SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY -7

THE

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA

OR

REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS

OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY

MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.

TRANSLATED BT

K B. COWELL,  

1

But the second kind is as follows : As action which

arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that

with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction

2 from

the points of space in which the original conjunction took

place ; and this is

" the disjunction of the intimate cause

and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces

an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates also

in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect

and the non-effect ; thus the disjunction of the body [the

intimate effect] and the points of space arises from the disjunction

of the hand and the points of space [the hand being

an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of

space being not a cause]. This second disjunction is not

produced by the action of the body, because the body is

supposed to be at the time inactive ; nor is it produced by

the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an

action residing in some other place [as the hand] should

produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore

we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view

that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the

1 The Siddhdnta Muktdvali, p, 1 12, conjunction with that old place ; 7.

describes the series of steps : I. An the conjunction with the new place ;

action, as of breaking, in one of the 8. the cessation of the original imhalves

; 2. the disjunction of the pulse of fracture. Here the second

two halves ; 3. the destruction of disjunction (viz., of the half of the

the, conjunction which originally pot and the place) is produced by

produced the pot; 4. the destruc- the previous disjunction of the halves,

tion of the pot ; 5. by the disjunction the intimate causes of the pot.

of the two halves is produced a dis- a The original has a plural injunction

of the severed half from the bhdgdn, t.e., disjunctions from the

old place ; 6. the destruction of the several points.

THE VAISESHIKA OR AVLUKYA DARSANA. 157

non-cause 1 which causes the second disjunction of the

body and the points of space.

But an opponent may here object that " what you formerly

stated (p. 147) as to existence being denied of darkness,

&c., is surely unreasonable ; for, in fact, there are no

less than four different opinions maintained on this point,

thus (a.) the Bhatta Mimamsakas and the Vedantins hold

that darkness is a substance ; (&.) Sridhara Acharya 2 holds

that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thug darkness

will be a quality] ; (c.) some of the Prabhaka.ra Mimamsakas

hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light ;

'

(d.)

the Naiyayikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light."

In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (a.)

it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with

neither of the two possible alternatives ; for if darkness

is a substance, it must either be one of the nine wellknown

substances, earth, &c.,

3 or some different one. But

it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever

one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance

should certainly be found in it ; nor can you, on the other

hand, assert that it is some substance different from these

nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot

properly be a substance at all [the very definition of substance

being

" that which is the substratum of qualities "],

and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance

from the nine. But you may ask,

" How can you say that

darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as

possessed of the dark blue of the tamala blossom ?

" We

reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that

the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught

on ancient sages.

4

(b.) Hence it follows that darkness can- .

not have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have

an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum

1

I.e., the disjunction of the hand 4 I am not sure that it would not

and the points of space. be better to read viddhavevidhayd,

3 The author of a commentary on rewounding the wounded, instead of

the Bhagavad Gft&

8 For dravyddi read prUhivyddi.

ISB THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

to receive it ;

1 and again, we cannot conceive the eye as

capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent

cause, the external light. Nor can we accept that

it is an impression independent of the eye [i.e., produced

by the internal sense, mind], because the concurrence of

the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition

to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that

" absence or non-existence (dbhdva

2

) is incapable of being

expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we

do use such phrases as tenebrce oriuntur, darkness cannot

be a mere non-existence "] ; because your assertion is too

broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a

mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,

8 &c. [and yet

we all know that men do speak of any of these things as

past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of dbhdva].

(c.) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of

light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ which

perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it

would follow that darkness would be perceived by the

mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions].

4

Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion

must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the

absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is

very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence

of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the

quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and

the idea of separation is connected with the absence of

conjunction. And you need not assert that "

this absence

of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the

eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an

object possessing colour,

5 as we see in the case of a jar's

1 Unless you see the rope you can- dkaka-kriyd. It has that meaning

not mistake it for a serpent. in Kivyaprakds'a, V. (p. 114, 1. i).

2 In p. 1 10, last line, read 'bhdve. 4 The mind perceives dlofo-jftdna,

9 Read in p. no, last line, anava- therefore it would perceive its abdhdnddishu.

Vidhipratyaya properly sence, i.e., darkness, but this last is

means an imperative or potential perceived by the eye.

affix implying

" command ;

" but the 6

I.e., light possesses colour, and we

pandit takes vidhi here as bhdvabo- cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.

