SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY -8

THE

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA

OR

REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS

OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY

MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.

TRANSLATED BT

K B. COWELL,  

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 177

any yogin endowed with the transcendent faculties (ttvra,

1

&c.)

Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by

ite performance of duties which produce His favour, the

desired end, Liberation, is obtained; thus everything is

clear. E. B. C.

NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.

We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or hetvdbhdsas

of the modern Hindu logic (cf. Siddhdntamukt., 71, Tarkasaingr.,

55-67), viz., anaikdnta, viruddha, asiddha, kdldtyayopadishta or bddhita,

and pratipaksliita or sat-pratipaksha* The four first of these

generally correspond to the savyabhichdra or "

erratic," viruddha or

"

contradictory," sddhyasama or "

unproved," and atUakdla or "mistimed,"

i.e.,

"

precluded/' as given in the list of fallacies of the older

logic in p. 164 ; but pratipakshita corresponds imperfectly to prakaranasama.

The prakaranasama or " uncertain " reason is properly

that reason which is equally available for both sides, as, e.g., the

argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be

met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because

it is audible ;

"

or, according to other authorities, it is that

reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question,

as, e.g.,

lt sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not

perceived in it ;

" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of

dispute as the old question,

" Is sound eternal 1

" But the pratipakshita

reason is one which is counterbalanced by an equally valid

reason, as " Sound is eternal because it is audible," and " Sound is

non-eternal because it is a product."

1 For tivra cf. Yoga 8iitra8r i, 21, 22.

M

CHAPTER XII.

THE JAIMINI-DAK^ANA.

AN objector may here ask, "Are you not continually

repeating that merit (dharma) comes from the practice of

duty (dharma), but how is duty to be defined or proved ?

"

Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question

has been given in the older l Mimamsa by the holy

sage Jaimini. Now the Mimamsa consists of twelve

books.2 In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness

of those collections of words which are severally meant by

the terms injunction (wdhi),

"

explanatory passage" (arthawfc?

a),hymn (mantra), tradition (smritf), and "name." In

the second, certain subsidiary discussions [as e.g., on aptirva]

relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of

(erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance

[as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the third,

Sruti,

"

sign

"

or " sense of the passage

"

(lingo),

" context"

(vdkya), &c., and their respective weight when in

apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called

pratipatti-karmdni, things mentioned incidentally (andrabhyddhita),

things accessory to several main objects, as

praydjas, &c., and the duties of the sacrifices In the

fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and

subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the juhu being

made of the butea frondosa, &c., and the dice-playing,

&c., which form subordinate parts of the rdjasuya

sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different

1 Mddhava here calls it the prdchi Mimdmtd.

s Cf. J. Mydyamdldvitt, pp. 5-9.

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 179

passages of ruti, &c., the order of different parts of a

sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the vdjapcya], the

multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the

respective force of the words of ruti, order of mention,

&c., in determining the order of performance. In the

sixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations,

the substitutes for enjoined materials, supplies for

lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the saltra offerings,

things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial

fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of

one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic

text, and then as inferred by

" name "

or "

sign/' In the

eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or

obscurely expressed

"

sign," or by the predominant

"

sign,"

and cases where no transference takes place. In the

ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation

of hymns when quoted in a new connection (uha), the

adaptation of sdmans and mantras, and collateral questions

connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of

occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite

involves the "

preclusion

" and non-performance of the

dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are precluded

because other rites produce their special result, discussious

connected with the graha offerings, certain sdmans, and

various other things, and a discussion on the different

kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention

and subsequently the fuller discussion of tantra l [where

several acts are combined into one], and dvdpa [or the performing

an act more than once]. In the twelfth, a discussion

on prasanga [where the rite is performed for one chief

purpose, but with an incidental further reference], tantra,

cumulation of concurrent rites (samuchchaya) and option.

Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of

1 Thus it is said that he who de- tantra one offering to Agni would do

sires to be a family priest should for both ; but as the offering to Soma

offer a black-necked animal to Agni, comes between, they cannot be

a parti-coloured one to Soma, and united, and thus it must be a case

a black-necked one to Agni Should of dvdpa, i.e., offering the two sepathia

be a case for tantra or not ? By rately '(J. Nydyamdld, xi i, 13).

i8o THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

the P\irva-Mimamsa arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore

a desire to know duty [is to be entertained by thee"].

