SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY -9

THE

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA

OR

REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS

OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY

MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.

TRANSLATED BT

K B. COWELL,  

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 199

ledge, it is not produced by any other cause (as

"

defect,"

&c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in

full: Eight knowledge is not produced by any other

Instrumental causes than those of knowledge, while, at

the same time, it is produced by these, because it is not

the site of wrongness of knowledge, just like a jar.

1 NOT

can Udayana's

2 argument be brought forward as establishing

the dependence of authoritativeness on something

external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the

equally potent contradictory argument.

"

Eight knowledge

is not produced by any cause which is other than

the causes of knowledge and is also other than 'defect,'

8

from the very fact of its being knowledge like wrong

knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can arise from

the causes of knowledge per set it would be a needless complexity

to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether

you call it a guna or the absence of a " defect

"

(dosha)*

" But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of

wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence

must be a cause of right knowledge ?

" We meet this,

however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only

an indirect and remote cause, as it only acts negatively by

preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said

1 Wrongness of knowledge (apraa

I suppose this is the argument

mdtva) can only reside in knowledge given at the close of the previous

as a characteristic or quality thereof ; long purva-paksha.

it cannot reside in a jar. The jar

8 These words " and is other than

is, of course, produced by other in- defect

"

(doska - vyatirikta) are, of

etrumental causes than those of course, meaningless as far as right

knowledge (as, e.^r., the potter's stick, knowledge is concerned; they are

&c.)> but it is not produced by these simply added to enable the author

other causes in combination with to bring in "wrong knowledge

"

aa

being also produced by the instru- an example. Wrong knowledge is

mental causes of knowledge (with caused by the causes of knowledge

which it has nothing directly to do) ; plus

" defect ;

"

right knowledge by

and so by a quibble, which is less the former alone,

obvious in Sanskrit than in English,

4 The Nyaya holds that wrong

this wretched sophism is allowed to knowledge is produced by a "defect,"

Emuster. The jar is not produced- as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and

tny- other - instrumental - causes- right knowledge by a guna or " virthose

-of- knowledge,-while-at- tue" (as the direct contact of the

the same time it - is - produced - by- healthy organ with a true object), or

these. by the absence of a " defect/

200 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

"Therefore We reasonably conclude from the presence

otgunas the absence of '

defects/ 1 from their absence

the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness,

2 and from this the general conclusion."^

(6.) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge

is produced by the same causes only which make

us perceive the first knowledge

*

[sc. the eye, mind, &c.]

Nor can you object that this view is precluded, because it

would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt ;

for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although

all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there

is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause,

as a "

defect," &c.

As for your argument [0 Jfaiyayika ! given supra, in p.

198, lines 17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative

proof by itself or not ? If it is, it proves too much

[for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its

own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to

be independent of such] ; and if it is not, we should have a

case of regressus in infinitum, for it will want some other

proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its

turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

As for the argument urged by Udayana 5 in the Kusumdnjali,

when he tries to establish that immediate and

vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty

as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him

acting :

" Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that

1 The guna (or ^\rLtmj <$) of a jar," the second knowledge is the

an organ is not properly a cause of cognition of this perception in the

pramd but rather doshdbhdva-bod- form " I perceive the jar ;

" and

kaka. simultaneously with it arises the

1

Scil. "doubtful" (tandigdha] and cognition of the truth of the percep- " ascertained non-authoritativeness" tion, i.e., its authoritativeness or

(ntichitdprdrndnya). prdmdnya.

1

Utoarga is a general conclusion * This seems to be a quotation of

which is not necessarily true in every TJdayana's own words, and no doubt

particular case ; but here it means is taken from his very rare prose

the conclusion that "right knowledge commentary on the Kusumdfijali, a

has no special causes but the common specimen of which I printed in the

causes of knowledge, the eye," &c. preface to my edition. This passage

* The first knowledge fc " This is must come from the fifth book (v. 6 ?)

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 201

of the wish,1 wish on the knowledge that the thing wished

for is a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is

only ascertained by an inference based on some 'sign* which

1

proves that the thing is closely connected with the wishedfor

end, and this inference depends on the things being

in direct contact with the agent's senses ; but throughout

the whole series of antecedent steps the Mimamsa idea of

the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as

a cause of action." All this appears to us simple bluster,

like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all

his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold

under his armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing

is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge

recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which

causes the definite volition to arise at all ; and in this we

can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception

of authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently

pretended to deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in

any case from doubt, then, as it might always arise so in

every given case, all ascertainment of authoritativeness

would be useless ; and as the very existence of what is

unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness

would have to be considered as dead and buried!