THE VAISESHIKA OR AULUKYA DARSANA. 159

absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz.,

that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object,

it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence,

it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on

light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive

this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort

that " the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light]

necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence

resides [and this will require light]," as such an assertion

is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to

have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a

conception of the place where the absence resides, else

we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound,

as is implied in such an expression as

" the tumult has

ceased." l Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind,

the venerable Kanada uttered his aphorism [as an ipse

dixit to settle the question] :

"

Dravya-guna-karma-nishpatti-

vaidharmydd abhdvas tamas" (Vati. SM. v. 2, 19),

" Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to

the production of substances, qualities, or actions." The

same thing has been also established by the argument that

darkness is perceived by the eye

2

[without light, whereas

all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence

of light as well as of the eye to be visible].

Non-existence (dbhdva) is considered to be the seventh

category, as established by negative proofs. It may be

concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate

relation, is not intimate relation ;

3 and this is twofold,

"

relative non-existence

" 4 and "

reciprocal non-existence."

1 Sound resides in the impcrcep- eva vd tamah sydt, vdhydlolcapragratible

ether, and cessation is the ham antarena cliakahwkd no, grihdhvamsdbhdva,

or "emergent non- yeta."

existence." 3 Intimate relation has also no

2 The reading pratyayavedyatvena, mtimate relation.

seems supported by p. no, last line,

4 "Relative non-existence" (4091-

but it is difficult to trace the argu- aargdbhdva) is the negation of a

xnent ; I have, therefore, ventured relation ; thus " the jar is not in the

hesitatingly to read pratyaksliave- house" is ** absolute non-existence,"

dyatvena, and would refer to the "

it was not in the house "

is

" antecommentary

(Vais. Sut. p. 250), cedent," and "

it will not be in the

"

yadi hi nlla-rupavan nftarp, rupam house "is "emergent," non-existence.

160 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent,"

and " absolute."

" Antecedent "

is that non-existence

which, though without any beginning, is not everlasting;

"emergent" is that which, though having a

beginning, is everlasting ;

" absolute

"

is that non-existence

which abides in its own counter-entity ;

l "

reciprocal nonexistence

"

is that which, being different from "

absolute,"

has yet no defined limit [i.e., no terminus ad quern nor terminus

a quo, as " antecedent

" and "

emergent

"

have].

If you raise the objection that " '

reciprocal non-existence

'

is really the same as ' absolute non-existence/

" we

reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's

highroad ; for

"

reciprocal non-existence

"

is that negation

whose opposite is held to be identity, as "ajar is not cloth;"

but " absolute non-existence

"

is that negation whose

opposite is connection, as " there is no colour in the air." 2

Nor need you here raise the objection that " dbhdva can

never be a means of producing any good to man," for we

maintain that it is his summum bo&um, in the form of

final beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute

abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the category

of dbhdva]. E. B. C.

1

I.e., the absolute absence of the jdti ghafatva which resides in the

jar is found in the jar, as, of course, jar.

the jar does not reside in the jar,

a The opposite is " there is colour

but in the spot of ground, it is the in the air."

161

CHArTEE XL

THE AKSHAPiDA (OR NYiYA) DAK^ANA.

THE principle that final bliss, i.e., the absolute abolition of

pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a

certain sense universally accepted], is established in a .

special sense as a particular tenet l of the Nyaya school,

as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words

"

proof, that which is to be proved, &c., from knowledge

of the truth as to these things there is the attainment of

final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the Nyaya

Sastra. "Now the Nyaya Sustra consists of five books,

and each book contains two "daily portions." In the

first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gotama

discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with

"

proof," and in the second those of the remaining seven,

beginning with "discussion" (vdda). In the first daily

portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses

the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested

objections to their being instruments of right knowledge;

and in the second he shows that "

presumption," &c., are

really included in the four kinds of

"

proof

"

already given

[and therefore need not be added by the Mimamsakas as

separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third

book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their

objects; in the second, "understanding" (buddhi), and

" mind "

(manas). In the first daily portion of the fourth

book he examines "volition" (pravritti), the "faults,"

1 Cf. Nydya Stitras, I tg.

162 THE SARVA-PARSANA-SANGRAHA.

"transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and "final

liberation ;

"

in the second he* investigates the truth l as

to^ the causes of the "

faults," and also

" wholes

" and

"

parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth book he

discusses the various kinds of futility (jdti), and in tlie

second the various kinds of

" occasion for rebuke "

(nigrar

hasthdna, or " unfitness to be argued with ").

