THE
SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA
OR
REVIEW
OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS
OF
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
BY
MiDHAVA
iCHiBYA.
TRANSLATED
BT
K
B. COWELL, M.A.
42
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
his
own word ? How can you establish either when they
thus
both depend on reciprocal support ?
6.
"[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was
uttered
by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's
existence;'
how can either point be established without i
some
previously established foundation ?
7.
"But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on
the
baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the
meaning
of a real omniscient's words.
8.
"
And again, if we now could see anything like an
omniscient
being, we might have a chance of recognising
him
by the [well-known fourth] proof, comparison
(upamdna).
9.
"And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina],
which
embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established
as
authoritative, if there were not in him the attribute of
omniscience,1
and so on/'
We
reply as follows : As for the supposed contradiction
of
an Arhat's existence, derived from the failure of the
five
affirmative proofs, this is untenable, because there
are
proofs, as inference, &c., which do establish 2 his
existence.
Thus any soul will become omniscient when,
(its
natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining
the
same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done
away.
Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing
any
object, will, when its hindrances to such knowledge
are
done away, actually know it, just as the sense of
vision
cognises form, directly the hindrances of darkness,
&c.,
are removed. Now there is such a soul, which has
its
hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasp-
1
Kumdrila tries to prove that no would not be true and authoritative,
such
being can exist, as his existence but we see that they are, therefore
is
not established by any one of the he is omniscient." He answers by
five
recognised proofs, the sixth, retorting that the same argument
abhdva,
being negative, is, of course, might be used of Buddha by a Budnot
applicable.
I understand the dhist; and as the Jaina himself would
last
61oka as showing the inapplic- disallow it in that case, it cannot be
ability
of "presumption" or arthd- convincing in his own.
patti.
A Jaina would say, "If the 3 In p. 29, line 2, read tatsadbhdvd-
Arhat
were not omniscient, his words vedakuya for tatdadbhdvdddaiya.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 43
ing
all things remaining unchanged; therefore there is
an
omniscient being. Nor is the assertion unestablished
that
the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things ;
for
otherwise the Mimamsist could not maintain that a
knowledge
of all possible cases can be produced by the
authoritative
injunction of a text,
1
nor could there otherwise
be
the knowledge of universal propositions, such as
that
in our favourite argument,
"
All things are indeterminate
from
the very fact of their existence" [and, of
course,
a follower of the Nyaya will grant that universal
propositions
can be known, though he will dispute the
truth
of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the
teachers
of the Piirva Mimamsa accept the thesis that the
soul
has a natural capacity for grasping all things ; since
they
allow that a knowledge embracing all things can be
produced
by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions,
as
is said [by Sabara in his commentary on the Siitras,
i.
I, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present,
the
future, the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c."
Nor
can you say that "it is impossible to destroy the
obstructions
which hinder the soul's knowing all things,"
because
we [Jainas] are convinced that there are certain
special
means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
["gems"],
right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all
inferior
assaults of argument can be put to flight.
But
the Naiyayika may interpose, "You talk of the
pure
intelligence, which, after all hindrances are done
away,
sees all objects, having sense-perception at its
height;
but this is irrelevant, because there can be no
hindrance
to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
been
always liberated." We reply that there is no proof
of
your eternally liberated being. There cannot be an
omniscient
who is eternally "liberated," from the very
fact
of his being
"
liberated,"
like other liberated persons,
since
the use of the term "liberated" necessarily im-
29,
line 9, for nikh&drtkajfiandt notpauy, I propose to read
iidnotpatty.
44
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
plies
the having been previously bound ; and if the latter
is
absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
the
ether.
"
But is not this being's existence definitely
proved
by his being the maker of that eternal series of
effects,
the earth, &c. ? according to the well-known argument,
' the
earth, &c., must have had a maker, because they
have
the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This argument,
however,
will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
have
the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from
the
fact of their being composed of parts, because this
supposition
falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this
"
being
composed of parts
"
mean (i.) the being in contact
with
the parts ; or (ii.)
"
the being in intimate relation to
the
parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
(iv.)
the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.)
the
being the object of an idea involving the notion of
parts?
Not
the first, Because it would apply too widely, as it
would
include ether [since this, though not itself composed
of
parts, is in contact with the parts of other things ;] nor
the
second, because it would similarly include genus, &c.
[as
this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and
yet
itself is not composed of parts ;] nor the third, because
this
involves a term (" produced ") just as much disputed
as
the one directly in question ;
l
nor the fourth, because
its
neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative
:
Do you mean by your phrase used above that it
is
to be a substance, and to have something else in intimate
relation
to itself, or do you mean that it must
have
intimate relation to something else, in order to
be
valid for your argument ? If you say the former, it
will
equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
has
its qualities resident in it by intimate relation ; if you
say
the latter, your new position involves as much dispute
as
the original point, since you would have to prove the
existence
of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called
1
Janya is included in Kdrya and equally disputed.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 45
"intimate
causes," which you mean by
"
something
else."
We
use these terms in compliance with your terminology ;
but,
of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
such
a thing as " intimate relation," as there is no proof of
tits
existence.
Nor
can the fifth alternative be allowed, because this
would
reach too far. as it would include soul, &c., since
soul
can be the object of an idea involving the notion
of
parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect.1
Nor
can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible
in
itself, but by reason of its connection with something
possessing
parts may itself become metaphorically
the
object of an idea involving the notion of parts,
because
there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of
that
which has no parts and that which is all-pervading,
just
as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not allpervading],
And,
moreover, is there only one maker ? Or, again, is
he
independent ?
In
the former case your position will apply too far, as
it
will extend erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for
ourselves
the work of many different men, as carpenters,
&c.,
and [in the second case] if all the world were produced
by
this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous.