But enough of this prolix controversy ; since it has been

said

" Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which

(authoritativeness) presented itself as representing

a real fact, may be overthrown by the perception

of a '

defect/ which perception is produced by some

sign that proves the discrepancy between the cognition

and the fact." *

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved

and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the

following divergency between the two great Mfmdmsa

1 I read tat-prdchuryam for tat- authontativeneas is self-proved, nonprdchurye

in p. 134, line 7. authoritativeness is proved from

1 This stanza affirms that accord- something else (as inference, &c.)

fag to the Mim4rp4 school, while

202 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

schools] : The Veda is composed of three portions, respectively

called "hymns

"

(mantra), "explanatory passages"

(arthavdda), and "

injunctions

"

(vidhi) ; and by

"

injunction"

we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires 1

heaven sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here ta, the affix

of the third person singular, denotes an enjoining power,

which is

" coloured

"

[or rendered definite] by the meaning

of the root, according to the opinion of the followers of

Bhatta Kumarila, who maintain that words signify

l something

definite by themselves [apart from the sentence].

The followers of Guru Prabhakara, on the contrary, hold

that the whole sentence is a command relating to the

sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an

action or something to be done.2 Thus all has been made

plain. E. B. C.

1 I take in/utpatti here as used for i.e., the bovine genus as connected

iMi ; siddhe means ghafddau. with "

bringing." We cannot have

2 These are the two great Mim- a case of a noun without some

drpsii schools. The former, called governing verb, and vice versd. Cf.

abhihitdnvaya-vddinah, hold (like Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce

the Naiydyika school) that words by (Comparative Philology, page 136) :

themselves can express their sepa-

" We do not think in words but in

rate meaning by the function abhidkd sentences; hence we may assert

or " denotation ;

" these are subse- that a living language consists of

quently combined into a sentence sentences, not of words. But a

expressing one connected idea. The sentence is formed not of single

\B,tteT) ca^ledanvitdbhidhdna-vddinahJ independent words, but of words

hold that words only express a mean* which refer to one another in a paring

as parts of a sentence and gram- ticular manner, like the correspondmatically

connected with each other ; ing thought, which does not consist

they only mean an action or some- of single independent ideas, but of

thing connected with an action. In such as, connected, form a whole, and

gam dnaya, gam does not properly determine one another mutually."

mean gotva, but dnayandnvita-gotva,

( 203 )

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PiNINI-D ARCANA.1

IF any one asks,

" Where are we to learn how to separate

a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the

original root and this is an affix/

"

may we not reply that

to those who have drunk the waters of Patanjali this

question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that

the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of

the separation of the original roots and affixes ? Thus the

very first sentence of the venerable Patanjali, the author

of the " Great Commentary/' is

" atha tialddmtddsanam"

"Now comes the exposition of words." The particle atha

(" now ") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement

; and by the phrase,

"

exposition of words," is

meant the system of grammar put forth by Panini. Now

a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies

that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or

not ; and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed

the particle atha, since this particle implies that what

follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion

of everything else.

The word "

exposition

"

(anuSdsana), as here used, implies

that thereby Vaidic words, such as those in the line

Sarji no dewtr abhishfaye? &c., and secular words as ancillary

to these, as the common words for

"

cow,"

"

horse/'

"

man,"

- * Mdhava uses this peculiar term is eternal He therefore treats of

because the grammarians adopted sphofa here, and not in his Jaimini

and fully developed the idea of the chapter.

P(irva-Mim&ps& school that sound a

Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.

204 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

"

elephant,"

"

bird," &c., are made the subject of the exposition,

i.e., are deduced from their original roots and properly

formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into

root and affix. We must consider that the compound in <

this phrase represents a genitive of the object \abddnudsanam

standing for Sdbdasydnu4dsanam\t and as there is a

rule of Panini (Jcarmani cha, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits

composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede

that the phrase Sdbddmi^dsanam does not come before

us as a duly authorised compound.

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application

of the alleged rule of Panini], for we hold that, by

ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed

in one and the same sentence in connection with

a word ending with a krit affix, there the object alone can

be put in the genitive and not the agent ;

x this limitation

arising from our taking ubhayaprdpti in the siitra as a

lahuvrflii compound.

2 Thus we must say,

" Wonderful is

the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We

may, however, remark in passing that some authors do

maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the

genitive (as well as the object) ; hence we find it stated in

the KaJika Commentary :

" Some authors maintain that

there should be an option in such cases without any distinction,

and thus they would equally allow such a construction

as ' the exposition of words of the teacher ' or '

by

the- teacher/

"

Inasmuch, however, as the words of the

phrase in question really mean that the "

exposition

"

intended relates to words and not to things, and since this

can be at once understood without any mention of the

1 Sabddnuid&ana, if judged by the we cannot say dfckaryo godoho tilahiapparent

sense of Papini, ii. 2, 14, tena gopdlena (as it would violate ii.

would be a wrong compound ; but 2, 14), neither can we say dtcharyo

it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be gavdrp, doko 'tikshitatya gopdlatya (as

interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, it would violate ii. 3, 66).

whence it follows that the compound * That is, the ubhayaprdpti of ii.

