SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY - 2

THE

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA

OR

REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS

OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY

MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.

TRANSLATED BT

K B. COWELL, M.A.

22 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain

is the common verdict of all the founders of institutes,

else they would not be found desirous to put a stop to it

and engaging in the method for bringing it to an end.

We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is pain, and pain*

alone.

If you object : When it is asked, like what ? you must

quote an instance, we reply: Not so, for momentary

objects self-characterised being momentary, have no common

characters, and therefore it is impossible to say that

this is like that. We must therefore .hold that all is like

itself alone, like itself alone.

In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void

alone. For we are conscious of a determinate negation.

This silver or the like has not been seen by me in

sleeping or waking. If what is seen were (really) existent,

then reality would pertain to the corresponding act of

vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular

nature (or hocceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily

superposed upon that basis, to the connection between

them, to the co-inherence, and so forth : a supposition not

entertained by any disputant. Nor is a semi-effete existence

admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a fowl

may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying

eggs. The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of

the illusorily superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre,

&c.), the connection between them, the act of vision, and

the widens, if one or more be unreal it will perforce ensue

that all are unreal, all being equally objects of the negation

; the Madhyamikas excellently wise explain as follows,

viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a

total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow

progression like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through

the position of a momentary flux, and through the (gradual)

negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensibility,

of universality, and of reality.

The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 23

four alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from

both (reality and unreality), and from neither (reality nor

unreality). To exemplify this : If real existence were the

nature of a water-pot and the like, the activity of its

unaker (the potter) would be superfluous.

If non-existence be its nature the same objection will

accrue ; as it is said

"

Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and

the like, for instance ;

<f No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers

of the sky and the like, for instance."

The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory,

are inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by

the venerated Buddha in the Alaftkaravatara 1

"Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is

ascertained ;

2

"Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable

and natureless."

And again

,

" This matter perforce results, which the wise declare,

No sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."

That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one

of the four alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said

"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog

have three views of a woman's person, respectively that it

is a carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."

In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when

all ideas are come to an end, final extinction, which is a

void, will result. Accordingly we have overtaken our end,

1

Query, Lanktlvatdra ? to which matter is reduced by the

3 Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Meta- tactics of

speculation ; and this prephysic,

p. 213. "If every completed dicament is described not unaptly

object of cognition must consist of by calling it &flux~-or, as we have

object plus the subject, the object depicted it elsewhere, perhaps more

without the subject must be incom- philosophicaUy, as a never-ending

plete, that is, inchoate that is, no redemptip of nonsense into sense,

possible object of knowledge at all. and a new-ending relapse of sense

This ia the distressing predicament into nonsense."

24 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

and there is nothing to be taught to us. There consequently

remain only two duties to the student interrogation

and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the putting

of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.

Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred

teacher. These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting

to that which the religious teacher enounces, and defective

in interrogation, whence their conventional designation

of Madhyamikas (or mediocre).

Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogacharas, because

while they accept the four points of view proclaimed by

the spiritual guide, and the void of external things, they

make the interrogation : Why has a void of the internal

(or baselessness of mental phenomena) been admitted?

For their technology is as follows : Self-subsistent cognition

must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole

universe is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed

by Dharmakfrti :

" To one who disallows perception the

vision of objects is not competent."

An external percipibile is not admissible in consequence

of the following dilemma. Does the object cognitively

apprehensible arise from an entity or not ? It does not

result from an entity, for that which is generated has no

permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for what has not

come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do

you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible,

as begetting cognition ? If so, this is childish nonsense,

because it conflicts with the apparent presentness of the

object, and because on such a supposition the sense organs

(and other imperceptible things) might be apprehended.

Further (we ask), Is the percipibile a simple atom or a

complex body ? The latter it cannot be, this alternative

being ejected by the dilemma as to 'whether part or whole

is perceived. The former alternative is equally impossible,

an atom being supersensible, and} it not being able to

combine simultaneously with six Others ; as it has been

said

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 25

" If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it

would have six surfaces ;

" And each of these being taken separately, there would

be a body of atomic dimension."