As
it has been said in the Vttardgastuti, or " Praise of
Jina"
1.
"There is one eternal maker for the world, allpervading,
independent,
and true; they have noiie of
these
inextricable delusions, whose teacher art thou"
And
again
2.
"
There is here no maker acting by his own free will,
else
his influence would extend to the making of a mat.
What
would be the use of yourself or all the artisans, if
fabricates
the three worlds ?
"
1
Thus "I am possessed of a predicate involving the notion of
body
"
(aham
tfarirl),
"
my hand," parts> app&ed to the soul " L"
&o.,
are all sentences in which a
46
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
Therefore
it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience
is
produced when the hindrances are removed by the three
means
before alluded to.
Nor
need the objection be made that "
right
intuition,"
&c.,
are impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to, ,
because
this universal knowledge can be produced by the
inspired
works of former omniscient Jinas. Nor is our
doctrine
liable to the imputation of such faults as Anyonyd^
rayatd,
1
&c.,
because we accept an eternal succession
of
revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the endless
series
of seed springing from shoot and shoot from
seed.
So much for this preliminary discussion.
The
well-known triad called the three gems, right
intuition,
&c., are thus described in the Paramdgamasdra
(which
is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the
Arhats)
"
Eight
intuition, right knowledge, right conduct
are
the path of liberation/' This has been thus explained
by
Togadeva :
(a.)
When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul,
&c.,
has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance
with
their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, i.e., the
entire
absence of any contrary idea, is
"
right
intuition/'
And
to this effect runs the Tattodrtha-stitra,
"
Faith in the
predicaments
2
is right
'
intuition/
"
Or,
as another definition
gives
it,
"
Acquiescence
in the predicaments declared
by
a Jina is called '
right
faith ;
'
it
is produced either by
natural
character or by the guru's instruction."
"
Natural
character
"
means the soul's own nature, independent of
another's
teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced
by
the teaching of another in the form of explanation,
&c.
(&.)
"
Eight
knowledge
"
is
a knowledge of the predicaments,
soul,
&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed
by,any
illusion or doubt ; as it has been said
1
Reasoning in a circle. I sup- that it is actually borne out in a case
pose
the &c. includes the Anavastkd- before everybody's eyes.
dotha
or reasoning ad infinitum. He 3 In p. 31, line 5, infra, read taiaccepts
the
supposed fault, and holds tvdrthc for tattvdrtJiam.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 47
"
That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail
the
predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right
knowledge
'
by
the wise."
This
knowledge is fivefold as divided into mati, Sruta,
jivadhi,
manas-parydya, and Jcevala; as it has been said,
"Mati,
ruta, avadhi, manas-parydya, and kevala, these
are
knowledge." The meaning of this is as follows :
1. Mati
is that by which one cognises an object through
the
operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions
of
knowledge being abolished.
2.
Sruta is the clear knowledge produced by inati, all
the
obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
3.
Avadhi is the knowledge of special objects caused
by
the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by
"
right
intuition,"
&C.1
4.
Manas-parydya is the clear definite knowledge of
another's
thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the
obstructions
of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
5.
Kevala is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake
of
which ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
The
first of these (mati) is not self-cognised, the other
four
are. Thus it has been said
"True
knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow,
and
which manifests itself as well as its object ; it
is
both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as
the
object is determined in two ways."
But
the full account of the further minute divisions must
be
got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
(c.)
"
Eight
conduct "
is
the abstaining from all actions
tending
to evil courses by one who possesses faith and
knowledge,
and who is diligent in cutting off the series of
actions
and their effects which constitutes mundane existence.
This
has been explained at length by the Arhat
I.
"Eight conduct is described as the entire relinquish-
1 I
read in p. 32, line 9, Samyag- by the abolition of hindrances pro
daricmddi
for atamyagdartanddi ; duced by the \ualitieB, wrong inbut
the
old text may mean " caused tuition," &c.
48
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
xnent
of blamable impulses ; this has been subjected to a
fivefold
division, as the ' five vows/ ahimsd, stinrita, asteya,
foahmacharyd,
and aparigraha.
1
2.
"
The ' vow ' of ahimsd is the avoidance of injuring
life
by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or
immovable
thing.
3.
"
A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the
'vow'
of stinrita. That truthful speech is not truthful,
which
is unkind to others and prejudicial.
4.
"The not taking what is not given is declared to
be
the ' vow '
of
asteya; the external life is a man's property,
and,
when it is killed, it is killed by some one who
seizes
it.
5.
"The 'vow' of brahmacharyd (chastity) is eighteenfold,
viz.,
the abandonment of all desires,
2
heavenly
or
earthly,
in thought, word, and deed, and whether by one's
own
action or by one's consent, or by one's causing another
to
act.
6.
"
The c vow '
of
aparigraha is the renouncing of all
delusive
interest in everything that exists not; since
bewilderment
of thought may arise from a delusive interest
even
in the unreal.
7.
"
When carried out by the five states of mind in a
fivefold
order, these great
c
vows ' of the world produce the
eternal
abode."
The
full account of the five states of mind (bhdvand)
has
been given in the following passage [of which we only
quote
one lloka]
"
Let him carry out the ' vow* of stinrita uninterruptedly
by
the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger,
and
by the deliberate avoidance of speech,"
8
and so forth.
These
three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right
conduct,
when united, produce liberation, but not severally;
just
as, in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of
1
Of. the five yamat in the Toga-
* I
read idmdndm for kdmdndm
*tttro*,ii3O.
Hemachandra^ft&idA in p. 33, line 7 (2 x 3 x 3 = 18).