In accordance with the principle that "to know the

thing to be measured you must first know the measure,"

"proof" (pram&na) is first enunciated, and as this must

be done by defining it, we have first a definition of "

proof."

"Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right

knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from

the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the

site of knowledge [i.e., the soul] ;

2 and this definition thus

includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyaya School that God

is a source of right knowledge,

8 as the author of the

aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68),

" and the fact

of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells

and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit

one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."

And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher

Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of

logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the Kusumanjali:

"

Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right

knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is,

according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all

absence thereof.

"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably

united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets,

the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,

all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away

1 In p. 112, line 16, of the Cal- (vishaya), as these are, of course,

cutta edition, I read doshanimitta- connected with right knowledge.

tattva for dotkanimittakatva (compare

8

fa*vara is a cause of right know-

Nyaya Sdt iv. 68). ledge (pramdna) according to the

3 Without this last clause the definition, because he is pramdyd

definition might include the objects dsrayah.

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 163

by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the

slightest want of observation in Him, He, $iva, is my

authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as

tJieir authority must ever be with rising doubts ?

"

" Proof

"

is fourfold, as being divided into perception,

inference, analogy, and testimony. The "

thing to be

proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve

kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, understanding,

mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain,

and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose

nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being

caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are

common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive,

or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own,

which do not help us in determining the particular point

in question,

1 or by conflicting testimony. The thing which

one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is

" a

motive" (prayojana) ; this is twofold, i.e., visible and

invisible.

" An example

"

is a fact brought forward as a

ground for establishing a general principle, and it may

be either affirmative or negative.

2 A "

tenet

"

(siddhdnta)

is something which is accepted as being authoritatively

settled as true ; it is of four kinds, as being

" common to

all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant

assumption

"

[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion],

and "an implied dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of

a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an

inference for the sake of another ; and these are five, the

proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and

the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (tarka, i. 39) is

the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates

the admission of a false major

3

(cf. Sut. L 39, and

1 On this compare Siddhdnta- the smoke, is the confutation of there

Muktdvali, p. 115. being no fire in the hill" (Ballan-

1 a On these compare my note to tyne). Or, in other words, "the

Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 315. mountain must have the absence-of-

1 " Our coming to the conclusion smoke (vydpaka) if it has the abthat

there can be no smoke in the sence-of-fire (the false vydpya").

bill if there be no fire, while we tee

164 - THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

iv. 3) ; and this is of eleven kinds, as vydghdta, dtmdfraya,

itaretardSraya, &c.

" Ascertainment

"

(nirnaya, i. 40) is right knowledge or

a perception of the real state of the case. It is of

foijT

kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or

testimony.

" Discussion

"

(vdda) is a particular kind of

conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth

(i. 41). "Wrangling" (jalpa) is the talk of a man only

wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments

for either side of he question (i. 42).

"

Cavilling

"

(vitandd)

is the talk of a man who does not attempt to

establish his own side of the question (i. 43).

"

Dialogue

"

(katkd) is the taking of two opposite sides by two disputants.

A "

fallacy

"

is an inconclusive reason which is

supposed to prove something, and this may be of five

kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain,"

the "unproved," and the "precluded" or "mistimed"

(Slit i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (chhala) is the bringing

forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in

an ambiguous sense ; this is of three kinds, as there may

be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a metaphorical

phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" (jdti) is a selfdestructive

argument (i. 58). This is of twenty-four kinds

(as described in the fifth book of the Nyaya aphorisms

(1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant

loses his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two

kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms,

44-67). We do not insert here all the minute sub-divisions

through fear of being too prolix, they are fully

explained in the aphorisms.

But here an objector may say,

" If these sixteen topics,

proof, &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has

received the name of the Nyaya astra, [as reasoning, ie.,

Nydya,oi logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics

which it treats of ? "] We allow the force of the objection;

still as names are proverbially said to be given for some

special reason, we maintain that the-name Nyaya was

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 165

rightly* applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or

inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a

predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of

l^powledge, and from

its^ being a necessary means for every

kind of pursuit. So it has been said by Sarvajna,

" This

is the pre-eminent science of Nyaya from its establishing

our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing

action ;

" l and by Pakshila Swamin,

" This is the science

of reasoning (dnvikshiM) divided into the different categories,

'proof/ &c. ; the lamp of all sciences, the means

for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious

duties, well proved in the declarations of science." 2

But here an objector may say,

" When you declare that

final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do

you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this

knowledge being attained ?