Now the learned describe a "

topic

"

as consisting of five

members, and these are (a.) the subject, (6.) the doubf,

(c.) the primd facie argument, (d.) the demonstrated conclusion,

and (e.} the connection (sangati). The topic is discussed

according to the doctrines held by the great teachers

of the system. Thus the "

subject

"

to be discussed is the

sentence, "TheVeda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which

arises is whether the study of Jaimini's dstra concerning

duty, beginning with the aphorism,

"

Duty is a thing which

is to be recognised by an instigatory passage," and ending

with " and from seeing it in the anvdkdrya" is to be commenced

or not. The primd facie argument is that it is not

to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda

be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and

future fruit, (a.) If you say that this injunction must have

a visible fruit, and this can be no other l than the knowledge

of the meaning of what is read, we must next ask

you whether this said reading is enjoined as something

which otherwise would not have been thought of, or

whether as something which otherwise would have been

optional, as we see in the rule for shelling rice. 2 It cannot

be the former, for the reading of the Veda is a means

of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as

reading, just as in the parallel instance of reading the

Mahsibharata ; and we see by this argument that it would

present itself as an obvious means quite independently

of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative

; just as the baked flour cake called puroddsa is made

only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar,

when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked

by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon and full

moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is

1 In p. 123, line 4, I read vilak- the lines vidhir atyantam aprdpto

hana-dri*htapkala. niyamah pdkshike sati, tatra chdn-

3 In the former case it would be a yatra cha prdptau parisairikhyd vidhividhi

t in the latter a niyama* Of. you.

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 181

the principal ap&rva, by means of the various minor effects

or subordinate aptirvas, produced by the various subordinate

parts of the whole ceremony ; and consequently the

minor aptirva of the unhusking is the reason there for the

restricting injunction. But in the case which we are dis

cussing, there is no such reason for any such restriction,

as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the

knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written

book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence

we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Piirva

Mimamsa as a means of knowing the sense of the Veda.

(&.)

" What, then, becomes of the Veclic injunction/ TheVeda

is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with the fact

that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,

although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the

literal words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand

the meaning which they may convey], since heaven,

though not expressly mentioned, is to be assumed as the

fruit, according to the analogy of the Vi^vajit offering. Just

as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15),

" Let that fruit be

heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes that

those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified

to offer the Vi&vajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that

its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be

in the present case also. As it has been said

" Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without

the injunction, this cannot be its sole object ; we must

rather suppose heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's

significance, after the analogy of fhe Vivajit, &c."

Thus, too, we shall keep the Smriti rule from being

violated :

"

Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this

rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place

between reading the Veda and the student's return to his

home ; while, according to your opinion, after he had read

the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's

house to read the Mimamsa discussions, and thus the idea

of no interval between would be contradicted. Therefore

182 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

for these three reasons, (a.) that the study of Mimamsa is

not enjoined, (&.) that heaven can be obtained by the

simple reading of the text, and (c.) that the rule for the

student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, we maintaki

that the study of the Mfmamsa discussions on duty is

not to be commenced.

The "

authoritative conclusion" (siddhdnta), however, is

as follows :

We grant that it cannot be a case of vidhi, for it might

have been adopted on other grounds ; but not even Indra

with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the

other alternative that it is a case of niyama. In the sentence,

" The Veda is to be read," the affix tavya expresses

an enforcing power in the word,1 which is to be rendered

visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain

effect into existence ; and this enforcing power seeks some

corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative

effort. Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as

suggested by the whole word adhyetavya, which it thus

seeks as an end ; for this act of reading, thus expressed

by the word, could never be regarded as an end, since it

is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, consisting

in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could

the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be

regarded as the end. For the mass of words called

"

Veda,"

which is what we really mean by the words "

portion read,"

being eternal and omnipresent, could never fulfil the conditions

of the four "fruits of action," production, &c.2

Therefore the only true end which remains to us is the

1 The Mimdmsa holds that the make up a sacrifice possessing a cerpotential

and similar affixes, which tain mystic influence ;

"

next it imconstitute

a ridhi, have a twofold plies an enforcing power residing in

power ; by the one they express an itself (as it is the word of the selfactive

volition of the agent, corre- existent Veda and not of God) which

spending to the root-meaning (ariha- sets the hearer upon this course of

Ihriwnd} ; by the other an enforcing action.

power in the word (Mbda-bhAvand).

s These four "fruits of action*'