Si)
calls them yomat.
*
For abhdthana, see Hemach. 16.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 49
what
it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application
of
the medicine,
1
united,
which produce the elixir's effect,
but
not severally.
Here
we may say concisely that the tattvas or predicaments
are
two, jim and ajiva ; the soul, jtiva, is pure
intelligence
; the non-soul, ajiva, is pure non-intelligence.
Padmanandin
has thus said
"The
two highest predicaments are 'soul* and 'nonsoul
;
' '
discrimination '
is
the power of discriminating
these
two, in one who pursues what is to be pursued, and
rejects
what is to be rejected. The affection, &c., of the
agent
are to be rejected ; these are objects for the nondiscriminating
;
the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone
to
be pursued, which is defined as upayoga"
Upayoga
[or
"
the true employment of the soul's activities"]
takes
place when the vision of true knowledge
recognises
the manifestation of the soul's innate nature ;
but
as long] as the soul, by the bond of pradeGa and the
mutual
interpenetration of form which it produces [between
the
soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
its
actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge
should
rather be defined as
"
the cause of its recognising
that
it is other than these." 2
Intelligence
(chaitanya) is common to all souls, and is
the
real nature of the soul viewed as parinata [i.e., as it is
in
itself] ; but by the influence of upaamakshaya and
TcshayopaSama
it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing
both,
8
or again, by the influence of actions as they
arise,
it assumes the appearance of foulness, &c.4 As has
been
said by Vachakacharya [in 'a sutra]
1 I
propose in p. 33, line 17, ra- 8 Or this may mean "by the
infayaTiajMrTwfraddhdvachdraridni
for
fluenoe of upatama-ksltaya or kslui-
TtudyaTiajflanaijigraddMndvarandni.
yopaxama, it appears characterised
For
avachdra-ria, see Svdruta, vol. ii. by one or the other."
P-
I57 &c.
'
If
andvarana be the 4 I read in p. 34, line 7, Iccdushdtrue
reading,
I suppose it must mean dydlcdre^a for Icaluzhdnydkdrena.
"the
absence of obstructions." The upatamaJcshaya and fahayopad-
(
a
This is a hard passage, but some ama seem to corre& *>nd to the aupa-
Bght
is thrown on it by the scholiast famika and kehdyifia states about to
to
Hemachandra, Athidh. 79. be described.
50
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
"
The aupaSamika, the KsMyika, and the ' mixed '
states
are
the nature of the soul, and also the audayika and the
Pdrindmika.9'
1.
The aupa&amika, state of the soul arises when all the
effects
of past actions have ceased, and no new actions
arise
[to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily
pure
through the defiling mud sinking to the
bottom
by the influence of the clearing nut-plant,
1
&c.
2.
The Kshdyika state arises when there is the absolute
abolition
of actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
3.
The " mixed "
(mira)
state combines both these, as
when
water is partly pure.
4.
The audayika state is when actions arise [exerting
an
inherent influence on the future]. The Pdrindmika
state
is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence,
&c.,
and disregarding its apparent states, as (i), (2), (3),
(4).
2
This nature, in one of the above-described varieties,
is
the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy.
This
is the meaning of the siitra quoted above.
This
has been explained in the Svartipa-sambodhana
"
Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical
with
it, in some way both different and the same,
knowledge
is its first and last ; such is the soul described
to
be."
If
you say that,
"
As difference and identity are mutually
exclusive,
we must have one or the other in the case of
the
soul, and its being equally both is absurd," we reply,
that
there is no evidence to support you when you
characterise
it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception
8
can
thus preclude a suggestion as absurd ; but this is not
found
in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
advocates
of the Sydd-vdda) it is perfectly notorious that
all
things present a mingled nature of many contradictory
attributes.
1
Strychno*
potatorum.
' A
valid non-perception is when
*
Just as in the Sankhya philo- an object is not seen, and yet all the
eopby,
the soul is not really bound usual concurrent causes of vision are
though
it seems to itself to be so. present, such as the eye, light, &o.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 51
Others
lay down a different set' of tattvas from the two
mentioned
above, jiva and ajiva; they hold that there
are
five astik&yas or categories, -jiva, dkdSa, dharma,
adharma,
and pudgala. To all these five we can apply
tye
idea of "existence" (asti),
1
as connected with the
three
divisions of time, and we can similarly apply the
idea
of
"
body
"
(kdya)?
from their occupying several parts
of
space.
Thejivas
(souls) are divided into two, the "mundane"
and
the "released." The "mundane" pass from birth to
birth
; and these are also divided into two, as those possessing
an
internal sense (samanaska), and those destitute
of
it (amanaska). The former possesses samjfld, i.e., the
power
of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving instruction
;
the latter are those without this power. These
latter
are also divided into two, as " locomotive
"
(trasa),
or
" immovable "
(sthdvara).
The
"locomotive" are those possessing at least two
senses
[touch and taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are
thus
of four kinds [as possessing two, three, four, or five
senses];
the " immovable" are earth, water, fire, air, and
trees,8
But here a distinction must be made. The dust
of
the road is properly
"
earth,"
but bricks, &c., are aggregated
"
bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body
is
appropriated becomes "
earthen-bodied,"
and that soul
which
will hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul."
The
same four divisions must also be applied to the others,
water,
&c. Now the souls which have appropriated or
will
appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies, are reckoned
as
" immovable ;
"
but earth, &c., and the " bodies of earth,"
&c.,
are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.*
These
other immovable things, and such as only possess
1 I
read in p. 35, line 5, 'MUi for I'apralhfitayat trasdi chaturvidhdh
tthtii.
prithivyaptqo.