, Intellect, therefore, as having no other percipibile but

itself, is shown to be itself its own percipibile, self-subsistent,

luminous with its own light, like light. Therefore

it has been said

" There is naught to be objectified by intellect ; there is

no cognition ulterior thereto ;

" There being no distinction between percept and percipient,

intellect shines forth of itself alone."

The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible,

thus: That which is cognised by any cognition is not

other than that cognition, as soul, for instance, is not other

than the cognition of soul ; and blue and other momentary

objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there were a

difference (between percept and percipient), the object

could not now have any connection with the cognition, there

being no identity to determine a constancy of connection,

and nothing to determine the rise of such a connection.

As for the appearance of an interval between the object

and subject consciousnesses, this is an illusion, like the

appearance of two moons when there is only one. The

cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream

without beginning and without interruption; as it has

been said

" As invariably cognised together, the blue object and

the cognition thereof axe identical ;

"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory

cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."

And again r

'* Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by

reason of illusory perceptions,

"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts

and of percipient." *,

Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the

26 TtiE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

juice, the energy, and the digestion derivable from an

imaginary and an actual sweetmeat will be the same ; for

it cannot be questioned that though the intellect be in

strictness exempt from the modes of object and subject,

yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in

virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning,

by reason of its possessing diverse modes percept

and percipient, conformably to its illusory supposition of

practical agency, just as to those whose eyes are dim with

some morbid affection a hair and another minute object

may appear either diverse or identical; as it has been

said

" As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,

appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,

" Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept

and percipient ;

" So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the

example of the differences of the cognition of a hair

and the like,

" Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as

percipient and percept."

Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected

by beginningless ideation, manifests itself under diverse

forms.

When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four

points of view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted,

there arises knowledge purged from the illusions which

take the form of objects, such illusions being now melted

away ; and this is technically called Mahodaya (the grand

exaltation, emancipation).

Others again (the Sautrantikas) hold that the position

that there is no external world is untenable, as wanting

evidence. Nor (they contend) can it be maintained that

invariability of simultaneous cognition is an evidence, foi

this simultaneous cognition which you accept as proof oi

the identity of subject and object is indecisive, being found

in dubious and in contrary instances* If you rejoin (they

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 27

proceed) : Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this

proof be invariability of simultaneous cognition, we refuse

this, because inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have

some object, it is manifested in duality, and because such

invariability of simultaneity as to time and place is impossible.

Moreover (they continue), if the object, blue

or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it

should be presented as Ego, not as Hoc aliquid, because

the cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps

you will say: A blue form consisting of cognition is

illusorily presented as external and as other than self, and

consequently the Ego is not suggested ; and so it has been

said

" This side of knowledge which appears external to the

other portion,

" This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is

an illusion."

And again

" The principle to be known as internal also manifests

itself as if it were external."

To this we reply (say the Sautrantikas) : This is untenable,

for if there be no external objects, there being no

genesis of such, the comparison

" as if they were external

"

is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say,

" Vasumitra

looks like the son of a childless mother." Again, if

the manifestation of identity be proved by the illusoriness

of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of

duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity,

you are involved in a logical circle. Without controversy

we observe that cognitions take external things, blue or

whatever they may be, as their objects, and do not take

merely internal modifications as such, and we see that

men in their everyday life overlook their internal states.

Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there

is difference between subject and object, turns out a mere

absurdity, like milky food made of civ-dung. When then

you say

" as if it were external/' you must already suppose

28 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

an external percipibtie, and your own arrow will return

upon you and wound you.

If any one object that the externality of an object

synchronous with the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrantikas)

reply that this objection is inadmissible,inasmuch

as the subject in juxtaposition to tte sensory imposes its

form upon the cognition then in production, and the

object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The

interrogation and response on this point have been thus

summarised

"If it be asked, How can there be a past percipibile ?

They recognise perceptibility,

" And a competent inferribility of the individual thing

is its imposition of its form."

To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a

thriving look, as nationality is inferred from language,

and as affection is inferred from flurried movements, so

from the form of knowledge a knowable may be inferred.

Therefore it has been said

" With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)

without losing the nature of a half ;

" The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable

is Jhe nature of the knowable."