Thus in ivargakdmo yajcta, the eta are obscure, and I do not remember

implies

" let him produce heaven by to have seen them alluded to elsemeans

of certain acts which together where. I was told in India that

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 183

knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the

sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old

rule,

" He has the right who has the want, the power, and

the wit," those who are aiming to understand certain things,

as the new and full moon sacrifices, use their daily reading

to learn the truth about them. And the injunction for reading,

since it virtually excludes the reading of written books,

&c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word

" read

" when used in this connection], conveys the idea

that the reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated

character [as taught by a duly authorised teacher]. Therefore,

as the principal aptirva, produced by the great new

and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and establishes the

subordinate aptirvas produced by the inferior sacrificial

acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of aptirva

produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes

a previous aptirva produced by the restricting injunction

(niyama), which prescribes reading the Veda as the means

to know how to perform these sacrifices. If you hesitate

to concede that a niyama could have this future influence

called aptirva, the same doubt might equally invalidate

the efficacy of a vidhi [as the two stand on the same level

as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a

valid one that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy

of the Vi&vajit offering, since, if there is a present and

visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of

the sacred text, it is improper to suppose any other future

and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said

" Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose

an unseen one ; but if a vidhi has the restricting

meaning of a niyama, it does not thereby become

meaningless."

they were a thing's coming into ate, viparinamate, apakshiyate, natbeing,

growing, declining, and per- yati. I do not see how there could

ishing. If so, they are the second, be any reference to the four kinds

third, fifth, and sixth of, the six of apurva, sc. pkala, sanwddya, utvikdras

mentioned in Saukara's patti, and anga, described in Nydya

Vajrasuchi, 2, i.e., <uti, jdyate, vardh- M. V. il 1,2.

184 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

But an objector may say,

"

Although a man who reads

the simple text of the Veda may not attain to a knowledge

of its meaning, still, as he who reads the Veda with

its aiigas, grammar, &c., may attain to this knowledge, th

study of Mfmamsa will be useless." But this is not true :

for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of

the literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend

on this kind of discussion. For instance, when it is said,

" He offers anointed gravel," neither grammar nor nigama x

nor nirukta will determine the true meaning that it is to

be anointed with ghee and not with oil, &c. ; it is only by

a Mfmamsa discussion that the true meaning is unravelled

from the rest of the passage,

"

Verily, ghee is brightness."

2

It is therefore established that the study of Mimamsa is

enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts

the passage of Sinriti, "Having read the Veda, let him

bathe," which implies that he should now leave his teacher's

house, and prohibits any further delay ; as the words do

not necessarily imply that the return to the paternal roof

is to follow immediately on his having read the Veda, but

only that it is to follow it at some time, and that both

actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see

in the common phrase,

"

Having bathed, he eats." Therefore

from the purport of the injunction we conclude that

the stfcdy of the Piirva Mimamsa Sastra, consisting .of a

thousand "topics,"

8 is to be commenced. This topic is

connected with the main subject of the Sastra as being a

subsidiary digression, as it is said,

"

They call that a subsidiary

digression which helps to establish the main subject."

4

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the

same "

topic

"

in accordance with the teaching of the Guru

Prabhakara.

In the Smriti rule,

6 "Let him admit as a pupil the

Brahman lad when eight years old (by investing him with

1 The niyamas are the Vedic 4 This is to explain the last of the

quotations in Yaska's nirukta. five members, the samgati.

8 See Nyiya-miila-vistara, i. 4, 19.

6 Of. Asvaldyana's Gfihya Siitras,

3 The exact number is 915. i 19, i.

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 185

the sacred cord), let him instruct him," the object of the

direction appears to be the pupil's instruction. Now a direction

must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if

^ou ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires

to be a teacher," since, by Panini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root wi

is used in the dtmanepada when honour, &c., are implied, i.e.,

here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils. He

who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same

person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since both

are the object of one and the same command. Hence the

inspired sage Mann has said (ii. 140), "The Brahman who

girds his pupil with the sacrificial cord and then instructs

him in the Veda, with its subsidiary aiigas and mystic

doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (dchdrya)" Now

the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot

be fulfilled without the learning which is the function of

the pupil, and therefore the very injunction to teach implies

and establishes a corresponding obligation to learn,

since the influencer's efforts fail without those of one to be

influenced. If you object that this view does not make

reading the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply,

What matters it to us if it is not ? For even if there is

no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading

the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a

duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual

anuvdda or "

supplementary repetition."

l Therefore the

former primd facie argument and its answer, which were

given before under the idea that there was a definite

injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in

another way to suit this new view.

