SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY - 1

THE

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA

OR

REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS

OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY

MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.

TRANSLATED BT

K B. COWELL, M.A.

PREFACE.

I WELL remember the interest excited among the learned

Hindus of Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-dar-

6ana-samgraha of Madhava Acharya in the Bibliotheca

Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by Pandit fSvarachandra

Vidyasagara, but a subsequent edition, with no

important alterations, was published in 1872 by Pandit

Tdrandtha Tarkavachaspati. The work had been used by

Wilson in his

" Sketch of the Eeligious Sects of the Hindus

"

(first published in the Asiatic Eesearches, vol. xvi.,

Calcutta, 1828) ; but it does not appear to have been ever

much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce ;

and those found in the North of India, as far as I have had

an opportunity of examining them, seem to be all derived

from one copy, brought originally from the South, and

therefore written in the Telugu character. Certain mistakes

are found in all aliL and probably arose from

some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I

have noticed the same thing in the Nagarf copies of

Mddhava's Commentary on the Black Yajur Veda, which

are current in the North of India. ^

As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Benb

vi PREFACE.

gal Asiatic Society, I was naturally attracted to the book ;

and I subsequently read it with my friend Pandit Mahefochandra

Nyayaratna, the present Principal of the Sanskrit

College at Calcutta. I always hoped to translate it into

English; but I was continually prevented by other engagements

while I remained in India. Soon after my

return to England, I tried to carry out my intention ; but

I found that several chapters, to which I had not paid

the same attention as to the rest, were too difficult to be

translated in England, where I could no longer enjoy the

advantage of reference to my old friends the Pandits of

the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation

aside for years, until I happened to learn that my friend,

Mr. A. E. Gough, at that time a Professor in the Sanskrit

College at Benares, was thinking of translating the book.

I at once proposed to him that we should do it together,

and he kindly consented to my proposal ; and we accordingly

each undertook certain chapters of the work. He

had the advantage of the help of some of the Pandits of

Benares, especially of Pandit Kama Mi6ra, the assistant

Professor of Saftkhya, who was himself a Eainanuja;

and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some

things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have

.been able to throw light on many of the dark sayings

with which the original abounds. Our translations

were originally published at intervals in the Benares

Pandit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been

carefully revised for their present republication.

The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu

critical ability. The author successively passes in review

PREFACE. Yii

the sixteen philosophical systems current in the fourteenth

century in the South of India, and gives what appeared

to him to be their most important tenets, and the principal

arguments by which their followers endeavoured to main-

'tain them ; and he often displays some quaint humour as

h,e throws himself for the time into the position of their

advocate, and holds, as it were, a temporary brief in

behalf of opinions entirely at variance with his own.1

We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of the

relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always interesting

to see the point of view of an acute native critic.

In the course of his sketches he frequently explains at

some length obscure details in the different systems ; and I

can hardly imagine a better guide for the Europe^ reader

who wishes to study any one of these Dar^anas in its

native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in the

Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only

draw his materials second-hand from the discussions in

the works of Brahmanical controversialists; but in the

great majority he quotes directly from the works of their

founders or leading exponents, and he is continually following

in their track even where he does not quote their

exact words.2

The systems are arranged from the Vedanta point of view,

our author having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head

1 The most remarkable instance * An index of the names of author*

of this philosophical equanimity is and works quoted is given in Dr.

that of Vdchaspati Misra, who wrote Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue,

standard treatises on each of the six pp. 162-164, and also in Professor

system B exceptthe Vaiseshika, adopt- Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p.

ing, of course, the peculiar point of 247.

view of each, and excluding for the f

time every alien tenet

via PREFACE.

of the Smarta order in the Math of ^ringeri in the

Mysore territory, founded by $amkara Acharya, the great

Veddntist teacher of the eighth century, through whose

efforts the Vedanta became what it is at present the

acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems

form a gradually ascending scale, the first, the Charvaka

and Bauddha, being the lowest as the furthest removed

from the Vedanta, and the last, the Safrkhya and Yoga,

being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.

The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their

study the noblest minds in India throughout the mediaeval

period of its history. Hiouen Thsang says of the schools

in his day :

" Les ^coles philosophiques sont constamment

en luttoi et le bruit de leurs discussions passionn^es

s'&feve comme les flots de la mer. Les hrtiques des

diverses sectes s'attachent a des maltres particuliers, et,

par des voies diflterentes, marchent tous au mme but."