3
Hence the term here used for 4 In p. 35, line 1 6, 1 read tahdm
"category"
aitikdya. ajlvatvdt for teshd
ji
jivatvdt. If we
*
These (by Hemach. AbJiidh. 21), keep the old Beading we must tranposaess
only
one sense touch. In slate it, "because the former only
p.
35, line 10, 1 read iankhaganQda- are animate."
52
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
the
one sense of touch, are considered as "
released,"
since
they
are incapable of passing into any other state of
existence.
Dharma,
adharma, and dJcdia are singular categories
[and
not generic], and they have not the attribute oi
"
action,"
but they are the causes of a substance's change
of
place.
Dharma,
"merit," and adharma, "demerit," are well
known.
They assist souls in progressing or remaining
stationary
in the universally extended 1
sky
[or ether]
characterised
by light, and also called Lokakaa; hence
the
presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
from
progress, that of " demerit
"
from stationariness. The
effect
of dkdtia is seen when one thing enters into the
space
previously occupied by another.
Pudgala,
"body," possesses touch, taste, and colour.
Bodies
are of two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms
cannot
be enjoyed ;
2
the compounds are the binary and
other
combinations. Atoms are produced by the separation
of
these binary and other compounds, while these
arise
from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes
arise
from separation and conjunction [combined] ;
hence
they are called pudgalas, because they "fill" (ptir),
and
"
dissolve
"
(gal).
Although
"
time
"
is
not properly
an
astik&ya, because it does not occupy many separate
parts
of space [as mentioned in the definition], still it is a
draw/a
[or tattva], as the definition will hold ;
"
substance"
(draw/a)
possesses
"
qualities
and action." 8
Qualities
reside
1
In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I time throws himself into the Jaina
read
sarratrdvasthtte for tarvatrdvas- system which he is analysing, when
thiti.
In the preceding line I read we see that he gives the Jaina
terdlokendvachchhinne
for
dlokendvich- minology for this definition of dravya,
chhinnt.
cf. Vaweth. Stitra, i. 1, 1 5. Parydya
a
Of. Siddhdnta-muktaVali, p. 27. is explained as barman in Hemach.
The
vishaya is upabkoga'Sddhanam, Anek. Parydya, in p. 36, line n
butitbeginawiththedryanu/ta.
This (infra, p. 53, line 9), seems used in
category
takes up the forms of sthd- a different sense from that which it
vara
which* were excluded fromjlw. bears elsewhere. I have taken it
1
It ia an interesting illustration doubtingly as in Hemach. Abhidk.
how
thoroughly Miidhava for the 1503, parydyo 'nukramah Icramaff
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 53
in
substance but do not themselves possess qualities,
as
the general qualities, knowledge, &c., of thejtfra, form,
&c.,
of the body, and the power of causing progress,
stationariness,
and motion into a place previously occupied,
in
the case respectively of
"
merit,"
"
demerit,"
and
dkda.
" Action "
(parydya)
has thus been defined ; the
actions
(parydydh) of a substance are, as has been said,
its
existence, its production, its being what it is, its
development,
its course to the end, as, e.g., in the/foa, the
knowledge
of objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c. ;
in
the pudgala, the lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit
and
demerit, the special functions of progress, &c. Thus
there
are six substances or tattvas [i.e., the five above
mentioned
and " time "].
Others
reckon the tattvas as seven, as has been said
"
The tattvas are jtva, ajiva, dsrava, bandha, samvara,
nirjard,
and moksha" Jiva and ajtva have been already
described.
Asrava is described as the movement of the
soul
called yoga} through its participation in the movement
of
its various bodies, auddrika, &c. As a door opening
into
the water is called dsrava, because it causes the stream
to
descend through it,
2
so this yoga is called dsrava, because
by
it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
flow
in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the
dust
brought to it from every side by the wind, so the
soul,
wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points
of
contact with the body, the actions which are brought
to
it by yoga. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
lump
of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so
the
jiva, heated by previous sins, receives from every side
the
actions which are brought by yoga. Kashdya (" sin,"
"
defilement ") is so called because it
"
hurts
"
(kasli)
the
soul
by leading it into evil states ; it comprises anger, pride,
delusion,
and lust. Asrava is twofold, as good or evil.
Thus
abstaining from doing injury is a good yoga of the
1
Toga seems to be here the natural * In line* 1 8, read dtravanakdraimpulse
of
the soul to act. natvdd.
54
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
body
; speaking what is true, measured, and profitable is a
good
yoga of the speech.
These
various subdivisions of dsrava have been described
at
length in several Stitras. "Asrava is the impulse
to
action with body, speech, or mind, and it is good dt
evil
as it produces merit or demerit," &c. Others, however,
explain
it thus :
"
Asrava is the action of the senses
which
impels the soul towards external objects ; the light
of
the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
means
of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge
of
form, &c." l
Bandha,
"
bondage,"
is when the soul, by the influence
of
"false intuition," "non-indifference,"
"
carelessness,"
and
"sin"
(kashdya), and also by the force of yoga, assumes
various
bodies occupying many parts of space, which enter
into
its own subtile body, and which are suited to the
bond
of its previous actions. As has been said
"Through
the influence of sin the individual soul
assumes
bodies suitable to its past actions, this is,
'
bondage/"
In
this quotation the word "
sin
"
(kashdya)
is used to
include
the other three causes of bondage as well as that
properly
so termed. Vachakacharya has thus enumerated
the
causes of bondage :
"
The.
causes of bondage are false
intuition,
non-indifference, carelessness, and sin."
(a)
"
False intuition" is twofold, either innate from
one's
natural character, as when one disbelieves Jaina
doctrines
from the influence of former evil actions, irrespectively
of
another's teaching, or derived, when learned
by
another's teaching.