would only be wrong if there were 3, 66, is a bakuvriki agreeing with

an agent expressed at wett as an *r#t in ii. 3, 65. These points are

object, i&, if such a word as dcikdr- all discussed at some length in the

yena followed. In the example given, Commentaries on Panini

THE PANINI-DARSANA. 205

agent, i.e., the teacher, any such mention would be plainly

superfluous; and therefore as the object and the agent

are not both expressed in one and the same sentence, this

is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming

under ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of

quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an

agent or an object, in connection with a word ending with

a krit affix, is to be put in the genitive [which in this

instance is expressed by the tatpurusha compound] ; and

the compound in question will be strictly analogous to

such recognised forms as idkma-pravraSchana, palda-dtana,

&C.1 Or we might argue that the genitive case

implied in this shashtMtatpurusha is one of the class

called

"

residual," in accordance with Panini's rule (ii. 3,

50),

" Let the genitive be used in the residuum/' [i.e., in

the other constructions not provided for by special rules] ;

2

and in this way we might defend the phrase against the

opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your

alleged

' residual genitive

' could be assumed everywhere,

and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition

in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly

nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartrihari

in his Vdkyapadiya has shown that these rules are mainly

useful where the question relates to the accent? To this

effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamana

" In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,

" But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be

employed.

"Thus have they explained the meaning of Panini's

siitras, since

"He himself uses such phrases as janikartufy and tatprayojakah"

4

1 These actually occur in the Com- 4 These compounds occur in P6-

mentaries to Pdnini, ii 2, 8 ; iii 3, nini's own sutras (i 4, 30, and i. 4,

117, &c. 55), and would violate his own rule

* This takes in all cases of rela- m ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret

tion, sambandha (i.e., ehath(ki-6am- the latter without some such saving

bandha). modification as thatht/ii icthe.

1 As in such rules as vl 2, 139.

ao6 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence

in question (of the Mahabhdshya) is that "it is to be

understood that the rules of grammar which may be

taken as a synonym for ' the exposition concerning words '<

are now commenced."

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding

this intended meaning, it would have been better to have

said 'now comes grammar/ as the words 'now comes

the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of

letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since

the employment of such a word as Salddnu^dsanam,

the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its

etymology, proves that the author intends to imply an

end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate

study (aiiga) to the Veda.1 Otherwise, if there were no

such end set forth, there would be no consequent application

of the readers to the study of grammar. Nor may

you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced

by the injunction for study,

" the Veda with its six subordinate

parts must be read as a duty without any (special)

end,"

2

because, even though there be such an injunction,

it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if

no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an

aiiga of the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after

reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and

secular by common life,

" And therefore grammar is useless ?

"

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an

anga of the Veda that they applied themselves to its

study. So in the same way the students of the present

day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either.

It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set

forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish

1 The very word tabda in fabdd- 2 Compare Max Miiller, Sand.

fttt&tatnam implies the Veda, since Liter., p. 1 13. It is quoted as from

this ia pre-eminently tabda. the Veda in the Mahdbhashya,

THE PANINI-DARSANA. 207

that grammar is an anga of the Veda. If, when the end

is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then,

being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of

> secular words, they would become involved in sin in the

course of sacrificial acts, and would consequently lose their

religious merit. Hence the followers of sacrifice read,

" One

who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word,

should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatf." Now it

is to declare this end which establishes that it is an aiiga

of the Veda that he uses the words atha abddnudsanam

and not atha vydkaranam. Now the rules of grammar

must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's

pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice

undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in the

same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction

concerning words, i.e., propriety of speech. "But," an objector

may say, "will not the desired end be still un attained

for want of the true means to it ? Nor can it be said

that reading the Veda word by word is the true means ;

for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words,

since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and

improper words.1 Thus there is a tradition that Brihaspati

for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study

of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda

is read word by word,2 and still he came not to the end.

Here the teacher was Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and

the time of study a thousand years of the gods ; and yet

the termination was not reached, how much less, then,

in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is

rendered efficient by four appropriate means, reading,

understanding, practising, and handing it on to others ;

but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare

time of reading ; therefore the reading word by word is

not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently,

1 In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele danda in line 3 after bhavet, and

insert it in line 4 after fabddndm.

1 AM in the so-called pada text.

208 THE SARVA-DAkSANA-SANGRAHA.

as we said at first, the desired end is not established."

We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the

knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading

word by word. And again, since general and special rules*

apply at once to many examples, when these are divided

into the artificial parts called roots, &c. (just as one cloud

rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can

easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,

for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, i), karmani, the

affix an is enjoined after a root when the object is in

composition with it; and by this rule we learn many

words, as kumlhakdra,

" a potter," kdndaldva,

" a cutter of

steilis," &c. But the supplementary special rule (iii 2, 3),

dto 'nupasarge kah, directing that the affix ka is to be used

after a root that ends in long d when there is no upasarga,

shows how impracticable this reading word by word would

be [since it would never teach us how to distinguish an

upasarga].

" But since there are other angas, why do you

single out grammar as the one object of honour ?

" We

reply, that among the six angas the principal one is

grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal is

sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said

"

Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious

austerities,

" The wise have called grammar the first anga of the

Veda."

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the

direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is

the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been

said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary

[quoting a Varttika],

" the end (or motive) is preservation,

inference, scripture, facility, and assurance." 1 Moreover

prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word ;

thus Katyayana has said, "There is prosperity in the

employment of a word according to the &dstra; it is equal

to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said

1 See Ballantyne'e MaMbhdtkya, pp. 12, 64.

THE PANINI-DARSANA. 209

that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly

used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow/' Thus

(they say)

"

They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness,

in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech ;

"But those who use such false forms as achikramata

must trudge thither on foot." l

Nor need you ask " how can an irrational word possess

such power ?