We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read

the mediaeval literature. Thus, for instance, when King

Harsha wanders among the Vindhya forests, he finds

" seated on the rocks and reclining under the trees Arhata

begging monks, ^vetapadas, Mahapa^upatas, Pandarabhikshus,

Bhagavatas, Varnins, Ke^alufichanas, Lokayatikas,

Kapilas, Kanadas, Aupanishadas, fsvarakdrins, Dharma-

^astrins, Paurdnikas, Saptatantavas, ^abdas, Pancharatiikas,

&c., all listening to their own accepted tenets and

zealously defending them." l Many of these sects will

occupy us in the ensuing pages ; many of them also are

found in Madhava's poem on the controversial triumphs

1

6riharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)

PREFACE. ix

of 6amkara Acharya, and in the spurious prose work on

the same subject, ascribed to Anantanandagiri. Well

may some old poet have put into the mouth of Yudhishthira

the lines which one so often hears from the lips

of modern pandits

Veda" vibhinnaljt smritayo vibhinna,

Nasau munir yasya matam na bhinnam,

Dhannasya tattvam nihitam guhtydm,

Mahajano yena gatah sa panthdh. 1

And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,

i? rolvvv oi/crT;? TT}? aXrjdelas, TO yap ^reuSo? /Jivplas

Kaddirep al ^aic^ai ra rov UevBeo)? $ia<f>oal

r^5 <f>i\ocro<l>la$ rrj$ re ftapftdpov n ^9 re

Trvra a

E. B. C.

1 Found in the Mahabh. iii. 1 7402, with some variations. I give them

as I have heard them from Pandit Ra'mana'ra'yana Vidyaratna.

CONTENTS.

VAUB

I. The Charvaka System (E. B. C.) 2

II. The Bauddha System (A. E. G.) 12

III. The Arhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.) . . . . 36

IV. The Ramanuja System (A. E. G.) 64

V. The Piirna-prajna System (A. E. G.) . . . . 87

VI. The NakulisVPaSupata System (A. KG.). . . 103

VII. The Saiva System (E. B. C.) 112

VIII. The Pratyabhijna or Becognitive System (A. E. G.) . 128

IX. The RasesVara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.) . .137

X. The Vai&shika or Auliikya System (E. B. C.) . . 145

XL The Akshapdda or Nyaya System (E. B. C.) . . 161

XII. The Jaiminlya System (E. B. C.) 178

XIII. The Papinfya System (E. B. C.) 203

XIV. The Sankhya System (E. B. C.) 221

XV. The Patanjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.) . 231

XVI. The Vedanta or System of Samkara Acharya . . 27$

APPENDIX On the Upadhi (E. B. C.) . . . 2^

THE SARYA-DARSANA-SAMRAHA.

THE PROLOGUE.

1. I worship !iva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the

storehouse of supreme felicity ; by whom the earth and

the rest were produced, in him only has this all a maker.

2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajna-Vishnu, who knows

all the Agamas, the son of arftgapani, who has gone to

the further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has

contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning

of the term Soul.

3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable

Madhava, mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of

the milk-ocean of the fortunate Sayana.

4. Having thoroughly searched the Sastras of former

teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sayana-

Madhava 1 the lord has expounded them for the delight of

the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which

all envy has been far banished ; who finds not delight in

a garland strung of various flowers ?

1 Dr. A. 0. Burnell, in his preface -description of his body, himself being

to his edition of the Vaipsa-Bnih- the eternal soul. His use of the

mana, has solved the riddle of the term Sdyana-Mddhaval> here (not

relation of Mddhava and Sdyana. the dual) seems to prove that the two

Sdyana is a pure Dravidian name names represent the same person,

given to a child who is born after all The body seems meant by the Sayana

the elder children have died. Ma*- of the third &oka. Mayana was the

dhava elsewhere calls Sayana his father of Mrfdhava, and the true

"

younger brother," as an allegorical reading may be friman-mdyaqa-

A

CHAPTEE I.

THE CHlBViKA SYSTEM.