For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being

of the cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike,

and if indifference were to attach itself to this, it would

reduce all things to indifference. Accordingly the formal

argument for the existence of external things: Those things

which while a thing exists appear only at times, all depend

upon something else than that thing ; as, for instance, if I

do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of speaking

or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or

walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity

under discussion, while there exists the recognition of a

subject of them, are only at times manifested as blue and

so forth. Of these, the recognition of a subject is the

presentation of the Ego, the manifestation as blue and

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 29

so forth is a presentment of activity, as it has been

said

" That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant

about the Ego :

"That is a presentment of activity which manifests

blue and the rest."

. Over and above, therefore, the complement of subjectrecognitions,

let it be understood that there is an external

object world perceptible, which is the cause of presentments

of activity ; and that this external world does not

rise into being only from time to time on occasion of presentments

resulting from ideation.

According to the view of the Sensationalists (vijndnavddin),

ideation is a power of generating such and

such sensations (or presentments of activity) in subjectrecognitions

which exist as a single stream. The maturescence

of this power is its readiness to produce its effect ;

of this the result is a presentment (or sensation); the

antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental

train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being

admitted to exercise such causality. It must therefore be

stated that all momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in

the subject-consciousness are dike able to bring about that

maturescence of ideation in the subject-consciousness, which

maturescence is productive of presentments of activity.

If any one (of these fleeting sensations) had not this power,

none would possess it, all existing alike in the stream of

subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all

have this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and

therefore any intelligent man, however unwilling, if he

has a clear understanding, must decide, without putting

out of sight the testimony of his consciousness, that to

account for the occasional nature (of sense percepts) the

six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, of

pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four

conditions. These four conditions ari*Jaiown as (i.) the

data, (2.) the suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the

30 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

dominant (organ). Of these, the form of blue or the like

arises from the condition of blue data in the understanding

in which there is a manifestation of blue or the like, which

manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of

forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition.

The restriction to the apprehension of this or that object

arises from the medium, light, for instance, as a condition,

and from the dominant, the eye, for example, as another

condition. The eye, as determinant of one particular

cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been equally

cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday

life he who determines is regarded as dominant. We

must thus recognise four causes of pleasure and the rest

which constitute the understanding and its modifications.

So also the universe, which consists of mind and its

modifications, is of five kinds, entitled (i.) the sensational,

(2.) the perceptional, (3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal,

and (5.) the impressionaL Of these, the sensible world

(rtipa-skandha) is the sense organs and their objects,

according to the etymology, viz., that objects are discriminated

(r&pyante) by these. The perceptional world is the

stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of

activity. The affectional world is the stream of feelings

of pleasure and pain generated by the two aforesaid

worlds. The verbal (or symbolical) world is the stream of

cognitions conversant about words the words "

cow," and

so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as desire,

aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser

miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.

Eeflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode

of pain, and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire

a knowledge of the principles, the method of suppressing

this pain. Hence it has been said

" The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint

the four methods of suppressing the aggregate of

pain."

l

1 Of. Burnoof, Lotut, p. 520. Should we read tamvdaya t

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 31

In these words the sense of pain is known to every one ;

the "aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate

is twofold, as (i.) determined by concurrence ; or (2.) determined

by causation. Of these, there is an aphorism comprising

the aggregate determined by concurrence,

" which

other causes resort to this effect ;

"

the condition of these

causes thus proceeding is concurrence ; the concurrence of

causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious

being, such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify

this. A germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence

of six elements. Of these, earth as an element

produces hardness and smell in the germ; water as an

element produces viscidity and moisture; light as an

element produces colour and warmth ; air as an element

produces touch and motion ; ether as an element produces

expansion and sound ; the season as an element produces

a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism comprising the aggregate

determined by causation is: "With the Tathagatas the

nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or by

non-production ; there is continuance as a condition, and

determination by a condition, and conformity of the production

to the cause ;

"

that is to say, according to the doctrine

of the Tathagata Buddhas, the nature of these conditions,

that is, the causal relation between the cause and

effect, results from production or from non-production.

That which comes into being, provided that something

exists, is the effect of that as its cause ; such is the explanation

of the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as

a condition is where the effect is not found without its

cause. The (abstract) affix tal (in the word sthitita) has

the sense of the concrete. Determination by a condition

is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here some

one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause

and effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent.