" We reply,

"

No," for it is

said in the second Nyaya aphorism,

"

Pain, birth, activity,

faults, false notions, on the successive annihilation of

these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next

before it," by means .of this knowledge of the truth. Now

false notions are the thinking the body, &c., which are

not the soul, to be the soul ;

"

faults

"

are a desire for those

things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to

those things which seem disagreeable to it,

3 though in

reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the

soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different

"

faults

"

the stupid man desires and the desiring man is

stupid ; the stupid man is angry, and the angry man is

stupid. Moreover the man, impelled by these faults, does

those things which are forbidden: thus by the body he does

injury, theft, &c. ; by the voice, falsehood, &c. ; by the mind,

malevolence, &c. ; and this same sinful "activity" produces

demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by

1 Action (pravfitti) follows afterthe 3 The printed text omits the third

ascertainment of the truth by nydt/a. fault,

" a stupid indifference, moha"

3

Op. Vdtsyayana's Comment., p. which is however referred to pre-

6. The Calcutta edition reads pra~ sently.

klrtitd for parttehitd.

166 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

his body, as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking,

upright counsel, &c., by his voice, and guilelessness, &c.,

by his mind; and this same right "activity produces merit.

But both are forms of activity^ and each leads to rfi

similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation

; and while this birth lasts there arises the impression

of

"

pain," which we are conscious of as of something that

jars against us. Now this series, beginning with "false

notions" and ending with "pain," is continually going

on, and is what we mean by the words " mundane existence,"

which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And

whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his

previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a

great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is

only a scene of pain and bound up with pain, he recognises

that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the

ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced it.

1

Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the

knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the

objects of right knowledge divided into the four sciences,

2

there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in

other words, a right view of things as they are ; and from

this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear. When

false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with

them ceases "

activity ;

" and with it ceases " birth ;

" and

with the cessation of

" birth

" comes the entire abolition

of "

pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its

absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that

which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly

said in the second aphorism of the Nyaya Sutras :

"

Pain,

birth, activity, faults, false notions, since, on the successive

annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of

1 In p. 1 1 6, line 3, I would read the causes of the stability of the

tannirvartakam for tannivartakam. world "

(cf. Manu, vii. 43). It

* This refers to the couplet BO occurs in K&mandaki's Nttisdra, 11

often quoted in Hindu authors, 2, and seems to be referred to in

"Logic, the three Vedas, trade and Vdtsyayana's Com. p. 3, from which

agriculture, and the eternal doctrine Mtfdhava is here borrowing,

of polity, these four sciences are

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 167

the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the

last of them] final beatitude."

"But is not your definition of the summum bonum,

liberation, i.e.,

' the absolute abolition of pain/ after all

as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to

the tongue ;

l why then is this continually put forth as if

it were established beyond all dispute ?

" We reply that

as all those who maintain liberation in any form do

include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition,

as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools,

may well be called the royal highway 2 of philosophy.

No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without

the individual's activity. Thus even the Madhyamika's

opinion that *' liberation consists in the abolition of soul/'

does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it

is the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that

the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just

like the body, &c., we reply that this does not hold, since

it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by

" the soul/' (a.) the continued succession of cognitions, or

(&.) something different therefrom ? (a.) If the former, we

make no objection, [since we Naiyayfkas allow that cognition

is evanescent,

8 and we do desire to abolish cognition

as a cause of pravritti or action 4

], for who would oppose

a view which makes for his own side ? (&.) But if the

latter, then, since it must be eternal,

6 its abolition is

impossible ; and, again, a second objection would be that

no one would try to gain your supposed "summum bonum;"

for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate

the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the prin-

1 Compare the English proverb, first moment, remains during the

" As soon as the cat can lick her second, and ceases in the third,

ear."

4 See Nyaya But. i. 2.

2

Literally the "bell- road," i.e.,

6 As otherwise why should we

" the chief road through a village, require liberation at all ? Or rather

or that by which elephants, &c., the author probably assumes that

decorated with tinkling ornaments, other Naiydyikas have sufficiently

proceed." Wilson's Diet. established this point against its

8 The cognition is produced in the opponents, of. p. 167, line 1 1,

168 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

ciple that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"

and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as

"

liberated,"

[and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or

abolition]. &

" But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the

doctrine of pure intelligence [i.e., the Yogacharas and the

Sautrantikas *], that ' the summum bonum '

is the rising of

pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the conscious

subject ?