[WE have said in our preliminary invocation "

salutation

to 6iva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of

supreme felicity,"] but how can we attribute to the Divine

Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion

has been utterly abolished by Charvdka, the crest-gem of

the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of

Brihaspati ? The efforts of Charvdka are indeed hard to

be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the

current refrain

While life is yours, live joyously ;

None can escape Death's searching eye :

When once this frame of ours they burn,

How shall it e'er again return ?

The mass of men, in accordance with the (astras of

policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the

only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object

belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the

doctrine of Charvaka. Hence another name for that

school is Lokayata, a naifce well accordant with the

thing signified.

1

In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the

1

"gaftkara, Bhfekara, and other etymologically analysed as "preva-

Jsommentators name the Lokdya- lent in die world "

(loka and dyata).

tikae, and these appear to be a Laukayatika occurs in P&uni'a ukbranch

of the Sect of Charvdka" thagano.

(Colebrooke). Lokfyata may be

THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. 3

original principles; from these alone, when transformed

into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating

power is developed from the mixing of certain

ingredients ;

1 and when these are destroyed, intelligence at

once perishes also. They quote the ruti for this [Brihad

Arany. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these elements,

itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they

are destroyed, after death no intelligence remains." 2

Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the

attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any

soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved,

since this school holds that perception is the only source

of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual

pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called

the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind

of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure

as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably

accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish

takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having

taken as many as he wants, desists ; or just as the man

who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having

taken as much as he wants, desists. It is not therefore

for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which

our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do

not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are

wild animals to devour it ; nor do they refuse to set the

cooking-pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars

to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were

1 Kinwa IB explained as "drug or chewed together have an exhilaraseed

used to produce fermentation ting property not found in those

in the manufacture of spirits from substances severally."

sugar, bassia, &c." Colebrooke * Of course Sankara, in his cornquotes

from &ankara : "The faculty mentary, gives a very different inof

thought results from a modifica- terpretation, applying it to the cessation

of the aggregate elements in tion of individual existence when the

like manner as sugar with a ferment knowledge of the Supreme is once

and other ingredient* becomes an attained. Of. Sahara's Comm. Jaiinebriating

liquor ; and as betel, mini Sut., i. i. .

areca, lime, and extract of catechu *

4 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, lie would indeed

be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet

The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,

Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain, such is the reasoning

of fools ; (

The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,

What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because

covered with husk and dust ?

l

If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness

in a future world, then how should men of experienced

wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which

can only be performed with great expenditure of money

and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be accepted

as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are

only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted

by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;

2 then again the impostors who call themselves

Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority

of the jnana-kanda is overthrown by those who maintain

that of the karma-kanda, while those who maintain the

authority of the jnana-kanda reject that of the karmakanda

; and lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only

the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs

the popular saying

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing

oneself with ashes

?

Bfihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have

no manliness nor sense.

Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane

pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns,

&c. ; the only Supreme is the earthly monarch whose

existence is proved by all the world's eyesight ; and the

only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By holding

the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body,

1 I take kana as here equal to the Bengali iunf. Of. Atharva-V., xi.

3, 5. Atvdh hand gdva* tanduld matakd* tutkdh. eNarasii. 5*7.

THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. $

such phrases as " I am thin/*

" I am black," &c., are at

once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, &c., and selfconsciousness

will reside in the same subject [the body] ;

like and the use of the phrase

" my body

"

is metaphorical

"the head of Rahu" [Kahu being really all head}.

All this has been thus summed up

In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air ;

And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,

Just like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c., mixed together ;

Since in " I am fat,"

" I am lean," these attributes * abide in the

same subject,

And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,

2

it alone is the soul

and no other,

And such phrases as "my body

"

are only significant metaphorically.

" Be it so," says the opponent ;

"

your wish would be

gained if inference, &c., had no force of proof ; but then

they have this force ; else, if they had not, then how, on

perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent

immediately proceed to fire ; or why, on hearing another

say,

' There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those

who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore ?

"

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of

fancy.

Those who maintain the authority of inference accept

the sign or middle term as the causer of knowledge, which

middle term must be found in the minor and be itself

invariably connected with the major.