"

since we have revelation declaring that it

is like to the great god. For the &ruti says,

" Four are its

horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,

roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters

mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great commentator

thus explains it : The " four horns "

are the four kinds

of words nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its

" three feet

" mean the three times, past, present, and future,

expressed by the tense- affixes, lat, &c. ; the " two heads,"

the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished

as the "manifested" and the " manifester ;" its

" seven hands "

are the seven case affixes, including the

conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed

in the three organs the chest, the throat, and the head.

The metaphor "bull" (vrishabha) is applied from its pouring

forth (varshana), i.e., from its giving fruit when used with

knowledge.

"

Loudly roars," i.e., utters sound, for the root

ru means " sound ;

"

here by the word " sound

"

developed

speech (or language)

2

is implied ;

" the great god enters

mortals," the "great god," i.e., speech, enters mortals,

i.e., men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is

declared the likeness [of speech]

3 to the supreme Brahman.

The eternal word, called sp?io{a, without parts, and the

cause of the world, is verily Brahman ; thus it has been

1 Achikramata seems put here as Bhartrihari which immediately fola

purposely false form of the fre- low.

qualitative of kram for achankra- * One would naturally supply tabmyata.

dcuya after sdmyam, but the Mahil-

9 Or it may mean " the developed bhashya has nah tdmyam (see Balnnivene."

Compare the lines of lantyne's ed., p. 27).

2io THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

declared by Bhartrihari in the part of his book called the

Brahmakanda

"

Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible

essence of speech, f

" Which is developed in the form of things, and whence

springs the creation of the world."

" But since there is a well-known twofold division of

words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold

division ?

" We reply, because this, too, is well known.

Thus it has been said in the Prakirnaka

" Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold

or a fivefold,

" Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix,

and the like."

Helaraja interprets the fivefold division as including

Jcarmapravachaniyas.

1 But the fourfold division, mentioned

by the great commentator, is proper, since karmapravachanfyas

distinguish a connection produced by a

particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular

kind of connection and so marking out a particular

kind of verb, they are really included in compounded

prepositions (upasargas)?

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an

eternal sound called sp?io{a? This we do not concede,

since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We

reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there

is one word "

cow," since all men have the cognition of a

word distinct from the various letters composing it. You

cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction,

that this perception of the word is a false perception,

1

/.e., prepositions used separately ample, S'dJcalyasamhitdm anu prdas

governing cases of their own, and varshat, "he rained after the Sikalya

not (as usually in Sanskrit) in com- hymns," anu implies an understood

position. verb nitamya,

"

having heard," and

* The karmapravackaniya* imply this verb shows that there is a relaa

verb other than the one expressed, tion of cause and effect between the

and they are said to determine the hymns and the rain. This anu is

relation which is produced by this said to determine this relation,

understood verb. Thus in the exTHE

PANINI-DARSANA. 211

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as

sphota, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition

of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its

Cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination,

since it breaks down before either horn of the following

dilemma : Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition

of the meaning in their united or their individual

capacity ? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only

for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole

at all ; and not the second, since the single letters have no

power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the

word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative

other than their single or united capacity ; and therefore

it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the

letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there

must be a sphota by means of which arises the knowledge

of the meaning ; and this sphofa is an eternal sound, distinct

from the letters and revealed by them, which causes

the cognition of the meaning.

" It is disclosed (sphutyate)

or revealed by the letters/' hence it is called sphota, as

revealed by the letters ; or " from it is disclosed the

meaning," hence it is called sphota as causing the knowledge

of the meaning, these are the two etymologies to explain

the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by

the worshipful Patanjali in the great Commentary,

" Now

what is the word ' cow '

gauh f It is that word by which,

when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous

cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This

is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage commencing,

" Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct

from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if

the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing

the second and following ones [as the first would

have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending,

" The,

V&kyapadfya has established at length that it is the sphota

which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound,

expresses the meaning."

l

1 See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.

212 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

Here, however, an objector may urge,

" But should we

not rather say that the sphota has no power to convey the

meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives,

for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself

manifested or unmanifested ? Not the latter, because it

would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying

the meaning always produced, since, as sphota is

supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an everpresent

cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect

could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this

fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that sphota

conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well,

then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting

power separately or combined? Whichever alternative

you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against

the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will

have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this

power to manifest splwta. This has been said by Bhatta

in his Mfmamsa-loka-varttika

" The grammarian who holds that sphota is manifested

by the letters as they are severally apprehended,

though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby

escape from a single difficulty."

The truth is, that, as Panini (L 4, 14) and Gotama (Sfrt.

ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a

word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters

which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension

of the conventional association of ideas which they

help.