" To this view we object that there is an

absence of means ; and also it cannot be established that

the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For

the former, if it is replied that the well-known fourfold

set of Bauddha contemplations

2 are to be accepted as the

cause, we answer that, as [according to the Bauddha tenet

of the momentary existence of all things] there cannot be

one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will

necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued

at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce

any distinct recognition of the real nature of things.

And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions

when accompanied by the natural obstacles 8 is said

to be "

bound," and when freed from those obstacles is

said to be "

liberated," you cannot establish an identity

of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say

that the very same being which was bound is now

liberated.

Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that " Liberation

is the releasing from all '

obstructions/

"

a path entirely

free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our

Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by

"

obstruction

"

?

4 If he answers "

merit, demerit, and error/' we

readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that

" the body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is

the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the

1 See *upra, pp. 24-32. 8 In the form of the various Tdeias

* All is momentary, all is pain, er "afflictions."

all is ut generis, all is unreal 4 Avaraqa, cf. pp. 55, 58.

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 169

body's annihilation, as of a parrot released from its

cage," then we must inquire whether this said soul

possesses form or not. . If it possesses form, then has it

parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the wellknown

definition of an atom will apply here as "that

which has form without parts/' it will follow that the

attributes of the soul are, like those of an atom, imperceptible

to the senses.1 If you say that it has parts, then

the general maxim that "whatever has parts is noneternal,"

would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal ;

and if this were conceded, then two grand difficulties

[against the Providential course of the world] would burst

in unopposed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at

its cessation, perish with it [and thus fail of producing

the proper fruit], while it would have reaped during life

the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil

which happened to it would not be the consequences of

its actions in a former birth]. If, on the other hand, the

Jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all,

then how can he talk of the soul's

"

upspringing," since

all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent

possessing form ?

2

Again, if we take the Charvtika's view " that the only

bondage is dependence on another, and therefore independence

is the true liberation," if by ' (

independence

" he

means the cessation of pain, we have no need to controvert

it. But if he means autocratic power, then no sensible

man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power

involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of

being equalled.

8

Again, the Sankhya opinion, which first lays down that

nature and soul are utterly distinct, and then holds that

1 But the Nydya holds that the is difficult, but I believe that pratiattributes

of the soul, as happiness, bandha.means here vydpti, as it does

desire, aversion, &c., are perceived in Sdnkhya Sutras, i. 100.

by the internal sense, mind (Bhashd

3 The true summum lonum must

P. 83). be niratifaya, incapable of being

1 The reading miirtdpratibandhdt added to.

i;o THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

"

liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after

nature* [on being known] has withdrawn," even this

opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain ; but

there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of

the distinction between nature and soul resides in the

soul or in nature. It is not consistent to say that it

resides in the soul, since the soul is held to be unchangeable,

and this would seem to involve that previously it

had been hampered by ignorance ; nor can we say that it

resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.

Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or

inactive ? If the former, then it follows that there can be

no liberation at all, since the spontaneous actions of things

cannot be set aside ; and if the latter, the course of mundane

existence would at once cease to go on.

Again, we have the same recognition of our " abolition

of pain

"

in the doctrine of Bhatta Sarvajna and his

followers, that "Liberation is the manifestation of an

eternal happiness incapable of being increased ;

" but here

we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not

come within the range of definite proof. If you allege

Sruti as the proof, we reply that fruti has no place when

the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception ;

l or

if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede

the existence of such things as floating stones.2

"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the

manifestation of happiness/ and then accept such a view

as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain,

does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic

patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour ricegruel?"

Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter

for some speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical

argument]. The truth is that all happiness must

1

YogydnupalaJbdhi is when an "grdvdnah plawnti," see Uttara

object is not seen, and yet all the Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase

usual concurrent causes of vision are atmdnah plavanti occurs in Shadv.

present, as the eye, light, &o. Br. 5, 12.

9 Alluding to the Vedic phrase,

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 171

be included under the category of pain, since, like honey

mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by pain,

either as admitting of increase,

1 or as being an object of

perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences,

or as involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds

of instruments for its production. Nor may you retort on

us that we have fulfilled the proverb of "seeking one

thing and dropping another in the search," since we have

abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some incidental

pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite

alternative is one which no one can consider desirable.