(6)
"
Non-indifference
"
is
the non-restraint of the five
senses,
and the internal organ from the set of six, earth,
&c.
(c)
"Carelessness" (pramdda) is a want of effort to
practise
the five kinds of samiti, gupti, &c.
1
Thejndna is one, but it becomes tion with the senses and external
apparently
manifold by its connec- objects.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 55
(d)
"
Sin
"
consists
of anger, &c. Here we must make
the
distinction that the four things, false intuition, &c.,
cause
those kinds of bondage called sthiti and anubhdva ;
yoga
[or dsrava] causes those kinds called prakriti and
prade6a.
"Bondage"
is fourfold, as has been said: "Prakriti,
sthiti,
anubhdva, and pradefa are its four kinds."
I.
Prakriti means "the natural qualities," as bitterness
or
sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may
be
subdivided into eight mtila-prakritis.
1
Thus
obstructions (dvarana)
2
cloud the knowledge and
intuition,
as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp.
This
is (a^jndndvarana, or (6) darSandvarana. (c) An object
recognised
as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces
mingled
pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a
sword's
edge, this is vedaniya. (d) A delusion (mohaniya)
in
intuition produces want of faith in the Jaina categories,
like
association with the wicked ; delusion in conduct produces
want
of self-restraint, like intoxication, (e) Ayus
produces
the bond of body, like a snare.8
(f)
Ndman, or
"
the name," produces various individual appellations, as a
painter
paints his different pictures, (g) Gotra produces
the
idea of noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his
pots.
(K) Antardya produces obstacles to liberality, &c.,
as
the treasurer hinders the king by considerations of
economy.
Thus
is tbeprakriti-bandha eightfold, being denominated
as
the eight m&la-prakritis, with subdivisions according
to
the different actions of the various subject-matter.
And
thus has Umaswati-vachakacharya
4
declared: " The
first
kind of landha consists of obstructions of the knowledge
and
the intuition, wdaniya, mohaniya, dyus, ndman,
1
These are also called the eight used for dvarana (Pdn. iii. 4, 68).
l-armans
in Govindananda's gloss, Cf. Toga Stit., U. 52, where Vyasa's
Ved.
&&, ii 2, 33. Comzn. has dvaraniya.
*
The Calcutta MS. reads Adar- '
Jdlaw^.f
The printed text hag
aniyatya
for dvaraniyasya, in p. 37, jalavat.
*
last
line. But dvaraniya may be 4 Umaavami- ?
56
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
ffotra,
and antardya;" and he has also reckoned up the
respective
subdivisions of each as five, nine, twenty-eight,
four,
two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
explained
at full length in the Vidydnanda and other
works,
and here is omitted through fear of prolixity. *
2.
Sthiti. As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c.,
have
continued unswerving from their sweet nature for so
long
a period, so the first three mtila-prakritisjndndvarana,
&c.,
and the last, antardya, have not swerved from their
respective
natures even through the period described in
the
words,
"
sthiti
lasts beyonds crores of crores of periods
of
time measured by thirty sdgaropamas"
l
This continuance
is
sthiti.
3.
Anubhdva. As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes,
&c.,
there exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special
capacity
for producing
2
its several effects, so in the different
material
bodies produced by our actions there exists a
special
capacity (anufihdva) for producing their respective
effects.
4.
PradeSa. The landha called pradeSa is the entrance
into
the different parts of the soul by the masses, made
up
of an endless number of parts, of the various bodies
which
are developed by the consequences of actions.
Samvara
is the stopping of dsrava that by which the
influence
of past actions (/carman) is stopped from entering
into
the soul It is divided into gupti, samiti, &c.
Gupti
is the withdrawal of the soul from that "
impulse
"
(yoga)
which causes mundane existence, it is threefold,
as
relating to body, speech, or mind. Samiti is the acting
so
as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
into
five kinds, as iryd* bhdshd, &c., as has been explained
by
Hemachandra.
1
For the tdgaropama, see Wil- prachyvtih sthitih for prachyutitfhi.
son's
E&ays, vol. i. p. 309. In tih.
p.
38, line 1 6, I read ityddyuJcta-
2
In p. 38, line 1 8, read tvakdryahtfdd
lirdhvam
api for the obscure Jcarane.
ityddyuktarp,
kdladurddhdnavat. I 8 In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for
aiso
read at the end of the line irshyd read iryd, a bad misreading.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 57
1.
"In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to
walk
circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings,
this
the good call tryd.
2.
"Let him practise
1 a
measured utterance in his
>
intercourse with all people ; this is called bhdshd-samiti,
dear
to the restrainers of speech.
3.
"
The food which the sage takes, ever free from the
forty-two
faults which may accrue to alms, is called the
eshand-samiti?
4.
"
Carefully
looking at it and carefully seating himself
upon
it, let him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,
this
is called the dddna-samiti.
5.
"That the good man should carefully perform his
bodily
evacuations in a spot free from all living creatures,
3
thjs
is the utsarga-samiti* Hence samvara has been
etymologically
analysed as that which closes (sam + vrinoti)
the
door of the stream of dsrava,
5
as has been said by the
learned,
"Asrava is the cause of mundane existence, sarpvara
is
the cause of liberation;
6
this is the Arhat doctrine
in
a handful; all else is only the amplification of
this."
Nirfard
is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay
by
self-mortification, &c. ; it destroys by the body the
merit
and demerit of all the previously performed actions,
and
the resulting happiness and misery ;
"
self-mortification
"
means the plucking out of the hair, &c. This nirjard
is
twofold,7 "temporary" (yathdkdla) and ancillary
(aupakramanika).