1 If you object that as there are the same letters in

rasa as in sara, in nava as in vana, in dtind as in nadi, in

mdra as in rdma, in raja as in jdra, &c., these several

pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we

reply that the difference in the order of the letters will

produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said

by Tautatita

1 This is not very clear, the anu and so imply the successive order of

in anugraha might mean kramtna, the letters.

THE PANINI-DARSANA. 213

" As are the letters in number and kind, whose power

is perceived in conveying any given meaning of

a word, so .will be tl^e meaning which they

convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the

same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot

be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis

of the existence of a separate thing called sphota is unnecessary,

as we have proved that it is the letters which

express the word's meaning [your arguments against our

view having been shown to be irrelevant]."

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's

catching at a straw ;

1 for either of the alternatives is impossible,

whether you hold that it is the single letters or

their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word.

It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate

letters, without any one pervading cause,

2 could never

produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of

separate flowers would form a garland without a string.

Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately

pronounced and done with, cannot combine into

an aggregate. For we use the term "

aggregate

" where a

number of objects are perceived to be united together in

one place ; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an

Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant,

a man, a horse, &c., seen together in one place ; but these

letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are

severally produced and pass away; and even on the

hypothesis of their having a "

manifesting

"

power, they

can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only

manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously.

Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters,

because this would involve a -"mutual dependence" (or

reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters

would only become a word when their power to convey

1 In the Calcutta edition, p. 142,

* In p. 142, line 3, I add vind

line n,I read kaLpam for kalpanam. after nimittwn.

214 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,

their power to convey one meaning would only follow

when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore,

since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning,

we must accept the hypothesis of sphota.

" But even

on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called

sphota which expresses the meaning, the same untenable

alternative will recur which we discussed before; and

therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that * the

dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house

close by/

" 1

This, however, is only the inflation of the

world of fancy from the wide difference between the two

cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,

reveals the invisible sphota, and each successive letter

makes this sphota more and more manifest, just as the

Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure

by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not

clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested

at the final examination. This is in accordance

with the authoritative saying (of the teacher) :

" The seed

is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened

by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained

simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore,

since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that the

letters of a word [being many and successive] cannot

manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the

very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from

such and such a word" we are forced to assume the existence

2 of an indivisible sphota as a distinct category, which

has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this

has been established in the discussion (in the Mahabhashya)

on "

genus

"

(j&tt), which aims at proving that the meaning

of all words is ultimately that summum genus, i.e., that

1 The gha^ta is the place where house just as day dawns and is thus

dues and taxes are collected. Some caught. Hence the proverb means

one anxious to evade payment is wid^ydfiddhi.

going by a private way by night,

a In p. 143, line 13, Ireadapftofabut

he arrives at the tax-collector's Icabkdvam for sphofdbhdvam.

THE PANINI-DARSANA. 215

existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the

supreme reality

l

(Brahman).

" But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then

all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning ;

and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing

result in demonstrating the uselessness of human

language as laboriously using several words to no purpose

at the same time ! Thus it has been said

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same

time is to be condemned; for they only express

their meaning in turn and not by combination."

" Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth

the trouble of refuting."

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for

just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects

which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the summum

genus, Brahman, is variously cognised through its

connection with different things, as severally identified

with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional

words which arise from the different species,

2 as

cow, &c., these being "existence" (the summum genus) as

found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we

have the following authoritative testimony

" Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally

joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is

seen as possessing that colour."

And so it has been said by Hari,

" Existence [pure and

simple] being divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason

of its connection with different subjects, is called this or

that species, and on it all words depend. This they call

the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence,

this the great soul ; and it is this which the affixed

tvat talt &c., express" (Panini v. I, 119).

1 Of. Ballantyne's TransL of the individual (vyaleti) ; the Nyaya holds

Hahibhashya, pp. 9, 32. that a word means an individual as

3 The Mimainsa holds that a word distinguished by such and such a

means the genus (jdti) and not the genus (or species).

216 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

" Existence

"

is that great summum genus which is found

in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects

in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow,"

"horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the

species

" cow " and " horse

"

(gotva and aSvatva) are not

really new subjects, but each is

" existence

"

as residing

in the subject

" cow " and "

horse." Therefore all words, as

expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one

summum genus existence, which is differentiated by the

various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence

"existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (prdtipadika).

A " root

"

is sometimes defined as that which expresses

IMva ;

l now, as Ihdva is

"

existence," the meaning of a

root is really existence.2 Others say that a root should be

defined as that which expresses

" action

"

(kriyd) ; but here

again the meaning of a root will really be "existence,"

since this

" action

"

will be a genus, as it is declared to

reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common

definition of a genus, in the line

" Others say that action (Jcriyd) is a genus, residing in

many individuals."

So, too, if we accept Panini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let

the affixes tva and tal come after a word [denoting anything],

when we speak of the nature (Ihdva) thereof," it is

clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in tva

or td [as ativatva and asvatd] are used in the sense of bhdva,

that they do express

"

existence." " This is pure existence

"

from its being free from all coming into being or

ceasing to be ; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are

developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space,

time, or substance: this existence is called "the great

soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two Jcdrikds quoted

above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on samlandha

[in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all

i Of. Big-Veda PratiS. xil. 5. monly received definitions of some

9 He here ifl trying to show that grammatical terms,

his view is confirmed by the comTHE

PANINI-DARSANA. '

217

words is that something whose characteristic is perfect

knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

"The true Eeality is ascertained by its illusory forms ; the

true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises

; as the object,

' Devadatta's house/ is apprehended

by a transitory cause of discrimination,

1 but by the word

'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."