8 Now this invariable

connection must be a relation destitute of any condition

accepted or disputed;

4 and thi^connection does not possess

its power of causing inference byjvMue~of Its erm?mc^ as

the eyejpj&c., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of

ite \>zi^known. What then is the means of this connection's

beinog known ?

1

/.., personality and fatness, &c. 4 For the *andigdka and nUchita

9 I read dehe for dehah. upddhi see Siddhdnta Muktrfvali, p.

8

Literally, "must be an attribute 125. The former is accepted only

of the subject and have invariable by oneyarty.

concomitance (vydpti)"

6 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

We will first show that it is not perception. Now perception

is held to be of two kinds, external and internal

[i.e., as produced by the external senses, or by the inner

sense, mind]. The former is not the required means ; for

although it is possible that the actual contact of the

senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the

particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can

never be such contact in the case of the past or the future,

the universal proposition

l which was to embrace the invariable

connection of the middle and major terms in

every case becomes impossible to be known. Nor may

you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition

has the general class as its object, because if so,

there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable

connection in this particular case 2

[as, for instance,

in this particular smoke as implying fire].

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot

establish that the mind has any power to act independently

towards an external object, since all allow that it

is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by

one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their objects as

described; but mind externally is dependent on the

others."

Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the

universal proposition, since in the case of this inference

we should also- require another inference to establish it,

and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad

infinilum retrogression.

Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may

either allege in reply, in accordance with the VaiSeshika

doctrine of Kandda, that this is included in the topic of

inference; or else we may hold ffiat"15is fresh proof of

testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that

1

Literally, the knowledge of the thus idiots are men, though man

invariable oonoomitanoe (as of smoke is a rational animal ; and again, this

by five). particular smoke might be a sign of

8 The attributes of the class are a fire in some other place,

not always found in every member.

THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. 7:

stopped the progress of 'inference, since it depends itself

on the recognition of ajjg^injihejormof thfiJLanguage

nsecfin the child's presence by the old man; 1

and, moreover,

there is no more reason for our believing on another's

word that smoke and fire are invariably connected, than

for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu, &c. [which, of

course, we Charvakas reject].

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only

means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then

in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable

connection between the middle and major terms had not

been pointed out by another person, there could be no

inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as

smoke] ; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of

inference for oneself 2 would have to end in mere idle

words.

Then again comparison* &c., must be utterly rejected as

the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition,

since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge

of the unconditioned connection [i.e., the universal proposition],

because tfreir end is to produce the knowledge of

quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name to

something so named.

Again, this same absence of a condition,

4 which has been

given as the definition of an invariable connection [i.e.t a

universal proposition], can itself never be known ; since it

is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects

of perception; and therefore, although the absence of per-

1 See Sdhitya Darpana (Ballan- named" Ballantyne's Tarka Santyne's

trans, p. 16), and Siddhanta- graha.

M..p.8o.

4 The upadhi is the conditionwhich

1 The properly logical, as distin- must be supplied to restrict a too

guished from the rhetorical, argu- general

middle term, aa in the inment

ference "the mountain has smoke

* u Upmdna or the knowledge of because it has fire," if we add wet

ft similarity is the instrument in the fuel as the condition of the fire, the

production of an inference from middle term will be no longer too

similarity. This particular inference general In the case of atruevyapti,

consists in the knowledge of the there %f course, no upadhi

relation of a name to something so

4 THE SARVA.DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

ceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of

non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible ; and

thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference,

&c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already

been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the

definition of the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal

or equipollent in extension l with the major term though

not constantly accompanying the middle." These three

distinguishing clauses,

" not constantly accompanying the

middle term,"

"

constantly accompanying the major term,"

and "being constantly accompanied by it

"

[i.e., reciprocal]*

are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three

such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the

non-eternity of sound, as

"

being produced,"

" the nature

of a jar," and "

the not causing audition ;

" 2 wherefore the

definition holds, and again it is established by the floka

of the great Doctor beginning samdsama*

wherever the class of jar is found

there is also found non-eternity.

Lastly, if we defined the upddhi as

"not constantly accompanying the

middle term, and constantly accompanying

the major," we might have

as a Mimfcpsaka upddhi "the not

causing audition," i.e., the not being

apprehended by the organs of hearing

; but this is excluded, as non-eternity

is not always found where this

is, ether being inaudible and yet

eternal.