For this reason it is added that there existing a cause,

conformity of the genesis to that catila is the nature

which is fixed in conditions (that is, in causes and

32 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

effects) ; and in all this no intelligent designer is observed.1

To illustrate this, the causal determination of a genesis to

be gone through is as follows : From the seed the germ,

from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem,

from the hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules*,

from the spicules the blossom, from the blossom the fruit.

In this external aggregate neither the cause, the seed and

the rest, nor the effect, the germ and the rest, has any

consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of being

brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental

facts two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole

ocean of scientific matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive

of making our treatise unduly prolix.

Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal

aggregates, or the rise of pure cognition subsequent to

such suppression. The method (path, road) is the mode of

suppressing them. And this method is the knowledge of

the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former

ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrantika

arose from the fact that the venerated Buddha said

to certain of his disciples who asked what was the ultimate

purport (anta) of the aphorism (stitra), "As you have inquired

the final purport of the aphorism, be Sautrantikas."

Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world,

consisting of odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of

colours, &a, in order to produce unbelief in these, declared

the universe to be a void. These the venerated Buddha

styled Prathamika (primary) disciples. A second school,

attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain

that sensation is the only reality. A third school, who

1 Of. G. H, Lewes' History of property of bricks, mortar, wood,

Philosophy, voL i. p. 85. "We not and glass. But what we know of

only see that the architect's plan organic materials is that they have

determined the arrangement of this spontaneous tendency to arrange

materials in the house, but we see themselves in definite forms ; prewhy

it must have done BO, because cisely as we see chemical substances

the materials have no spontaneous arranging themselves in definite

tendency to group themselves into forms without the intervention of

houses ; that not being a recognised any extra-chemical agency."

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 33

contend that both are true (the internal and the external),

and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible. Others

hold all this to be absurd language (viruddhd Ihdskd), and

are known under the designation of Vaibhashikas. Their

technical language springs up as follows : According to

the doctrine of inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible

object, and consequently no object from which a

universal rule can be attained, it will be impossible that

any illation should take place, and therefore a contradiction

will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,

therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of

these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of

knowledge as other than mere representation; cognition

which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being

a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said

"

Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory,

is non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting

from the appearances of things, is without controversy

an illusion.

"The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if

it were aught else,

" There could neither be things, nor evidence of things

derived from verbal communication, inference, or

sense."

Here some one may say : If discriminative cognition be

unauthentic, how is the apprehension of real objects by one

energising thereon and the universal consentiency of mankind

to be accounted for ? Let it be replied : This question

does not concern us, for these may be accounted for by

the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just

as if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may

yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light, while

if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold

of any silver). The rest has been fully discussed in

describing the Sautrantikas (cf. p. 27), and therefore need

not here be further detailed. |*

It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction

c

34 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

according to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional

(or orthodox) ; for it is said in the gloss on the

Bodha-chitta

" The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)

accommodating themselves to the character and dis$

position (of those who are to be taught),

" Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a

plurality of methods.

" For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep

and superficial,

" Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of

a universal void which is a negation of duality."

It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship

of the twelve inner seats (dyatana) is conducive to felicity.

" After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner

seats

" Are to be thoroughly reverenced ; what use of reverencing

aught else below ?

" The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,

"The common sensory and the intellect have been

described by the wise as the twelve inner seats."

The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in

the Viveka-vilasa :

11 Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the

universe is momentarily fluxional ;

" The following four principles in order are to be known

by the name of the noble truths :

"

Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is

held,

1

" And the path (method) ; of all this let the explication

be heard in order.

"

Pain, and the skandhas of the embodied one, which are

declared to be five,

"

Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form*

"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense,

sound and the rest, the common sensory,

1 These are not the usual four ' sublime truths ;

'

cf. p. 30.

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 35

"And (the intellect) the abode of merit, these are the

twelve inner seats.

"

This should be the complement of desire and so forth,

when it arises in the heart of man.

"Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be

the aggregate.

" The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,

" This is to be known as the path, and is also styled

emancipation.

"

Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,

perception and inference.

" The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four

sects, the Vaibh&shikas and the rest.