Now the primd facie argument was that the study of

Mimamsa, not being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be

commenced ; the " conclusion

" was that it is to be commenced

as being thus authoritatively enjoined.

1 The anuvdda, of course, implies anuvdda in the present case is the

a previous vidhi, which it thus re- passage which mentions that the

peats and supplements, and so carries Veda is to be read, as it enforces

with it an equal authority. The the previous vidJd aa to teaching.

1 86 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

Now the upholders of the former or primd facie view

argue as follows :

" We put to the advocates of the conclusion

the following dilemma: Does the injunction to

teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning

of what is read, or does it only refer to the bare reading ?

It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of teaching

cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding

what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a

recipient]; and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare

reading is sufficient, the Mimamsa discussions in question

will have no subject or use. For their proper subject is a

point in the Veda, which is doubted about from having

been only looked at ip. a rough and impromptu way ; now

if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all,

why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope

of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious

discussion ? And therefore in accordance with the wellknown

principle,

' That which is a thing of use and not a

matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent

man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and in

contact with the external and internal senses/ as there is

in the present case no such thing as a subject to exercise

it upon, or a useful end to be attained by it, we maintain

that the study of Mimamsa is not to be commenced."

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does

not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must

understand the meaning ; still when a man has read the

Veda with its subsidiary angas, and has comprehended

the general connection of the words with their respective

meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning

of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human

compositions. "But may we not say that, just as in

the case of the mother who said to her son,

* Eat poison,'

the meaning literally expressed by the words was not

what she wished to convey, since she really intended to

forbid his eating anything at all in such and such a house;

so if the literal meaning of the Veda does not express its

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 187

real purport, the old objection will recur with full force

that the study of Mimamsa will have neither subject nor

end [as there will be no use in understanding the literal

tneaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead

astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge "].

We reply, that your supposed illustration and the case

in question are not really parallel. In the supposed

illustration the primary meaning of the words would

be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat poison

would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative

and trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would

know at once that this could not be what she wished to

say ; but in the case of the Veda, which is underived from

any personal author, why should not the literal meaning

be the one actually intended ? And it is just the doubts

that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this

intended meaning, which will be the proper

"

subject

"

of

Mimamsa discussion ; and the settlement of these doubts

will be its proper

" end." Therefore, whenever the true

meaning of the Veda is not obtained 1 by that reading

which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunction

to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper subject for

systematic discussion ; and hence we hold that the study

of Mimamsa is enjoined, and should be commenced.

"

Well,2 be it so

"

[say the followers of the Nyaya],

" but

how can the'Vedas be said to be underived from any personal

author, when there is no evidence to establish this?

Would you maintain that they have no personal author because,

although there is an unbroken line of tradition, there

is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with

the soul

"

?

8 This argument is weak, because the alleged

characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved;

for those who hold the human origin of the Vedas main-

1 I read in p. 127, line 12, anava- Dr. Muir's translation in his Sanskrit

gamyamdnasya, and so the recension Texts, vol. iii. p. 88.

given in the Nyaya M. V. p. 14,

* The soul may be traced back

na budhyamdnasya. through successive transmigrations,

9 In the next two or three pages but you never get back to its begin-

I have frequently borrowed from ning.

188 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

tain that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time

of the dissolution of the universe. And, again, what is

meant by this assertion that the author is not remembered?

Is it (i.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that no author

is remembered ? The first alternative cannot be accepted,

since we hold that God is proved to have been the author.

Nor can the second, because it cannot stand the test of the

following dilemma, viz., is it meant (a.) that no author of

the Veda is remembered by some one person, or (&.) by any

person whatever ? The former supposition breaks down,

as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such

an isolated stanza as

" He who is religious and has overcome

pride and anger," &C.1 And the latter supposition is

inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person

who was not omniscient to know that no author of the

Veda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover,

there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author,

for we argue as follows : The sentences of the Veda must

have originated from a personal author, since they have

the character of sentences like those of Kalidasa and other

writers. And, again, the sentences of the Veda have been

composed by a competent person, s^nce, while they possess

authority, they have, at the same time, the character of

sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

But [ask the Mimamsakas] may it not be assumed that

"

all study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study

of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda

must always have had one common character which was*

the same in former times as now ;