It is
"
temporary
"
as
when a desire is
dormant
in consequence of the action having produced its
fruit,
and at that particular time, from this completion of
1 In
p. 39, line 6, 1 read dpadyetd dharma,
"
the ten duties of an as*
for
dpadyatd. cetic, patience, gentleness," &c. ;
3
In p. 39, line 9, for seshand read bhdvand,
"
conviction,"
such as that
saishand.
'
worldly
existences are not eternal,
8
In p. 39, line 12, join nirjantu &c.; chdritra, "virtuous
observance."
Kndjagatttale.
*
In p. 39, line 14, read dsrava-
4
Mddhava omits the remaining trotaso.
divisions
of sarfivara. Wilson, Essays,
6
Fo^woAa,
in line 16, read moltha.
vol.i.p.3ii,givesthemasj>0rttWii,
7
In p. 39,
line
2 infra, I read
"
endurance,"
as of a vow ; yati- yathdkdla- for yathd kdla-.
$8
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
the
object aimed at, nirjard arises, being caused by the
consumption
of the desire, &c. But when, by the force of
asceticism,
the sage turns all actions into means for attaining
his
end (liberation), this is the nirjard of actions.
Thus
it has been said : "From the decaying of the actions
which
are the seeds of mundane existence, nirjard arises,
which
is twofold, sakdmd and akdmd. That called
sakdmd
belongs to ascetics, the akdmd to other embodied
spirits."
l
Moksha.
Since at the moment of its attainment there
is
an entire absence of all future actions, as all the causes
of
bondage (false perception, &c.) are stopped,
2
and since
all
past actions are abolished in the presence of the causes
of
nirjard, there arises the absolute release from all actions,
this
is moksha; as it has been said:
"
Moksha is the
absolute
release from all actions by the decay (nirjard} of
the
causes of bondage and of existence."
Then
the soul rises upward to the end of the world.
As
a potter's wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves
on
even after these have stopped, until the impulse is
exhausted,
so the previous repeated contemplations of the
embodied
soul for the attainment of moksha exert their influence
even
after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward
to
the end of the world ; or, as the gourd, encased with
clay,
sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed
from
its encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works,
rises
upward by its isolation,
8
from the bursting of its
bonds
like the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant, or by its
own
native tendency like the flame.
1
This passage is very difficult and dormant ; the latter is saJcdmd, benot
improbably
corrupt, and my in- cause the ascetic conquers the lower
terpretation
of it is only conjectural, desire under the overpowering influ-
The
ordinary nirjard is when an ence of the higher desire for liberaaction
attains
its end (like the lull- tion.
ing
of a passion by the gratification),
* I
read nirodhe for nirodhah in
this
lull is temporary. That nirjard p. 40, line 6 ; of. p. 37, line 13. The
is
"
ancillary
"
which is rendered by causes of bondage produce the asasceticism
a
means to the attainment sumption of bodies in which future
of
the highest good. The former is actions are to be performed.
akdmd,
"desireless," because at the *
Literally
"absence
moment
the desire is satisfied and so
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 59
"
Bondage
"
is
the condition of being unseparated, -with
a
mutual interpenetration of parts [between the soul and
the
body]; sanga is merely mutual contact. This has
been
declared as follows :
'
"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of
former
impulses, from the absence of sanga> from the cutting
of
all bonds, and from the natural development of the
soul's
own powers of motion, like the potter's wheel, the
gourd
with its clay removed, the seed of the castor-oil
plant,
or the flame of fire."
Hence
they recite a 61oka :
"
However often they go away, the planets return, the
sun,
moon, and the rest ;
"But
never to this day have returned any who have
gone
to -AlokakaSa."
Others
hold moksha to be the abiding in the highest
regions,
the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge
unhindered
and itself untainted by any pain or impression
thereof.
Others
hold nine tattwas, adding "merit" and "demerit
"
to
the foregoing seven, these two being the causes of
pleasure
and pain. This has been declared in the Siddhdnta,
"
Jiva,
ajiva, punya, pdpa, dsrava, samvara, nirjarana,
dandha,
and moksha, are the nine tattwas" As
our
object is only a summary, we desist here.
Here
the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite
logic
called the sapta-Wiangi-naya* or the system of the
seven
paralogisms,
"
may be, it is,"
"
may be, it is not,"
"
may be, it is and it is not,"
"
may be, it is not predicable,"
"
may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
"
may be, it is not,
and
not predicable,"
"
may be, it is and it is not, and not
predicable."
All this Anantavirya has thus laid down :
1.
"When you wish to establish a thing, the proper
course
is to say
'
may be, it is ;
'
when you wish to deny
it,
*
may be, it is not.'
2.
"When you desire to establish each in turn, let your
1
In p. 41, line 7, read taptabhanglnaya, see VecL S. Gloss., ii. 2, 23.
60
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
procedure
likewise embrace both ; when you wish to
establish
both at once, let it be declared 'indescribable'
from
the impossibility to describe it.
3.
"The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to
establish
the first as well as its andescribableness ; when*
the
second as well as its indescribableness, the occasion
for
the sixth process arises.
4.
"
The seventh is required when all three characters
are
to be employed simultaneously."
Sydt,
"
may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the
form
of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness
;
as it has been said
"
This particle sydt is in the form of a verb, but, from
its
being connected with the sense, it denotes
indeterminateness
in sentences, and has a qualifying
effect
on the implied meaning,"
If,
again, the word sydt denoted determinateness, then
it
would be needless in the phrase,
"
may be, it is ;
"
but
since
it really denotes indeterminateness,
"
may be, it is,"
means
"it is somehow;" sydt, "may be," conveys the
meaning
of "somehow," kathainchit ; and so it is not
really
useless. As one has said
"
The doctrine of the sydd-vdda arises from our everywhere
rejecting
the idea of the absolute ;
l
it depends on
the
sapta-bhangf-naya, and it lays down the distinction
between
what is to be avoided and to be accepted."