2

So, too, the author of the Mahabhashya, when explaining

the Varttika,

3 " a word, its meaning, and its connection

being fixed," in the passage beginning

" substance is eternal,"

has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman,

expressed by the word "substance" and determined by

various unreal 4 conditions [as

" the nature of horse," &c.]

According to the opinion of Vajapyayana, who maintains

that all words mean a genus, words like "cow;

"

&c.,

6 denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in

different substances ; and when this genus is apprehended,

through its connection with it we apprehend the particular

substance in which it resides. Words like

"

white," &c.,

denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through

the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and

through the connection with the quality we apprehend

the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing

particular names, in consequence of the recognition

that "

this is the same person from his first coming into

existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference

produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence,

&c.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadattahood,

6 &c. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words

expressing

" action

"

a genus is denoted ; this is the rootmeaning,

as in patiiati,

" he reads," &c., since we find here

a meaning common to all who read,

1 Since Devadatta ia only its 4 In p. 145, line 8, read tuatya

transient owner. for awattka.

a So by the words "horse," "cow," * We have here the well-known

&c., Brahman is really meant, the four grammatical categories, jdti,

one abiding existence. ffuna, dravya or sanjnd, and kriyd.

Of. Ballantyne's Mabdbh&hya,

' But cf. Siddb. Mukttv., p. 6,

pp. 44, 50. line 12.

218 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

In the doctrine of Vyadi, who maintained that words

meant individual things [and not classes or genera], the

individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily

denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic

mark] ; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of

"

indefiniteness,"

and "

wandering away from its proper subject."

*

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Panini;

since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means

the genus, where he says that " when the singular is used

to express the class the plural may be optionally used "

[as in the sentence,

" A Brahman is to be honoured," which

may equally run,

" Brahmans are to be honoured "] ; while

in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the

individual thing, where he says,

" In any individual case

there is but one retained of things similar in form "

[i.e. y

tke dual means Kama and Eama, and the plural means

Rama, and Eama and Eama; but we retain only one,

adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being

adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories without

being compromised. Therefore both theories are in a

sense true ;

2 but the real fact is that all words ultimately

mean the Supreme Brahman.

As it has been said

" Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words,

one true universal meaning, identical with the one

existent, shines out in many forms as the thing

denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussing sambandha, thus

describes the nature of this true meaning

1 Thus we read in the Siddhdnta should not include ; if it is held to

Muktavali, p. 82, that the Mim&nsa* mean many individuals, it will have

holds that a word means the genus an endless variety of meanings and

and not the individual, since other- be " indefinite."

wise there would be vyabhickdra and * This seems the meaning of the

dnantya (cf. also Mahesachandra text as printed tasmdt dvayarji tat-

Nyayaratna's note, KaVya-prak&a, yam, but I should prefer to read

p. 10). If a word is held to mean conjecturally tasmdd advayaqi satonly

one individual, there will be the yam, "therefore non-duality is the

first fault, as it will "wander away" truth."

and equally express others which it

THE PANINI-DARSANA. 219

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and

the perception [which unites them] are insusceptible

of doubt,

1 that only is called the truth by

those who know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says

" That which remains as the Eeal during the presence

of modification, as the gold remains under the

form of the earring, that wherein change comes

and goes, that they call the Supreme Nature."

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is

maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality

of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all

words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation

of the two, while .they are thus ultimately identical, varies

as does the relation of the two souls." 2

The meaning of this Karika is that Brahman is the

one object denoted by all words ; and this one object has

various differences imposed upon it according to each

particular form; but the conventional variety of the

differences produced by these illusory conditions is only

the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state ;

but through the power of

" concealment " 3

[exercised by

illusion] at the time of the conventional use of words a

manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during

sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedanta lore tell us

"As all the extended world of dreams is only the

development of illusion in me, so all this extended

waking world is a development of illusion likewise."

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus

known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the

individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished,

1 Sett, they can only be the absolute ' The Sarjivriti of the text seems

Brahman who alone exists. to correspond to the dvarana so fre-

1 Scil. the individual soul (jiva) quent in Veddnta books,

and Brahman.

220 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the

abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the

text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman

attains to the Supreme Brahman." 1 And thus we establish

the fact that the "

exposition of words "

is the means

to final bliss.

Thus it has been said

"

They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine

of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences,

the science of sciences." 2

And so again

" This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder

of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the

travellers to emancipation."

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sastra of

grammar should be studied as being the,means for attaining

the chief end of man. E. B. C.

1 This passage is quoted in the Upanishad, i 3, i, where it is ex-

Maitri Upanishad, vi. 22. plained by Sarpkara as vidydsv adhi

3 Adhividyam occurs in Taitt. yad dartanarp tad adhividyam.

( 221 )

CHAPTER XIV.