For the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness

as the summum lonum, since it is inevitably accompanied

by various causes of pain, is only like the man who

would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion

that it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got

together by rightful means, we may find many firefly-like

pleasures; but then how many are the rainy days to drown

them ? And in the case of those got together by wrong

means, the mind cannot even conceive the future issue

which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers

consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own

conscious experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as

indisputable that for him, pre-eminent among his fellows,

who, through the favour of the Supreme Being, has, by

the regular method of listening to the revealed Sruti, &c.,

attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the soul,

for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.

But it may be objected,

" Is there any proof at all for

the existence of a Supreme Being, i.e., perception, inference,

or Sruti ? Certainly perception cannot apply here,

since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c., must be beyond

the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no

universal proposition or true middle term which can

apply.

2 Nor can Sruti, since neither of the resulting

1 Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed.'*

* Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.

172 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

alternatives can be sustained ; for is it supposed to reveal,

as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal ? Under the former

view an established tenet of our school would be contradicted

[viz., that the 'Veda is non-eternal] ; under thp

latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.1 As for

comparison and any other proof which might be adduced

[as that sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need

not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter

is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.2

Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as unreal as a

hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need excite

no flurry iu the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at

once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c.,

must have had a maker from their possessing the nature

of effects just like a jar." (a.) Nor can our middle term

[possessing the nature of effects] be rejected as uuproved

(asiddha), since it can be established beyond a doubt by the

fact of the subject's possessing parts.

" But what are we to

understand by this '

possessing parts

'

? Is it

'

existing in

contact with parts/ or ' in intimate relation with parts

'

?

It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to

such eternal things as ether,

8 &c. ; nor can it be the

second, since this would prove too much, as applying to

such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, which abides

in intimate relation with the individual threads. It therefore

fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply,

that it holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as

"

belonging to the class of those substances which exist in

intimate relation." 4 Or we may adopt another view and

1 Since the Veda, if non-eternal, tact with the parts of everything, as

must [to be authoritative] have e.g., a jar.

been created by God, and yet it 4 The whole (as the jar) resides

is brought forward to reveal the by intimate relation in its parts (as

existence of God, the jar's two halves). But the eter-

3 The Nydya holds presumption nal substances, ether, time, the soul,

to be included under inference, and mind, and the atoms of earth, water,

comparison is declared to be the fire, and air, do not thus reside in anyascertaining

the relation of a name thing, although, of course, the cateto

the thing named. gory vitesha does reside in them by

3 Since ether is connected by con- intimate relation. The word " subTHE

AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 173

maintain that it is easy to infer the "

possessing the nature

of effects

"

from the consideration of their possessing intermediate

magnitude.

1

% (6.) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"

(viruddha)? since there is no such acknowledged

universal proposition connected with it as would

establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism

[i.e., that they must have had no maker], (c.) Nor is our

middle term too general (anaikdnta), since it is never

found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the

mpaksha in the argument,

" The mountain has fire because

it has smoke "]. (d.} Nor again is it precluded (bddhita

or kdldtyayopadishta), for there is no superior evidence to

exercise such a precluding power, (e.) Nor is it counterbalanced

(sat-pratipakshita\ for there does not appear to

be any such equally valid antagonist.

If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism,

"The mountains, &c., cannot have had a maker, from the

fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the

case with the eternal ether," this pretended inference

will no more stand examination than the young fawn can

stand the attack of the full-grown lion ; for the additional

words "

by a body

"

are useless, since " from the fact that

they were not produced" would be a sufficient middle

term by itself [and the argument thus involves the fallacy

called vydpyatvdsiddhi]? Nor can you retort,

"

Well, let

this then be our middle term ;

"

for you cannot establish

it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise the

stances" excludes tantutva, and "ex- older Naiya*yikas maintained that

isting in intimate relation" excludes the argument

' the mountain has fire

ether, &c. because it has blue smoke,' involved

1 Intermediate between infinite the fallacy of vydpyatvdsiddhi, beand

infinitesimal, all eternal sub- cause the alleged middle tenn was

stances being the one or the other. unnecessarily restricted (see Sid-

2 The viruddha-ketu is that which dhanta Muktdv.p. 77). The moderns,

is never found where the major term however, more wisely consider it as

is. a harmless error, and they would

1 This and much more of the rather meet the objection by assertwhole

discussion is taken from the ing that there is no proof to establish

Kusumafijali, v. 2, and I extract my the validity of the assumed middle

note on the passage there. "The term."