If
a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
everywhere,
and with everybody, and no one at any time or
place
would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as
it
would be absurd to treat what is already present as an
object.to
be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or
indefinite),
the wise will concede that at certain times and
in
certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover,
suppose
that the question to be asked is this :
"
Is
being
or non-being the real nature of the thing?" The
1 I
cannot understand the words tadvidkeh, and therefore leave them
at
the end of the first line, kim vftia- untranslated.
THE
ARHATA SYSTEM. 61
real
nature of the thing cannot be "being, for then you
could
not properly use the phrase,
"
It
is a pot
"
(ghafo'sti),
as
the two words "
is
"
and "
pot
"
would be tautological ;
nor
ought you to say,
"
It
is not a pot," as the words thus
aused
would imply a direct contradiction ; and the same
argument
is to be used in other questions.
1
As it has
been
declared
"
It
must not be said ' It is a pot/ since the word '
pot
'
implies
'is;'
"
Nor may you say
'
it
is not a pot/ for existence and
non-existence
are mutually exclusive/' &c.
The
whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of
our
opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence,
non-existence,
existence and non-existence successively,
and
the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (anirvachanfyatd)
;
2
three other classes hold one or other of the
three
first theories combined with the fourth.8 Now, when
they
meet us with the scornful questions,
"
Does the thing
exist
?
"
&c.,
we have an answer always possible,
"
It
exists
in
a certain way," &c., and our opponents are all abashed
to
silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the Syddvdda,
which
ascertains the entire meaning of all things.
Thus
said the teacher in the 8yddvdda-ma/njar
fi
"A
thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the
object
only of the omniscient ; a thing partly determined
is
held to be the true object of scientific investigation.
4
When
our reasonings based on one point proceed in the
revealed
way, it is called the revealed Sydd-vdda, which
ascertains
the entire meaning of all things."
"
All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual
propositions
and counter-propositions ; it is only the doctrine
of
the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours
all
sects."
1
Thus Govinddnanda applies it tenet in
(Ved.
Sdt., ii 2, 33) to " may be dya.
it
IB one," "may be it is many," 8 In ^42, line ij,toTmatendmitri-
&c.
tdni react matena mitritdni.
1 '
JiKaTa\ij^lcL.
This is ^riharsha's
' 4
In p. 43, line 2, for na ycuya
read
nayasya.
62
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
The
Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by
Jinadatta-siiri
"
The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual
pleasure,
giving and receiving, sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion,
laughter,
liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of in-i
difference,
desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen
'faults
1
(dosha)
according to our system.
1
The divine
Jina
is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of the
tattwas.
The path
2
of emancipation consists of knowledge,
intuition,
and conduct. There are two means of proof
(pramdna)
in the Sydd-vdda doctrine, sense-perception
and
inference. All consists of the eternal and the noneternal
;
there are nine or seven tattwas. The jiva, the
ajtva,
merit and demerit, dsrava, samvara, bandha, nirfard,
muktiy
we will now explain each. Jwa is defined as
intelligence
; ajiva is all other than it ; merit means bodies
which
arise from good actions, demerit the opposite;
dsrava
is the bondage of actions,
8
nirjard
is the unloosing
thereof
; moksha arises from the destruction of the eight
forms
of karman or "action." But by some teachers
"
merit
"
is
included in samvara* and " demerit
"
in
dsrava.
"
Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things
6
and
is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are
abolished,
absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The
^wetambaras
are the destroyers of all defilement, they
live
by alms,
6
they
pluck out their hair, they practise
patience,
they avoid all association, and are called the
Jaina
Sddhus. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they
1
This list is badly printed in the 8 This seems corrupt, a line is
Calcutta
edition. It is really identi- probably lost,
cal
with that given in Hemachandra's 4 In last line, for sarjixravc read
A
bhidhdna-chintdmani, 72, 73 ; but saijivarc.
we
must correct the readings to * Does this mean the knowledge
antardydt,
rdgadwcskdv aviratih sma- of the world, the soul, the liberated
raA,
and hdso for himtd. The order and liberation ? These are called
of
the eighteen dosha* in the Cal- ananta. See Weber's Bkagavati,
cutta
edition is given by Hexna- pp. 250, 261-266.
Chandra
as 4, 5, I, 2, 3, 10, u, 12,
6
Sarajoharandh is explained by
7,
o, 17, 1 6, 1 8, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14. the rajohara$adkdrin (=* vrativ) of
*
In p. 43, line 13, for vartini read Halayudlia, it 189.
wrtinih.
THE
ARAHTA SYSTEM. 63
carry
peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their
hands,
and they eat upright in the giver's house, these
are
the second class of the Jaina Rishis.
"A
woman attains not the highest knowledge, she
Centers
not Mukti, so say the Digambaras ; but there is
a
great division on this point between them and the
Swetambaras.1
E. B. C.
1
Of. Wilson, Essays, i. 340. For strtm read strt.
64
CHAPTER
IV.
THE
RAMiNUJA SYSTEM.
