere ; it is therefore left untouched
here.1 R B. C.
NOTE ON THE YOGA.
There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
Raivataka in M&gha (iv. 55) : *
"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in Benevolence
(maitri) and those other purifiers of the mind, having successfully
abolished the ' afflictions ' and obtained the * meditation possessed
of a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises
the essential difference between the quality Gooc^pess and the Soul,
desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."
It is curious to notice that maitri, which plays such a prominent
part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first start
towards his final goal. It is called a parikarman ( = prasadhaka) in
Vydsa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is borrowed by
Mdgha. Bhqja expressly says that this purifying process is an
external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself ; just as in
arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in themselves,
but as aids in effecting the more important calculations which
arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to Buddhism
in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.
x NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.
For the word vitdkopa in the original here (see also p. 242, 1. 3
infra), cf. Kusumanjali, p. 6, 1. 7.
1 This probably refers to the Pa&- tddhydya-bralimana, p. x), but, if
chada&L A Calcutta Pandit told this is the same as the vivaraname
that it referred to the Prameya- prameya-sangraha, it is by Bhdravivarana-
sangraha (cf. Dr. Burnett's tftirthavidydranya (see Dr. Burnett's
preface to his edition of the Deva- Cat of Tanjore MSS. p, 88).

APPENDIX.
ON THE TJPA'DEI (cf. supra, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).
[As the upddhi or " condition
"
is a peculiarity of
Hindu logic which is little known in JSurope, I have
added the following translation of the sections in the
Bhdshd-parichchheda and the Siddhanta-muktdvalf, which
treat of it.]
cxxxvii. That which always accompanies the major term
(sddhyd), but does not always accompany the middle
(hetu), is called the Condition (upddhi) ; its examination
is now set forth.
Our author now proceeds to define the upddhi or
condition,
1 which is used to stop our acquiescence in a
universal proposition as laid down by another person ;
" that which always accompanies," &c. The meaning of
this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
1 The upddhi is the " condition
" smoke. Similarly, the alleged arwhich
must be supplied to restrict gument that " B is dark because he
a too general middle term. If the is Mitrd's son
"
fails, if we can estabmiddle
term, as thus restricted, is lish that the dark colour of her forstill
found in the minor term, the mer offspring A depended not on
argument is valid ; if not, it fails, his being her son, but on her hap-
Thus, in " The mountain has smoke pening to have fed on vegetables
because it has fire
"
(which rests on instead of ghee. If we can prove
the false premiss that
"
all fire is ac- that she still keeps to her old diet,
companied by smoke "), we must add of course our amended middle term
"wet fuel" as the oonditionof "fire;" will still prove B to be dark, but
and if the mountain hat wet fuel not otherwise.
as well as fire, of course it will have
276 , APPENDIX.
accompanies that which is accepted as the major term,
does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent
puts forward as his middle term. [Thua in the false
argument,
" The mountain has smoke because it has fire,"
we may advance " wet fuel," or rather " the being produced
from wet fuel," as an up&dhi, since " wet fuel
"
is necessarily
found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire
is, as e.g., ^n a red-hot iron ball.]
"
But," the opponent may suggest,
"
if this were true,
would it not follow that (a) in the case of the too wide
middle term in the argument,
' This [second] son of Mitra's,
whom I have nofc seen, must be dark because he is Mitra's
son/ we could not allege
' the being produced from feeding
on vegetables
' 1 as a '
condition/ inasmuch as it does not
invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which
have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables ? (6)
Again, in the argument,
' The air must be perceptible to
sense 2 because it is the site of touch/ we could not allege
the '
possessing proportionate form ' as a ' condition ;
' because
perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the
soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the
*
possessing proportionate form ' does not invariably accompany
perceptibility], (c) Again, in the argument,
' Destruction
is itself perishable, because it is produced/ we could
not allege as a ' condition ' the '
being included in some
positive category of existence ' 8
[destruction being a
form of non-existence, called "
emergent/ 'dvairidbJidwa]9
1 The Hindus think that a child's fire, are *partavatt but by 1. 27 of
dark colour comes from the mother's these air is neither pratyaksha nor
living on vegetables, while its fair rtipavat.
colour comes from her living on * This condition would imply that
ghee. we could only argue from this middle
1 By Bhasha-parich. 6L 25, the term 44 the beingproduced "in cases of
four elements, earth, water, air, and positive existence, not non-existence.
APPENDIX. 277
inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent nonexistence,
and this certainly cannot be said to be included
in any positive category of existence."
We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning
of the definition is simply this, that whatever fact or
mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the
topic, the major term which our condition is invariably to
accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken
to determine the middle term which our said condition is
not invariably to accompany. Thus (a) the "
being produced
from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies
" a dark colour," as determined by the fact^that it is Mitr&'s
son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is
the alleged middle term of the argument; but the pretended
contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in
point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (6) Again,
"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies
perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing
perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably
accompany the alleged middle term " the being
the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the
fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.
1
(c) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable
from its being produced," the "being included in some
positive category of existence" invariably accompanies
the major term "perishable," when determined by the
attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
" antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since
nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]
But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this
kind in valid middle terms, i.e., there is nothing there
1 "
Soul," of course, is not external ; but our topic was not soul, but air.
278 APPENDIX.
which invariably accompanies the major term when
determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so
accompany the middle term when similarly determined*
This is peculiar to the so-called condition, [Should the
reader object that " in each of our previous examples there
has been given a separate determining mark or attribute
which was to be found in each of the cases included under