174 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be

liable to limitation by any suggested condition (upddhi),

1

[such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to

limit our old reason " from having the nature of effects

"J,

because we have on our side a valid line of argument to

establish our view, viz.,

"

If the mountains, &c., had no

maker, then they would not be effects

"

[but all do acknowledge

that they have the nature of effects], for in this world

that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently

of any series of concurrent causes. And this

series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker ;

and I mean by "being a maker" the being possessed of that

combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of

the proper means, which sets in motion all other causes,

but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold

that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the

necessity of the action of all the other causes would be

simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent

thereon ; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine

that effects could be produced without any cause at all

There is a rule laid down by ^ankara-kifikara which

applies directly to the present case

" When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument

to establish its validity,

"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition

on account of the [supposed] non-invariable

concomitance of the major tetm."

If you maintain that there are many sound counterarguments,

such as

"

If the Supreme Being were a maker,

He would be possessed of a body," &c., we reply, that all

such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow

that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.2

1 For the upddhi cf. pp. 7, 8. itself non-existent, cannot be the

3 As in the former case it would be locus or subject of a negation (cf.

clear that it is a subject for separate Kusumanjali, iii. 2). "Just as that

discussion ; and in the latter you subject from which a given attribute

would be liable to the fault of dfray- is excluded cannot be unreal, BO

diddhit a '* baseless inference," since neither can an unreal thing be the

your subject (or minor term), being subject of a negation."

THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 175

As has been said by Udayana Acharya [in the Kusumaiijali,

iii. 5]

"

If $ruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument

fails from being precluded ; if they are fallacious,

our old objection of a ' baseless inference '

returns stronger than ever.'*

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction

to our argument, since it would be overthrown by

either alternative of God's being known or unknown.1

"

Well, let all this be granted ; but the activity of God in

creating the world, what end did it have in view? His own

advantage or some other being's ? If it was for the former

end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to

avoid something not desired ? It could not be the first,

because this would be quite incongruous in a being who

possesses every possible desire gratified ; and for the same

reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the

latter end [the advantage of another] it would be equally

incongruous ; for who would call that being

" wise

" who

busied himself in acting for another ? If you replied that

His activity was justified by compassion, any one would at

once retort that this feeling of compassion should have

rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and

not checkered with misery, since this militates against

His compassion ; for we define compassion as the disinterested

wish to avoid causing another pain. Hence we

conclude that it is not befitting for God to create the

world. This has been said by Bhattacharya

" Not even a fool acts without some object in view ;

"

Suppose that God did not create the world, what end

would be left undone by Him ?

"

We reply, thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be

1 If God is known, then His exis- pardJtatatvdt, and then begin the

tence must be granted ; if He is not next clause with sydd etat. The

known, how can we argue about printed text, vikalpapardkwtah sydt

Him? I read lines 15, 1 6, in p. tad etat, seems unintelligible.

1 20 of the Calcutta edition, wkalpa176

THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes,

and to consider the following suggestions. His action in

creation is indeed solely caused by compassion ; but the

idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is

inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot

but arise eventual differences from the different results

which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings

who are to be created. Nor need you object that this

would interfere with God's own independence [as He

would thus seem to depend on others* actions], since there

is the well-known saying,

" One's own body does not

hinder one ;

"

nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims ;

l

and for this there is authority in such passages of the

Veda as that (in the Sveta^vatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There

is one Rudra only; he admits 2 not of a second," &c.

" But

then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning

in a circle ? [for you have to prove the Veda by the

authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's

existence by the Veda "]. We reply, that we defy you to

point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do

you suspect this

"

reciprocal dependence of each," which

you call

"

reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being

produced or in regard to their being known ?

3 It cannot

be the former, for though the production of the Veda is

dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there

is no possibility of His being produced ; nor can it be in

regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge

of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be

learned from some other source ; nor, again, can it be in

regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,

for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by

1 The aggregate of the various * The usual reading is tasthur for

subtile bodies constitutes Hiranya- tasthe.

garbha, or the supreme soul viewed 8 For these divisions of the anyonin

His relation to the world as creator, ydbraya fallacy, see Nydyavutra vritti,

while the aggregate of the gross i. 39 (p. 33).

bodies similarly constitutes his gross

body (viraj).

Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)

(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to

Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)