T!|E

" BUT how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation

[thus held by the grammarians, following the guidance

of the p&rva and uttara Mimamsa schools], when the

system of development propounded by the Saftkhyas is

still alive to oppose it ?

" Such is their loud vaunt. Now

the ^astra of this school may be concisely said to maintain

four several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent

1

only, that which is evolute only, that which is both

evolute and evolvent, and that which is neither, (a.) Of

these the first is that which is only evolvent, called the rootevolvent

or the primary; it is not itself the evolute of anything

else. It evolves, hence it is called the evolvent

(jprdkrtti) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium of the

three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is

expressed [in the Saftkhya Karika],

" the root-evolvent is

no evolute." It is called the root-evolvent, as being both

root and evolvent ; it is the root of all the various effects,

as the so-called

"

great one/' &c., but of it, as the primary,

there is no root, as otherwise1 we should have a regres&us

ad inftnitum. Nor can you reply that such a regressus ad

infinitum is no objection, if, like the continued series of

seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our

senses,

2 because here there is no evidence to establish the

hypothesis. (6.) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the

great one, egoism, and the' subtile elements, thus the

1 I borrow this term from Dr. HalL

2 Compare Kusum&ftjali, i 4.

222 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

Saftkhya Karika ( 3),

" the seven, the great one, &c., are

evolute-evolvents." The seven are the seven principles,

called the great one, &c. Among these the great principle,

called also the intellect,

1

&c., is itself the evolute of

nature and the evolvent of egoism ; in the same manner

the principle egoism, called also

"

self-consciousness

"

(abhimdna), is the evolute of the great one, intellect ; but

this same principle, as affected by the quality of darkness,

is the evolvent of the five rudiments called subtile

elements ; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it

is the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs

of perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five

organs of action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative

organ ; and the mind, partaking of the character of

both; nor can you object that in our arrangement the

third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a cause by

producing action in the others. This has been thus

declared by fgvara Krishna in his Karikas 2

( 24-27),

"Self-consciousness is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold

creation, the elevenfold set and the five elemental

rudiments. From modified 3 egoism originates the class of

eleven imbued with goodness ; from egoism as the source

of the elements originate the rudimentary elements, and

these are affected by darkness ; but it is only from egoism

as affected by activity that the one and the other rise.

The intellectual organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the

tongue, and the skin ; those of action are the voice, feet,

hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is mind,

which has the character of each; it determines, and it

is an organ (like the other ten) from having a common

1 One great defect in the Sdnkhya

a It is singular that this is Madnomenclature

is the ambiguity be- hava's principal Sdnkhya authority,

tween the terms for intellect (buddht) and not the Sdnkhya Sutras,

and those for mind (manat). Mad- 3

Vailerita is here a technical term

hava here applies to the former the meaning that goodness predominates

term antahkarana or " internal over darkness and activity. On

organ/' the proper term for the this Kdrikd, comp. Dr. Hall's prelatter.

I have ventured to alter it face to the Sankhya-sdra, pp. 30-

in the translation. 35.

THE SANKHYA-DARSANA. 223

property with them/' 1 All this has been explained at

length by the teacher Vachaspati Mi6ra in the Safikhyatattva-

kaumudi.

*

(c.) The " evolute only

" means the five gross elements,

ether, &c., and the eleven organs, as said in the Karika,

" The evolute consists of sixteen ;

"

that is, the set of sixteen

is evolute only, and "not evolvent. Although it may

be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents of such productions

as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different "principle"

(tattva) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c.,

are not what we term " evolvents ;

"

as the accepted idea

of an evolvent is that which is the material cause of a

separate principle ; and in cows, jars, &c., there is the

absence of being any such first principle, in consequence

of their being all alike gross [i.e., possessed of dimensions]

and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,

ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch,

form, taste, and smell, each subtile element being accompanied

by all those which precede it, and thus the gross

elements will have respectively one, two, three, four, and

five qualities.

2 The creation of the organs has been previously

described. This is thus propounded in the Saftkhya

Karika ( 22)

" From nature springs the great one, from this egoism,

from this the set of sixteen, and from five among

the sixteen proceed the five gross elements."

(d.) The soul is neither, as is said in the Karika,

" The

soul is neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul,

being absolute, eternal, and subject to no development, is

itself neither the evolvent nor the evolute of aught beside.

Three kinds of proof are accepted as establishing these

twenty-five principles ; and thus the Karika ( 4).

"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy

persons are acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for

1 As produced, like them, from a Cf. Colebrooke Essays, voL i. p.

modified egoism. The reading Batji- 256. The tanmdtras will reproduce

kalpavikalpdtmakam must be cor- themselves as the respective qualities

rected by the Sankbya Kdriki. of the gross elements.

224 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

they comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from

proof that there results belief of that which is to be

proven."

Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature

of cause and effect. The Saugatas

1 maintain that the

existent is produced from the non-existent; the Naiyayikas,

&c., that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from

the existent ; the Vedantins, that all effects are an illusory

emanation from the existent and not themselves really

existent; while the Sankhyas hold that the existent is

produced from the existent.