each; how then, in the absence of some general rule,
are we to mid out what this determining mark is to be in
any particular given case ?
" We reply that] in the case
of any middle term which is too general, the required
general rule consists in the constant presence of one or
other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects
thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site
of the major term, and also the site of the condition,
1 or
else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle
term, but excluding the said condition ;
2 and it will be
when the case is determined by the presence of one or
other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered
as
"
always accompanying the major term, and not
always accompanying the middle term/' 8
1 As, e.g., the mountain and though possessing the respective
MitrfiVs first eon in the two false middle terms "fire
" and " the being
arguments,
" The mountain has MitraVs offspring" do not possess the
smoke because it has fire
"
(when respective conditions " wet fuel
" or
the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball " the mother's feeding on vegehaa
no smoke), and "
Mitrtt'a first tables," nor, consequently, the
son A is dark because he is respective major terms ($ddkya)
Mitrtfs offspring
"
(when her second " smoke " and " dark colour."
eon B is fair). These two subjects
' This will exclude the objected
possess the respective tddKyat or case of "dark jars" in (a), as it
major terms "smoke" and "dark falls under neither of these two altercolour,"
and therefore are respeo- natives ; for, though they are the
tively the subjects where the con- sites of the addhya "dark colour/'
ditions "wet fuel" and "the they do not admit the condition
mother's feeding on vegetables" are "the feeding on vegetables," nor
to be respectively applied. the middle term "the being
*
As, w, the red-hot ball of iron Mitrf's son."
and Mitri's second son ; as these,
APPENDIX. 279
cxxzviii. All true Conditions reside in the same subjects with
their major terms;
l
and, their subjects being thus common,
the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
in regard to the Condition and the major term?
cxxxix. It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
middle term that the Condition has to be employed.
The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the
middle term being found too general in regftrd to the
condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard
to the major term ; and tence the use of having a condition
at all. (a.) Thus, where the condition invariably
accompanies an unlimited s
major term, we infer that the
middle term is too general in regard to the major term,
from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the
condition ; as, for example, in the instance " the mountain
has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the
"
fire
"
is too general in regard to "
smoke," since it is too
general in regard to
" wet fuel ;
"
for there is a rule that
what is too general for that which invariably accompanies
must also be too general for that which is invariably
accompanied. (6.) But where we take some fact or mark
to determine definitely the major term which the condition
is invariably to accompany,-^ there it is from the middle
term's being found too general in regard to the condition in
cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the
middle term is equally too general in regard to the major
term. Thus in the argument,
" B is dark because he is
Mitra's son/' the middle term "the fact of being Mitr&'s
1
/.&, wherever there is fire pro- ball of iron), there the upddki also
duced by wet fuel there is smoke, is not applicable.
The condition and the major term *
/.e., one which require* no deterare
''equipollent"in their extension, mining fact or mark, such as the
3 Where the hetu is found and three objected arguments required
not the tddhya (as in the red-hot in 137.
28o APPENDIX.
son
"
is too general in regard to the sddhya,
" dark colour,"
because it is too general in regard to the upddhi, "feeding
on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitra's second son
[Mitra's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and
Mitra herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his
birth].
[But an objector might here interpose,
"
If your definition
of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condition
whicft fulfils your definition can always be found
even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in
the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because
it has smoke/ we may assume as our pretended condition
'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;'
since this certainly does not always 'accompany
the middle term/ inasmuch as it is not found in the
mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be ;
and yet it apparently does '
always accompany the major
term/ since in every other known case of fire we certainly
find it, and as for the present case you must remember
that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point
in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take?such
a condition as "the being always found elsewhere than in
the subject or minor term "
(unless this can be proved by
some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute) ;
because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argumeg^
cugogyince your antagonist that this condition does
ay the major term [since he naturally
^ present case is exactly one in point
adly, because it is self-contradictory
[
condition may be equally employed
argument].
L it by direct sense-evidence, then
Kind elsewhere than in the subject"
APPENDIX. 281
becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory
the false argument which a disputant tries to establish].
Thus, in the illusory argument
" the fire must be non-hot
because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
"
the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we
can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,
1
[thus the
up&dhi here is a means of overthrowing the false argument].
Where the fact of its always accompanyinj the major
term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a
disputed condition.2 But "the being found elsewhere
than in the subject
"
can never be employed even as a disputed
condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
of logical controversy.
8
E. B. 0.
1 The disputant says, "Tire must
be non-hot because it is artificial."
"Well," you rejoin, "then it must
only be an artificiality which is always
found elsewhere than in fire,
i.e. t one which will not answer
your purpose in trying to prove
your point." Here the proposed
upddhi "the being always found
elsewhere than in fire
" answers to
the definition, as it does not always
accompany the hetu "
possessing artificiality,"
but it does always accompany
the sddhya
"
non-hot," as fire is
proved by sense-evidence to be hot.
2 As in the argument,
" The earth,
&c., must have had a maker because
they have the nature of effects,"
where the Theist disputes the Atheistic
condition " the being produced
by one possessing a body." See
Kusumdnjali, v. 2.
8 In fact, it would abolish all disputation
at the outset, as each
party would produce a condition
which from his own point of view
would reduce his opponent to silence.
In other words, a true condition
must be consistent with either
party's opinions. 


THE END.




















Om Tat Sat

  End


(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to
Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)

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