" and therefore this uninterrupted

succession has force to prove the eternity of

the Veda ? This reasoning, however [the Naiyayikas

1 M&ihava means that the author sons did not know the origin, but

of this stanza, though unknown to which, nevertheless, had a human

many people, was not necessarily author. The stanza in question is

unknown to all, as his contempo- quoted in full in Bohtlingk's Inraries,

no doubt, knew who wrote it, dische Spriiche, No. 5598, from the

and hia descendants might perhaps MS. anthology called the Subkdskistill

be aware of the fact In this tdrnava. For muktaka, see Sdh.

case, therefore, we have an instance _#arp., 558.

of ft composition of which some perTHE

JAIMINI-DARSANA. 189

answer], cannot rise to the height of proof, for it has no

more validity than such obviously illusory reasoning, as

" All study of the Mahabharata was preceded by an earlier

tudy of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study

of the Mahabharata, which must have been the same in

former times as now." But [the Mimamsakas will ask

whether there is not a difference beween these two cases,

since] the Sinriti declares that [Vishnu incarnate as] Vyasa

was the author of the Mahabharata, in accordance with

the line,

" Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishnu could be

the maker of the Mahabharata ?

"

[while nothing of this

sort is recorded in any Sinriti in regard to the Veda]. This

argument, however, is pithless, since those words of the

Purushasdkta (Rig V., x. 90),

" From him sprang the Rich

and Sanian verses ; from him sprang the Metres ; from him

the Yajus arose ;

"

prove that the Veda had a maker.

Further [proceed the Naiyayikas] we hold that sound

is non-eternal l because it has genus, and is also perceptible

to the external organs of beings such as ourselves,

just as a jar is.

2 "

But," you may object,

"

is not this

argument refuted by the proof arising from the fact that

we recognise the letter g (for example) as the same we

have heard before?" This objection, however, is extremely

weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute

our argument, since it has reference only to identity of

species, as in the case of a man whose hair has been cut

and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed

afresh.

" But [asks the Mimdmsaka] how can the Veda

have been uttered by the incorporeal Parame^vara, who

has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore

cannot have pronounced the letters?" "This objection

1 The eternity of the Veda de- senses. Genera are themselves eterpends

on this tenet of the Mimfonsa" nal (though the individuals in which

that sound is eternal they reside are not), but they have

* Eternal things (as the atoms of not themselves genus. Both these

earth, fire, water, and air, minds, arguments belong rather to the

time, space, ether, and soul) have Nydya-vai&shika school than to the

vuedta, not sdmdnya or genus, and Nyuya.

they are all imperceptible to the

190 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

[answers the Naiyayika] is not happy, because, though

ParameSvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume

a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers.

Consequently the arguments in favour of the

doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."

I shall now [says the Mimamsaka] clear up the whole

question. What is meant by this paurusheyatva [" derivation

from a personal author"] which it is sought to

prove? Is it (i.) mere procession (utpannatva) from a

person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such

as ourselves, when we daily utter it ? or (2.) is it the

arrangement with a view to its manifestation of knowledge

acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of

treatises composed by persons like ourselves ? If the first

meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between

us.1 If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is

established (a.) by inference,

2 or (6.) by supernatural testimony

? (a.) The former alternative cannot be correct, because

your argument would equally apply to the sentences

in dramas such as the Malatimadhava [which, of course,

being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character],

]f you qualify your argument by inserting the saving

clause, "while they possess authority/'

3

[as supra, p. 188,

line 21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher.

For the sentences of the Veda are universally

defined to be sentences which prove things that are not

provable by other evidence. But if you could establish

that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable

by other evidence, this definition would be at once con-

1 The Mim&msaka allows that the like the compositions of Mann,

uchchdrana or utterance is non- &c."

eternal. 8 The argument will now run,

8 The inference will be as follows :

" The Vedas were arranged after

" The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of

being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess

proof, with a view to their manifes- authority, they still have the nature

tation, from the very fact of their of sentences, like the composition of

having the nature of sentences, just Manu, &c."

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 191

tradicted, just as if a man were to say that his mother

was a barren woman. And even if we granted that Parame^

vara might assume a body in sport, in order to show

]indness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow

that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the

senses, from the want of any means of apprehending

objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature.1

Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and other senses

alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,

for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance

with our past experience. This has been declared by the

Guru [Prabhakara] when he refutes the supposition of an

omniscient author

" Wherever we do find tlie power of an organ intensified,

2

it is done without its going beyond its own proper

objects ; thus it may appear in the power of seeing

the very distant or the very minute, but not in the

ear's becoming cognisant of form."