8 This refers to an obscure sloka

of Udayan&hfrya,

" where a reciprocal

and a non-reciprocal universal

connection (i.e., universal propositions

which severally do and do not

distribute their predicates) relate to

the same argument (as e.g., to prove

the existence of smoke), there that

non-reciprocating term of the second

will be a fallacious middle, which is

not invariably accompanied by the

other reciprocal of the first," Thus

"the mountain has smoke because it

has fire" (here fire and smoke are

non-reciprocating, as fire is not found

invariably accompanied by smoke

. . (Pr. Anal., ii. 25).

We have here our A with distributed

predicate.

2 If we omitted the first clause,

andonlymadetheupidhi "that which

constantly accompanies the

major

term and is constantly accompanied

by it," then in the Naiyrfyika argument

"sound is non-eternal, because

it has the nature of sound," "being

produced

" would serve as a Mimdxnsaka

upidhi, to establish the vyabkichdra

fallacy, as it is reciprocal

with "non-eternal ;" but the omitted

clause excludes it, as an uptfdhi

must be consistent with either party's

opinions, and, of course, the Naiya*-

yika maintains that "being produced

"

dway* accompanies the class

of sound. Similarly, if we defined

the upddhi as "not constantly accompanying

the middle term and constantly

accompanied by the major,"

we might have as an upddhi "the

nature of a jar," as this is never

found with the middle term (the

class or nature of sound only residing

in sound, and that of a jar only

la ft jar), while, at the same time,

THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. $

But since the knowledge of the condition must here

precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is

only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that

'the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is

possible, i.e., a knowledge in the form of such a connection

between the middle term and major term as is distinguished

by the absence of any such condition ; and on the other

hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the

knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten

on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-

like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the

impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition

it becomes impossible to establish inference, &C.1

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of

Smoke, &c., to the knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted

for by its being based on a former perception or by its

being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified

by the result, is accidental just like the coincidence of

effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,

drugs, &c.

From this it follows that fate, &c.,

2 do not exist, since

these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent

will say, if you thus do not allow adrishta, the various

phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause.

though smoke is by fire), or "because which is the reciprocal of fire. I

it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and wish to add here, once for all, that

fire from wet fuel being reciprocal I own my explanation of this, as

and always accompanying each well as many another, difficulty

other) ; the non-reciprocating term in the Sarva-dars*ana-6angraha to

of the former (fire) will give a falla- my old friend and teacher, Pandit

cious inference, because it is also, of Mahe&b Chandra Nyriyaratna, of the

course, not invariably accompanied Calcutta Sanskrit College,

by the special kind of fire, that prol

Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp.

duced from wet fuel. But this will ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist

not be the case where the non-re- system infra, we have an attempt

ciprocating term it thus invariably to establish the authority of the

accompanied by the other reciprocal, universal proposition from the relaa

" the mountain has fire because it tion of cause and effect or genus and

has smoke ;

"

here, though fire and species.

noke do not reciprocate, yet smoke .

*

Adftihfa i.e., the merit and dewill

be a true middle, because it is merit in our Actions which produce

invariably accompanied by heat, their effects in future births.

jo THE, SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since

these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously

from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been

said

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn ;

By whom came this variety 1 from their own nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Briliaspati

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another

world,

Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real

effect

The Agnihotra, the three Yedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smear*

ing one's self with ashes,

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge

and manliness.

If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven,

Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father ?

l

If the dr&ddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless

to give provisions for the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Srdddha here,

Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing

on the housetop ?

While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even

though he runs in debt ;

When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again ?

If he who departs from the body goes to another world,

How is it that he comes not back again^ restless for love of his

kindred ?

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established

here

All these ceremonies for the dead, there is no other fruit anywhere.

The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.

All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, turpharl, &C.1

And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aiwa*

xnedha,

1 This is an old Buddhist retort Aawamedba rites, see Wilson's Big.

See Burnonf, Introd., p. 209. Veda, Preface, vol. ii p. ziil

.

*

Rig -Veda, x. 106. For the

THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. n

These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents

to the priests,

1

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling

demons.

i Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we

fly for refuge to the doctrine of Charvaka. Such is the

pleasant consummation. E. B. C.