" The Vaibhashika highly esteems an object concomitant

to the cognition ;

"The Sautrantika allows no external object apprehensible

by perception ;

"The Yogachara admits only intellect accompanied

with forms ;

" The Madhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.

" All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same

emancipation,

"

Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream

of cognitions and impressions.

" The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags,

the single meal in the forenoon,

" The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by

the Bauddha mendicants." 1 A. E. G.

i Mddhava probably derived most (as, e.g., that of samwhiya or samu*

of hia knowledge of Buddhist doc- daya, &c.) seem to be at variance

trines from Brahmanical works ;con- with those given in Buddhist

aequently some of his explanations works.

CHAPTER III.

THE iRHATA SYSTEM.

THE Gymnosophists 1

(Jainas), rejecting these opinions of

the Muktakachchhas,2 and maintaining continued existence

to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness

of everything, (They say): If no continuing

soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means

for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless.

But surely this can never be imagined as possible that

one should act and another reap the consequences ! Therefore

as this conviction,

" I who previously did the deed,

am the person who now reap its consequences," establishes

undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which

remains constant through the previous and the subsequent

period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable

the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e., an existence

which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or

subsequent part.

But the opponent may maintain,

" The unbroken stream

(of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument,

so who can prevent it? In this way, since our

tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,

' whatever

is, is momentary, &c./ it follows that in each parallel line

of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the

agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may

1

Vivasanas, "without garments/' liarity of dress, apparently a habit

* " The Buddhists are also called of wearing the hein of the lower

hhaty alluding to a pecu- garment untucked." Cotebrooke.

THE ARHATA SYSTEM. 37

you object that,

'

if this were true, effects might extend

beyond all bounds '

[i.e., A might act, and B receive the

punishment] because there is an essentially controlling

relation in the very nature of cause and effect. Thus we

gsee that when mango seeds, after being steeped in sweet

juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite

certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the

stalk, the stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on

by an unbroken series to the fruit itself; or again, when

cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will

be a similar certainty of finding, through the same series

of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As it

has been said

"'In whatever series of successive states the original

impression of the action was produced,

" ' There verily accrues the result, just like the redness

produced in cotton.

" ' When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the

citron, &c.,

" ' A certain capacity is produced in it, do you not see

it?"'

But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a

straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma :

In the example of the "

cloud," &c. [supra, p. 15], was

your favourite

" momentariness

"

proved by this very proof

or by some other ? It could not be the former, because .

your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible

in the cloud, and consequently, as your example is not

an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the

ground. Nor can it be the latter because you might

always prove your doctrine of momentariness by this new

proof (if you had it), and consequently your argument

regarding all existence ["whatever is, is momentary,"

&c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition

of " existence

" " that which produces an effect," this

will not hold, as it would include e|*}n the bite of a snake

imagined in the rope, since this undoubtedly produces the

38 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAXGRAHA.

effect [of fear]. Hence it has been said that the definition

of an existence is

" that which possesses an origin, an end,

and an [intermediate] duration."

As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness

of objects is proved by the fact that the contrary*

assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity

and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," that

also is wrong for the alleged contradiction is not proved,

as the holders of the Syad-vada 1 doctrine [vide infra]

willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of

causes. As for what was said of the example of the

cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,

and we do not accept even in that instance a separate

destruction [at each moment]. And again, your supposed

continued series cannot be demonstrated without some

subject to give it coherence, as has been said,

" In individual

things which are of the same class or successively

produced' or in mutual contact, there may be a continued

series; and this series is held to be one [throughout

all"].

Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite

relation between causes and effects. For even on your

own admission it would follow that something experienced

by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of

the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might experience

the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;

and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing

done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the

thing not done was enjoyed. This has been said by the

author of the Siddhasenavakya

" The loss of the thing done, the enjoyment of the fruit

of a thing not done, the dissolution of all existence,

and the abolition of memory, bold indeed is the Buddhist

antagonist, when, in the teeth of these four objections,

he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruction

1"

1 In p. 26, line 3, read Sydd-rddindm.

THE ARHATA SYSTEM. 39

Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence),

as at the time of the perception (the second moment) the

object (of the first moment) does not exist, and similarly

at the time of the object's existence the perception does

fiot exist, there can be no such things as a perceiver and

a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of

the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose

that the object and the perception are simultaneous, because

this would imply that, like the two horns of an

animal, they did not stand in the relation of cause and

effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],

and consequently the Alambana, or the object's data

[supra, p. 29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent

causes (pratyaya).