(a.) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since

that which is itself non-existent and unsubstantial can

never be a cause any more than the hare's horn; and, again,

the real and unreal can never be identical.

(6.) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the

existent ; since it is impossible that that which, previous

to the operation of the originating cause, was as nonexistent

as a hare's horn should ever be produced, i.e.,

become connected with existence; for not even the cleverest

man living can make blue yellow.

2 If you say,

" But are

not existence and non-existence attributes of the same

jar?" this is incorrect, since we cannot use such an

expression as "

its quality

"

in regard to a non-existent

subject, for , it would certainly imply that the subject

itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is

existent even previously to the operation of the cause,

which only produces the manifestation of this already

existent thing, just like the manifestation of the oil in

sesame seed by pressing, or of the milk in cows by milking.

Again, there is no example whatever to prove the

production of a thing previously non-existent.

Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being

either connected with it or not connected ; in the former

1 A name of the Buddhists. cannot be made a cow, nor a woman

8

7.C., the nature of a thing (Sva- a man.

IKdva) cannot be altered a man

THE SANKHYA-DARSANA. 225

alternative the effect's existence is settled by the rule

that connection can only be between two existent things ;

in the latter, any and every effect might arise from any

and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the

action of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put

by the Sankhya teacher :

" From the supposed non-existence

of the effect, it can have no connection with causes

which always accompany existence; and to him who

holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises

an utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that " the

cause, though not connected with its effect, can yet produce

it, where it has a capacity of so doing, and this capacity

of producing is to be inferred from seeing the effect

actually produced," still this cannot be allowed, since in

such a case as " there is a capacity for producing oil in

sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is

non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame

seeds, whichever alternative you may accept as to their

being connected or not with the oil [since our before-mentioned

dilemma will equally apply here].

From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical,

it follows that the effect does not exist distinct from the

cause ; thus the cloth is not something distinct from the

threads, as it abides in the latter [as its material cause] ;

but where this identity is not found, there we do not find

the relation of cause and effect ; thus a horse and a cow are

distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the

other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but

the cloth is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything

different from its cause.1 If you object that, if this

were true, the separate threads ought to fulfil the office of

clothing, we reply, that the office of clothing is fulfilled by

the threads manifesting the nature of cloth when they are

placed in a particular arrangement. As the limbs of a

tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,

i I take arthdntaram here as kavdchaspati's note, Tattva Kausimply

bhinnam (of. Tarrfnatha Tar- mudi, p. 47).

P

226 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular

effects, as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they

come forth and are revealed, are said to be produced ; and

when they retire and are concealed, they are said to be

destroyed ; but there is no such thing as the production

of the non-existent or the destruction of the existent. As

has been said in the Bhagavad Gita (ii. 16)

" There is no existence for the non-existent, nor nonexistence

for the existent."

And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we

establish the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (prakriti).

This has been said [in the Karika, 9]

"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation

of cause be brought into existence ; materials, too,

are selected which are fit for the purpose ; everything

is not by every means possible; what is

capable does that to which it is competent; and

like is produced from like." l

Nor can we say [with the Vedantin] that the world is

an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman,

because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude

by its superior validity the primd facie belief that the

external world is real [as we have in the case of mistaking

a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will discover

the error] ; and again, where the subject and the attributed

nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman

and the unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the

supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of

gold and silver [which no one mistakes for each other].

Hence we conclude that an effect which is composed of

happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause

similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:

The subject of the argument, viz., the external world, must

have a material cause composed of happiness, misery, and

stupidity, because it is itself endued therewith ; whatever

is endued with certain attributes must have a cause endued

1 Colebrooke's translation.

THE SANKHYA-DARSANA. 227

with the same, thus a ring has gold for its material cause,

because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a

similar case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion.

What we call "being composed of happiness" in the

external world is the quality of goodness; the "being

composed of misery

'"

is the quality of activity;

1 the

"being composed of stupidity" is the quality of darkness

; hence we establish our cause composed of the three

qualities (i.e., prakriti, Nature). And we see that individual

objects are found by experience to have these three

qualities; thus Maitra's happiness is found in his wife

Satyavatl, because the quality of "goodness" in her is

manifested towards him; but she is the misery of her

fellow-wives, because the quality of

"

activity

"

is manifested

towards them; while she causes indifference to

Chaitra who does not possess her, because towards him

the quality of "darkness" is manifested. So, too, in

other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained, causes us

pleasure ; when seized by others it causes us pain ; but it

is viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in

it. Now this being regarded with no interest is what

we mean by

"

stupidity," since the word moha is derived

from the root muh,

"

to be confused," since no direct action

of the mind arises towards those objects to which it is

indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being

composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as

their cause Nature, which consists of the three qualities.

And so it is declared in the SvetaSvatara Upanishad

(iv. 5)-

"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the

one unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black,

and produces a manifold and similar offspring ; the

other unborn abandons her when once she has been

enjoyed."

Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express

the qualities "activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from

i Or "paBsion,"ra;ai.

Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)

(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to

Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)