1 Or this may mean " and all the^various other things to be handled in

the rites.'

1

CHAPTER II.

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.

AT this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you

(Charvakas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining

invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable,

inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable

by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly

been said

" From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity

as & determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance

not through the mere observation of

the desired result-in similar cases, nor through the

non-observation of it in dissimilar cases." x

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyayikas) that it is concomitance

and non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B*is,

A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable

connection, the unconditional attendance of the major

or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being

impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances

past and future, and present but unperceived.

If one (a Naiyayika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to

such instances is equally inevitable on our system, we

reply : Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect

may be produced without any cause would destroy itself

by putting a stop to activity of any kind ; for such doubts

* This Aoka is quoted in the the second line is there read more

" Benares Pandit," vol. i p. 89, with correctly, 'dariandn na na darfandt*

A commentary, and the latter part of

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 13

alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of which

does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like,

as it has been said,

" Doubt terminates where there is a

practical absurdity."

l

}

I. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz.,

of the designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable

concomitance (of the major) ; and the ascertainment of

such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of

five causes, in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of

cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand

in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by five

indications, viz., (i.) That an effect is not cognised prior

to its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.)

the effect is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised

(4.) there is its non-cognition, (5.) when the (material)

cause is no longer cognised.

'

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained

by the ascertainment of identity (e.g., a sisu-tree is

a tree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we

observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attaching

to the contrary opinion, inasmuch as if a sisu-tree

should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But,

on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and

where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed,

who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance ?

An ascertainment of the identity of sisu and tree is competent

in virtue of the reference to the same object (i.e.,

predication), This tree is a sisu. For reference to the

same object (predication) is not competent where there is

no difference whatever (e.g., to say,

" A jar is a jar," is no

combination of diverse attributes in a common subject),

because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be

simultaneously employed ; nor can reference to the same

object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion (of

the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, for instance,

horse and cow predicated the one of the ojher.

1 Kusumdnjaft iii 7.

14 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same

supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable copcomitants).'

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of

evidence,pramdi^at one may reply : You merely assert thus

much, that inference is not a form of evidence : do you

allege no proof of this, or do you allege any ? The former

alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that

bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted Nor is

the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert

that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some

truncated argument (to prove, i.e., infer, that it is none),

you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted

your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm

that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the

corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homogeneity,

you yourself admit induction by identity. Again,

when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known

by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction

by causality. When you deny the existence of any object

on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself

admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle

term. Conformably it has been said by Tathagata

" The admission of a form of evidence in general results

from its being present to the understanding of

others*

" The existence of a form of evidence also follows from

its negation by a certain person."

All this has been fully handled by great authorities;

and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our

treatise.

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man

from four standpoints. Celebrated under the designations

of Madhyamika, Yogdchdra, Sautrantika, and Vaibhashika,

these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a

universal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective

idealism), the inferribility of external objects (representaTHE

BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 15

tionism), and the perceptibility of external objects (presentationism).

1 Though the venerated Buddha be the only

one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of

this diversity of views; just as when one has said, "The

sun has set," the adulterer, the thief, the divinity student,

and others understand that it is time to set about their

assignations, their theft, their religious duties, and so forth,

^according to their several inclinations.

It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have

been laid out, viz., (i.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.)

all is pain, pain; (3.) all is like itself alone; (4.) all is

void, void.

Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting

things, blue and so forth (i.e., whatever be their quality),

is to be inferred from their existence ; thus, whatever is

is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all

these things are.2 Nor may any one object that the

middle term (existence) is unestablished ; for an existence

consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception

to belong to the blue and other momentary things ;

and the exclusion of existence from that which is not

momentary is established, provided that we exclude from

1 The Bauddhas are thus divided is that ? That conclusion is that

into you never, even for the shortest time

(I.) Maclhyamikas or Nihilists. that can be named or conceived, see

(2.) Yogacharas or Subjective any abiding colour, any colour which

Idealists. truly t& Within the millionth part

^ (3.) Sautrdntikas or Representa- of a second the whole glory of the

tionists. painted heavens has undergone an

(4.) Vaibhdshikas or Presenta- incalculable series of mutations. One

tionists. shade is supplanted by another with

* Of. Fender's Lectures and Re- a rapidity which sets all measuremains,

vol. i. p. 119. ment at defiance, but because the

"