1

If you say that "the object may still be perceived,

inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception,

even though the one may have existed in a different

moment from the other," this too will not hold. For if

you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception

has a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the

impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception

can possess the power of impressing a form ; and if you

say that it has no form impressed upon it, you are equally

met by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there

must be some definite condition to determine the perception

and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception

the abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced

by the external object, becomes modified under the

form of a jar, &c., with a definite reference to each man's

personality [i.e., I see the jar], and it is not merely the

passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror. Moreover,

if the perception only reproduced the form of the object,

there would be an end of using such words as "far/*

"near," &c., of the objects.

2 Nor can you accept this

conclusion, "as exactly in accordance with your own

,

l I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, infra, grdKJfMya for agrdhyatya. |

3 As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.

40 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

views," because, in spite of all our logic, the stubborn

fact remains that we do use such phrases as " the mountain

is nearer

"

or "

further/'

"

long

"

or "

large/' Nor may

you say that "it is the object (which supplies the form)

that really possesses these qualities of being

c

further/ &&

and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the perception

[though not really belonging to it "] because we

do not find that this is the case in a mirror [i.e., it does

not become a far reflection because it represents a far

object.] And again, as the perception produced by an

object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if

the object be insentient, it ought equally to assume its

form and so become itself insentient. And thus, according

to the proverb,

"

wishing to grow, you have destroyed

your root," and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties.

If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that

" the perception does not follow the object in being insentient,"

then there would be no perception that the

object is insentient,

1 and so it is a case of the proverb,

" While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another

drops."

" But what harm will it be if there is no perception

of a thing's being insentient ?

"

[We reply], that if

its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form

is perceived, the two may be quite distinct [and as different

from e^ich other as a jar and cloth], or it may be a case of

" indeterminateness" [so that the two may be only occasionally

found together, as smoke with fire]. And again, if insentience

is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue

form, how could there then be conformity between them

[so that both the blue and the insentience should together

constitute the character of the thing ?] We might just as

well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived

universe entered into it as also constituting its character.2

1 I correct the reading tasydgra- may be not seen though the avayavin

p to tasyd grahanaqi (ta#yd is seen, then I may say that the post

ja^atdydh).

'

is the avayavin, and the unperceived

. e., if you say that the avayava three worlds its avayava I

THE ARHATA SYSTEM. 41

All this collection of topics for proof has heen discussed

at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratapachandra and

others, in the Prameyakamalamdrtanda, &c., and is here

omitted for fear of swelling the book too much,

i Therefore those who wish for the summum, lonum of

man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather

honour only the Arhata doctrine. The Arhat's nature

has been thus described by Arhachchandra-siiri,

1 in his

Aptanichaydlankdra.

" The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient

one, who has overcome all faults, desire, &c., adored by

the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are."

But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul

can enter the path of proof, since none of the five affirmative

proofs can be found to apply, as has been declared by

Tautatita [Bhatta Kumarila 2

] ?

1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in

this world by ourselves or others ; nor is there any part

of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his

existence.

2. "Nor is there any injunction (mdki) of scripture

which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning

of the explanatory passages (arthavdda) be applied

here.

3. "His existence is not declared by those passages

which refer to quite other topics ; and it cannot be contained

in any emphatic repetitions (anuvdda), as it had

never been mentioned elsewhere before.

4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can

never be the subject of the eternal Veda ; and how can

he be established by a made and spurious Veda ?

5.

" Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on

1 I read arhatsvarupam arhach- Kumdrila had a little relenting tochandra

in p. 27, line 3, infra. wards the Jainas at the end of his life.

3 The following passage occurs in He repented of having so cruelly persome

part of Rumania's writings in secuted them, and acknowledged

an argument against the Jainas. It that there ws some truth in their

is curious that in the Sdnkara-digvi- teaching. Jainagui-umukhdt katckid

jaya, chap. lv., It is mentioned that vidydl&o jdtah.

Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)

(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to

Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)