Hence (&.) we also maintain that your position cannot

be established by any supposed supernatural testimony

[as that quoted above from the Pag-Veda, "from him

sprang the Rich and Saman verses"]. For the rule of

Panini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the

grammatical affixes with which such names as Kathaka,

Kalapa, and Taittiriya are formed, impart to those derivatives

the sense of "uttered by" Katha, Kalapin, &c.,

though we maintain that these names have reference [not

to those parts of the Veda as first composed by these

sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain

schools of traditional study. And in the same way we

hold [in reference to this verse from the Eig-Veda] that

it only refers to the institution of certain schools of traditional

study of these Vedas.

Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-

1 In assuming a material body, he 2 The Jainaa allow thirty -four

would be subject to material liiriita- such superhuman developments (atitiona.

wydh) in their gaints*

192 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGR4HA.

eternity of sound, because [as we said before] it is opposed

to the evidence of our consciousness, [since we certainly

recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before].

Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although the letters arc

not the same, they seem to be so on account of their

identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a

question Is this idea that " the apparent sameness arises

from identity of species" put forward from a wish to

preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same,

or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience

shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous

[as in the cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above] ?

(a.) If it arises from the latter reason, we Mimamsakas,

who hold that the Veda is its own evidence, have said in

reference to this timid imagination

" He who foolishly imagines that something as yet

unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his

present conclusion, will go to utter ruin in every

transaction of life, his mind a mass of doubts."

(&.) "But [the Naiyayikas will ask] does not this recognition

of g and other letters [as the same which we heard

before] refer to the species which exists the same in each,

and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we

perceive that they are different as uttered by different

persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions

as we do when we say

' Somagarman is reading

*

?

"

This

objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors,

for as there is no proof of any distinction between

the individual #'s, there is no proof that we ought to

assume any such thing as a species g; and we maintain

that, just as to the man who does not understand [the

Naiyayika doctrine of] the species g, the one species [in

the Naiyayika view] will by the influence of distinction of

place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as

if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as

small, as great, as long, as short ; so to the man who does

not understand our [Mimamsaka doctrine of] one individual

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 193

g, the one g (in our view) will by the diversity of " manifesters,"

J appear to him associated with their respective

peculiarities ; and as contrary characters are in this way

qgcribed [to the letter g\, there is a fallacious appearance

of distinction [between different g's]. But does this ascription

of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as

creating a difference [between the ^'s], result (i.) from the

nature of the thing, or (2,) from our imagination ? There

is no proof of the former alternative ; for, if it were true,

as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between

different #'s, we should have to say,

" Chaitra has

uttered ten g's" and not " Chaitra has uttered the same

g ten times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof

of any inherent distinction between g's, for inherent oneness

is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises.

Thus we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction

caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., that there

is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivisible

ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [i.e.,

"

different

"

as applied to the #'s] is really caused by the

noise, which in each case is different. This has been said

by the great teacher

" The object which the Naiyayikas seek by supposing a

species is, in fact, gained from the letter itself;

and the object which they aim at by supposing an

individuality in letters, is attained from audible

noises;

2 so that the assumption of species is

useless."

And again

" Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct

of recognition is always awake within us, it precludes

by its superior evidence all the inferences to

prove sound's non-eternity."

This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiya-

1 Jaimini maintains that the vibra- is these '

conjunctions

' and * digjunctions

of the air "manifest" the al- tions,' occasioned by the vibrations

of the tAT^Ba

'noise' (ndda) Aptorimi, L 17.

ways existing sound. tAT^Battantyne,

9 "What Is meant by '

194 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

yika] treatise by Vag&wara, entitled Mdna-manohara,

" sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special

quality belonging to an organ of sense l

(sc. the ear), just

as colour is to the eye." o

We can also refute it in the following ways : (a.) If we

follow the [Sankhya and Vedanta] view that sound is a

substance, it is evidently overthrown 2

[as in that case

sound cannot be a quality] ; (&.) if we take it as referring

to the noise, not the sound, we have no dispute, as it only

establishes what we ourselves allow; and (c.) the inference

is overthrown by the "

limiting condition

"