Suppose yourself gazing on a process is one to which no measuregorgeous

sunset. The whole western ment applies, . . . reason refuses

heavens are glowing with roseate to lay an arrestment on any period

hues, but you are aware that with- of the passing scene, or to declare

in half an hour all these glorious that it is, because in the very act of

tints will have faded away into a being it is not ; it has given place to

dull ashen grey. You see them even something else. It is a series of

now melting away before your eyes, fleeting colours, no one of which w,

although your eyes cannot place be- because each of them continually

fore you the conclusion which your vanishes in anot^sr."

reason draws. And what conclusion

16 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, according

to the rule that exclusion of the continent is exclusion

of the contained. Now this practical efficiency (here

identified with existence) is contained under succession

and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between

succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there

being a manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, accord*

ing to the rule

" In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior

alternative ;

"Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a

repugnance in the very statement." 1

And this succession and simultaneity being excluded

from the permanent, and also excluding from the permanent

all practical efficiency, determine existence of the

alternative of momentariness. Q.E.D.

Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical

efficiency reside in the non-fluxional (or permanent) ? If

so, this is wrong, as obnoxious to the following dilemma.

Has your "permanent" a power of past and future practical

efficiency during its exertion of present practical efficiency

or no ? On the former alternative (if it has such power),

it cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because

we cannot deny that it has power, and because we infer

the consequence, that which can at any time do anything

does not fail to do that at that time, as, for instance, a complement

of causes, and this entity is thus powerful. On the

latter 'alternative (if the permanent has no such power of

past and future agency), it will never do anything, because

practical efficiency results from power only; what at any

time does not do anything, that at that time is unable to

do it, as, for instance, a piece of stone does not produce a

germ ; and this entity while exerting its present practical

efficiency, does not exert its past and future practical

efficiency. Such is the contradiction.

You will perhaps rejoin : By assuming successive sub-

1

Principium exchuri xnedii inter duo contradictoria.

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 17

sidiaries, there is competent to the permanent entity a

successive exertion of past and future practical efficiency.

If so, we would ask you to explain : Do the subsidiaries

assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are not

^required ; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing

to do with the successive exertion. If they do assist the

thing, is this assistance (or supplementation) other than

the thing or not ? If it is other than the thing, then this

adscititious (assistance) is the cause, and the non-momentary

entity is not the cause : for the effect will then follow,

by concomitance and non-concomitance, the adventitious

supplementation. Thus it has been said :

" What have rain and shine to do with the soul ? Their

effect is on the skin of man ;

"

If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent

; and if the skin were like the soul, there could

be no effect produced upon it."

Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect,

together with its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let

the entity not give up its subsidiaries, but rather tie them

lest they fly with a rope round their neck, and so produce

the effect which it has to produce, and without forfeiting

its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does the

additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries

give rise to another additament or not? In

either case the afore-mentioned objections will come down

upon you like a shower of stones. On the alternative

that the additament takes on another additament, you will

be embarrassed by a many-sided regress in infinitum. If

when the additament is to be generated another auxiliary

(or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless

series of such additaments : this must be confessed to be

one infinite regress. For example, let a seed be granted

to be productive when an additament is given, consisting

of a complement of objects such as water, wind, and the

like, as subsidiaries; otherwise ancadditament would be

manifested without subsidiaries. ISow the seed in taking

18 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

on the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior)

subsidiaries; otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries,

it would follow that a germ would always be

arising from the seed. We shall now have to add to the

seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves

requiring an additament. If when this additament is

given, the seed be productive only on condition of subsidiaries

as before, there will be established an infinite

regression of additaments to (or supplementations of) the

seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.

Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for

the production of the effect produce its effect independently

of the seed and the like, or does it require the seed and

the like ? On the first alternative (if the supplementation

works independently), it would ensue that the seed is in

no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation

require the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is

thus required, must take on a supplementation or additament,

and thus there will be over and over again an endless

series of additaments added to the additament constituted

by the seed ; and thus a second infinite regression

is firmly set up.

In like manner the subsidiary which is required will

add another subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be

that is the subject of the additions, and thus there will be

an endless succession of additaments added to the additaments

to the seed which is supplemented by the subsidiaries;

and so a third infinite regression will add to

your embarrassment.

Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted

that a supplementation identical with the entity (the seed,

or whatever it may be) is taken on. If so, the former

entity, that minus the supplementation, is no more, and a

new entity identical with the supplementation, and designated

(in the techrfology of Buddhism) kurvad rtipa (or

effect-producing object), comes into being : and thus the

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM., i 9

tree of my desires (ray doctrine of a universal flux) has

borne its fruit.

Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is

inadmissible. Nor is practical efficiency possible apart

from succession in time ; for such a possibility is redargued

by the following dilemma. Is this (permanent) entity

(which you contend for) able to produce all its effects

simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production

of effects ? On the former alternative, it will result

that the entity will produce its effects just as much at one

time as at another ; on the second alternative, the expectation

of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting seed

eaten by a mouse to germinate.

That to which contrary determinations are attributed is

diverse, as heat and cold ; but this thing is determined by

contrary attributions. Such is the argumentation applied

to the cloud (to prove that it has not a permanent but a

fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term disallowable,

for possession and privation of power and impotence are

allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at

different times. The concomitance and non-concomitance

already described (viz., That which can at any time do

anything does not fail to do that at that time, and What

at any time does not do anything, that at that time is

unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence

of such power. The negative rule is : What at any time

is unable* to produce anything, that at that time does not

produce it, as a piece of stone, for example, does not produce

a germ; and this entity (the seed, or whatever it

may be), while exerting a present practical efficiency, is

incapable of past and future practical efficiencies. The

contradiction violating this rule is : What at any time

does anything, that at that time is able to do that

thing, as a complement of causes is able to produce its

effect; and this (permanent) entity exerts at tirrle past

and time future the practical efficiencies proper to those

times.

20 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary

; there being observed in regard to existence a negative

rule, that in regard to permanent succession and

simultaneity being excluded, existence which contains

succession and simultaneity is not cognisable ; and therer

being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in

virtue of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent

is accompanied or "pervaded" by the momentary), and

in virtue of a non-concomitance observed (viz., that the

non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by the

non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jnana-lri

" What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent

things ;

" The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,

and belongs to the ideal ; but this power exists not

as eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.) ;

" Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could

do the work of another ;

" For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and simultaneity),

a momentary flux is congruous and remains

true in regard to that which we have to

prove."

Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis

of the Vaieshikas and Naiyayikas, that existence is a

participation in the universal form existence; for were

this the case, universality, particularity, and co-inhesion

(which do not participate in the universal) could have no

existence.

Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity,

and co-inhesion dependent on any sui generis

existence of their own ; for such an hypothesis is operose,

requiring too many sui generis existences. Moreover, the

existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma

regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the

many) ; and there is not presented to us any one form

running through all the diverse momentary things, mustardseeds,

mountains, and so forth, like the string running

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 21

through the gems strung upon it. Moreover (we would

ask), is the universal omnipresent or present everywhere in

its subjicible subjects ? If it is everywhere, all things in

the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be

^eternal), and you will be involved in a tenet you reject,

since PraSasta-pada has said,

" Present in all its subjects."

Again (if the universal is present only in its proper subjects),

does the universal (the nature of a jar) residing in

an already existing jar, on being attached to another jar

now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the

other, or not come from it ? On the first alternative (if it

comes), the universal must be a substance (for substances

alone underlie qualities and motions) ; whereas, if it does

not come, it cannot attach itself to the new jar. Again

(we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, does the universal

outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another place ? On

the first supposition it will exist without a subject to

inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it

eternal (as you do) ; on the third, it will follow that it is

a substance (or base of qualities and motions). Destroyed

as it is by the malign influence of these and the like

objections, the universal is unauthenticated.

Conformably it has been said

" Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one

place, engages without moving from that place in

producing itself in another place.

" This entity (universality) is not connected with that

wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which

occupies that place : great is this miracle.

"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently

divided, it quits not its former repository :

what a series of difficulties !

"

If you ask : On what does the assurance that the one

exists in the many rest ? You must be satisfied with the

reply that we concede it to repose on difference from that

which is different (or exclusion ot heterogeneity). We

dismiss further prolixity.

Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)

(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to

Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)