THIS
doctrine of the Arhatas deserves a rational condemnation,
for
whereas there is only one thing really
existent,
the simultaneous co-existence of existence, nonexistence
and
other modes in a plurality of really existing
things
is an impossibility. Nor should any one say :
Granting
the impossibility of the co-existence of existence
and
non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory,
why
should there not be an alternation between
existence
and non-existence? there being the rule that
it
is action, not Ens, that alternates. Nor let it be supposed
that
the whole universe is multiform, in reliance
upon
the examples of the elephant-headed Gane^a and of
the
incarnation of Vishnu as half man, half lion; for
the
elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one
part,
and the human in another, and consequently there
being
no contradiction, those parts being different, these
examples
are inapplicable to the maintenance of a nature
multiform
as both existent and non-existent in one and
the
same part (or place). Again, if any one urge : Let
there
be existence in one form, and non-existence in
another,
and thus both will be compatible; we rejoin:
Not
so, for if you had said that at different times existence
and
non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
indeed
there would have been no vice in your procedure.
Nor
is it to be contended : Let the multiformity of the
universe
be like the length and shortness which pertain
THE
RAMANUJA SYSTEM. 65
to
the same thing (in different relations) ; for in these (in
this
length and shortness) there is no contrariety, inasmuch
as
they are contrasted with different objects.
Therefore,
for want of evidence, existence and non-existence
as
reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the
same
time in the same thing. In a like manner may be
understood
the refutation of the other Ihahgas (Arhata
tenets).
Again,
we ask, is this doctrine of the seven bhangas,
which
lies at the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding
one
contradictory), or multiform (as conciliating
contradictories).
If it is uniform, there will emerge a
contradiction
to your thesis that all things are multiform ;
if
it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished
to
prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and
non-existent)
proving nothing.
1
In either case, there is
rope
for a noose for the neck of the Syad-Vadin.
An
admirable author of institutes has the founder of
the
Arhata system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist),
proved
himself to be, when he has not ascertained whether
his
result is the settling of nine or p seven principles,
nor
the investigator who settles them, nor his organon, the
modes
of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced, whether
it
be ninefold or not !
In
like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as
the
Arhatas say), an extension equal to that of the body,
it
will follow that in the case of the souls of ascetics, who
by
the efficacy of asceticism assume a plurality of bodies,
1
Cf. "The argument in defence Herakleitean must go through like
of
the Maxim of Contradiction is other persons, and when, if he prothat
it
is a postulate employed in ceeded upon his own theory, he could
all
the particular statements as to neither give nor receive information
matters
of daily experience that a by speech, nor ground any action
man
understands and acts upon when upon the beliefs which he declares
heard
from his neighbours ; a postu- to co-exist in his own mind. Aclate
such
that, if you deny it, no cordingly the Herakleitean Kratylus
speech
is either significant or trust- (so Aristotle says) renounced the
worthy
to inform and guide those use of affirmative speech, and simply
who
hear it. You may cite innu- pointed with his finger." Grote's
merable
examples both of speech and Aristotle, voL ii. pp. 297, 298.
action
in the detail of life, which the
66
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
there
is a differentiation of the soul for each of those bodies*
A
soul of the size of a human body would not (in the
course
of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
body
of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its
elephantine
body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose
its
capacity of filling its former frame. And it cannot be
supposed
that the soul resides successively in the human,
elephantine,
and other bodies, like the light of a lamp
which
is capable of contraction and expansion, according
as
it occupies the interior of a little station on the roadside
in
which travellers are supplied with water, or the
interior
of a stately mansion ; for it would follow (from
such
a supposition) that the soul being susceptible of
modifications
and consequently non-eternal, there would
be
a loss of merits and a fruition of good and evil unmerited.
As
if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution
of
the rest of their categories may be anticipated
from
this exposition of the manner in which their treatment
of
the soul has been vitiated.
Their
doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal,
infallible
revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated
Vyasa
accordingly propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33),
"Nay,
because it is impossible in one;" and this same
aphorism
has been analysed by Kamdnuja with the express
purpose
of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas.
The
tenets of Eamanuja are as follows : Three categories
are
established, as soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject,
object,
and supreme disposer. Thus it has been
said
"Lord,
soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles:
Hari
(Vishnu)
"Is
Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
world
is not-souL"
Others,
again (the followers of ^aftkarachdrya), maintain
that
pure intelligence, exempt from all differences, the
absolute,
alone is really existent; and that this absolute
THE
RAMANUJA SYSTEM. 67
whose
essence is eternal, pure, intelligent, and free, the
identity
of which with the individuated spirit is learnt
from
the "reference to the same object" (predication),
"That
art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
JFhe
universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of
subject
and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as
in
that (one reality), as is attested by a number of texts :
Existent
only, fair sir, was this in the beginning, One only
without
a second, and so forth. Maintaining this, and
acknowledging
a suppression of this beginningless illusion
by
knowledge of the unity (and identity) of individuated
spirits
and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity with
hundreds
of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that
knows
spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any
real
plurality of things, in conformity with the text condemnatpry
of
duality, viz., Death after death he undergoes
who
looks upon this as manifold ; and thinking themselves
very
wise, the Saftkaras will not tolerate this division
(viz.,
the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
Lord).
To all this the following counterposition is laid
down
: This might be all well enough if there were any
proof
of such illusion. But there is no such ignorance (or
illusion),
an unbeginning entity, suppressible by knowledge,
testified
in the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know
not
myself and other things. Thus it has been said (to
explain
the views of the ^afikara)
"Entitative
from everlasting, which is dissolved by
knowledge,
"
Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."
This
perception (they would further contend) is not
conversant
about the absence of knowledge. For who
can
maintain this, and to whom ? One who leans on the
arm
of Prabhakara, or one to whom Kumdrila-bhatta gives
his
hand ? Not the former, for in the words
"By
means of its own and of another's form, eternal in
the
existent and non-existent,
11
Thing
is recognised something by some at certain times.
Om Tat Sat
(Continued
..)
(My
humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble
greatfulness to
Sreeman
K B Cowell for the collection)
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