[upddhi]

of ardvanatva, or

" the not causing audition." 8 So Udayana

tries at great length to establish that, although ether,

the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of

that which abides in this site is perceptible ; and he then

brings forward as an evidence for the non- eternity of

sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such

common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The

sound has arisen." * But he is sufficiently answered 6 by

our old reply [in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of

1 The Nydya holds that colour and is too wide, i.e., it is sometimes found

sound are respectively special quali- where the major term " non-eternal "

ties of the elements light and ether; is not found, as, e.g., in sound itself,

and as the organs of seeing and according to the Miindmsd doctrine,

hearing are composed of light and To obviate this he proposes to add the

ether, each will, of course, have its

"

condition," *' not causing audition,"

corresponding special quality. as he will readily concede that all

3 In p. 131, line 7, I read jpra- those things are non-eternal which,

tyakshdfiddheh. while not causing audition, are special

8 Cf. my note pp. 7,8, (on the Char- qualities belonging to an organ of

vdka-darsana) for the upddhi. The sense, as, e.g., colour. But I need

upddhi or " condition

"

limits a too scarcely add that this addition would

general middle term ; it is defined make the whole argument nugatory,

as " that which always accompanies In fact, the Ptirva Mimdmsd and the

the major term, but does not always Nydya can never argue together on

accompany the middle." Thus if this question of the eternity of sound,

the condition "

produced from wet as their points of view are BO totally

fuel" is added to "fire," the argu- different.

ment " the mountain has smoke be- 4 In the former case we have the

cause it has fire

"

is no longer a false dhwamta of sound, in the latter its

one. Here, in answer to the Nydya prdgabhdva.

argument in the text, our author * In p. 131, line 12, I read samoobjects

that its middle term (" from pauhi for samdpohi, i.e., the passive

the fact of its being a special quality aorist of tarn +apa + uh.

belonging to an organ of sense")

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 195

distinction arises from contrary characters being erroneously

ascribed, just as, in the story, thfe demon Tala went

away [as well as Betala] when the offering of blood was

given to the latter.

1 And as for the objection raised by the

author of the Nydyabh'&sliana^ that, if sound were eternal,

the conclusion must follow that it would be either always

perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated

by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which

is manifested by our articulate noise.3 And as for the

(Naiyayika) argument against the existence 4 of such a

constant relation as this which is supposed between the

manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since

they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense

of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply

with equal force in the case of the soul.6

Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not

originated from any personal author, and as the minutest

germ of suspicion against it is thus absolutely destroyed,

we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a

self - established authority in all matters relating to

duty.

" Well " 6

[say our opponents],

"

let this question rest ;

1 I do not know this legend. Tala The Naiyayika argument would

and Betala are the two demons who seem to be something as follows :

carryVikrain&ditya on their shoulders Sound is not thus manifested by

in the Simhdsan-battisi. It appears noise, since both are simultaneously

to be referred to here as illustrating perceived by the senses, just as we see

how one answer can suffice for two in the parallel case of the individual

opponents. and its species ; these are both pera

This is probably a work by Bhd- ceived together, but the individual is

sarvajna (see Dr. Hall's Bibl. Index, not manifested by the species. But

p. 26). the Mimrimsa1

rejoins that this would

8

Ithvani, or our " articulate equally apply to the soul and knownoise,"

produces the vibrations of ledge ; as the internal sense perceives

air which render manifest the ever- both simultaneously, and therefore

existing sound. There is always an knowledge ought not to be manieternal

but inaudible hum going on, fested by the soul, which is contrary

which we modify into a definite to experience. But I am not sure

speech by our various articulations, that I rightly understand the argu-

I take samskrita here as equivalent ment.

to abhivyakta.

6 Here begins a long ptirvapakafui,

4 I read in p. 131, line i$,sarfi8lcd- from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133,

rakataTjukdryabhdvdbhdvdnumdnani. line 9 ; see p. 198 infra.

6 It would be a case of vyabhichdra.

196 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

but how about another well-known controversy? It is

said

"'The Safrkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and

non-authoritativeness are self-proved; the followers ef

the Nyaya hold that both are proved by something else

[as inference, &c.] ; the Buddhists hold that the latter is

self-proved and the former proved by something else ; the

teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is

self-proved and npn-authoritativeness proved by something

else.' Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how

do the Mimamsakas accept as established their tenet that

the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved ? And what

is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness

? Is it (a.) that authoritativeness springs from itself ?

or (&.) that it springs from the right knowledge in which

it resides ? or (c.) that it springs from the instrumental

causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge

in which it resides ? or (d.) that it resides in a particular

knowledge produced by the instrumental causes

which produced the right knowledge? 1 or (e.) that it

resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental

causes only which produced the right knowledge ?

"

(a.) It cannot be the^rstf, because wherever the relation

of cause and effect is found there must be a difference,

and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject

[i.e., authoritativeness cannot cause itself]. (Z>.) It cannot

be the second, because if knowledge, which is a quality,

were the cause of authoritativeness, it would have to be a

substance, as being an intimate cause.2

(c.) It cannot be

the thirdt because ' authoritativeness ' cannot properly be

1 This ia Prabhrfkara's view (see

2 Substances are "intimate causes"

Siddh. Muktdv., p. 1 18). The first to their qualities, and only substances

knowledge is in thejform "This is a have qualities ; now if authoritativejar;"

the second knowledge is the ness, which is a characteristic of right

cognition of this perception in the knowledge, were caused by it, it

form "I perceive the jar;" and this would be a quality of it, that is,

latter produces authoritativenesa right knowledge would be its inti-

(prdmdnya), which* resides in it as mate - cause and therefore a subits

characteristic. stance. .

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 197

'

produced

' at all,

1 whether we call it a general characteristic

(upddhi) or a species (jdti);

9 for if we call it an

upddhi, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any

contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does

not possess the nature of recollection ;

a and this cannot be

produced, for we all allow that absolute non-existence is

eternal ; and still less can we speak of its being produced,

if we regard it as a species, (d.} Nor can it be the fourth,

for wrong knowledge [as well as right knowledge] is a particular

kind of knowledge, and the instrumental causes

which produce the general are included in those which produce

the particular,

4

just as the general idea *

seed/ as applied

to '

tree/ is included in the particular seed of any special

tree, as, e.g., the Dalbergia Sisu ; otherwise we might suppose

that the particular had no instrumental cause at all

Your definition would therefore extend too far [and include

erroneous as well as true knowledge] ; for non-authoritativeness,

which Vedantists and most Mimamsakas allow to be

produced by something external, must also be considered

as residing in a particular knowledge \i.e. y a wrong knowledge]

produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which

produced the right knowledge, (e.) As for your fifth

view, we ask whether by being produced by the instrumental

causes only which produced right knowledge, you

mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect* ? It

cannot be the former alternative ; because the followers of

the Nyaya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by

something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant

that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental

causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect.'

1 The eye, &c., would be its in- 8 The Purya Mim&nsi denies that

etrumental causes. recollection is right knowledge,

8 The first three categories

" sub- * Wrong knowledge is produced

stance,"

"

quality," and "

action," by the same instrumental causes (as

are called jdti* or species ; the last the eve, &c.) which produced right

four,

"

genus,"

"

vtietka,

" " intimate knowledge, but by these together with

relation," and "non-existence," are a "defect" aa biliousness, distance

called upddhi$ or "general charao- &c.

teristiw

198 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

Neither can it be the latter alternative ; for, inasmuch as

it is certain that the absence of a ' defect '

is found combined

with the various instrumental causes, this absence of

a ' defect* is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause orf

right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany

its presence, and be absent if it is absent,1 and

it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition.2

If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a

cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can

be an effect or not ? If it cannot, then we should have to

allow that cloth is eternal, as its

"

emergent non-existence"

or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect,

then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope

binds you at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana

[in his Kusumanjali, i 10]

" ' As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause

as well as an effect/

" The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows : Eight

knowledge depends on some cause 3 other than the common

causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an

effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge does.4

Authoritativeness is known through something external to

itself [e.g., inference], because doubt arises in regard to it in

an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is

both produced and recognised by means of something

external, the MImamsa tenet that ' authoritativeness is

self-proved

'

is like a gourd overripe and rotten."

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a

vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist ; for (a.) we

mean by our phrase

" self-proved

"

that while right knowledge

is produced by the instrumental causes of know-

1 ScU. if there be dothdbhdva there Soil or the absence of "

defect,"

i*pramd; if not, not. In p. 132, line doshdbhdva.

20, I read doshdbhdvatvena for do- 4 Wrong knowledge has doshatkdbkdvasahahritatvena.

Ikdva or the presence of a " defect

"

*

Anyathdsiddhatvam means nt- as its cause, in addition to the comyatapurvavartitvf

tati andvaJyakat- mon causes.

Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)

(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to

Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)