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Friday, August 31, 2012

SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA OR REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY -7
















THE
SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA
OR
REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS
OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
BY
MiDHAVA iCHiBYA.
TRANSLATED BT
K B. COWELL,  



1
But the second kind is as follows : As action which
arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that
with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction
2 from
the points of space in which the original conjunction took
place ; and this is
" the disjunction of the intimate cause
and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces
an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates also
in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect
and the non-effect ; thus the disjunction of the body [the
intimate effect] and the points of space arises from the disjunction
of the hand and the points of space [the hand being
an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of
space being not a cause]. This second disjunction is not
produced by the action of the body, because the body is
supposed to be at the time inactive ; nor is it produced by
the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an
action residing in some other place [as the hand] should
produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore
we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view
that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the
1 The Siddhdnta Muktdvali, p, 1 12, conjunction with that old place ; 7.
describes the series of steps : I. An the conjunction with the new place ;
action, as of breaking, in one of the 8. the cessation of the original imhalves
; 2. the disjunction of the pulse of fracture. Here the second
two halves ; 3. the destruction of disjunction (viz., of the half of the
the, conjunction which originally pot and the place) is produced by
produced the pot; 4. the destruc- the previous disjunction of the halves,
tion of the pot ; 5. by the disjunction the intimate causes of the pot.
of the two halves is produced a dis- a The original has a plural injunction
of the severed half from the bhdgdn, t.e., disjunctions from the
old place ; 6. the destruction of the several points.
THE VAISESHIKA OR AVLUKYA DARSANA. 157
non-cause 1 which causes the second disjunction of the
body and the points of space.
But an opponent may here object that " what you formerly
stated (p. 147) as to existence being denied of darkness,
&c., is surely unreasonable ; for, in fact, there are no
less than four different opinions maintained on this point,
thus (a.) the Bhatta Mimamsakas and the Vedantins hold
that darkness is a substance ; (&.) Sridhara Acharya 2 holds
that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thug darkness
will be a quality] ; (c.) some of the Prabhaka.ra Mimamsakas
hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light ;
'
(d.)
the Naiyayikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light."
In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (a.)
it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with
neither of the two possible alternatives ; for if darkness
is a substance, it must either be one of the nine wellknown
substances, earth, &c.,
3 or some different one. But
it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever
one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance
should certainly be found in it ; nor can you, on the other
hand, assert that it is some substance different from these
nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot
properly be a substance at all [the very definition of substance
being
" that which is the substratum of qualities "],
and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance
from the nine. But you may ask,
" How can you say that
darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as
possessed of the dark blue of the tamala blossom ?
" We
reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that
the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught
on ancient sages.
4
(b.) Hence it follows that darkness can- .
not have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have
an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum
1
I.e., the disjunction of the hand 4 I am not sure that it would not
and the points of space. be better to read viddhavevidhayd,
3 The author of a commentary on rewounding the wounded, instead of
the Bhagavad Gft&
8 For dravyddi read prUhivyddi.
ISB THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
to receive it ;
1 and again, we cannot conceive the eye as
capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent
cause, the external light. Nor can we accept that
it is an impression independent of the eye [i.e., produced
by the internal sense, mind], because the concurrence of
the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition
to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that
" absence or non-existence (dbhdva
2
) is incapable of being
expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we
do use such phrases as tenebrce oriuntur, darkness cannot
be a mere non-existence "] ; because your assertion is too
broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a
mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,
8 &c. [and yet
we all know that men do speak of any of these things as
past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of dbhdva].
(c.) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of
light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ which
perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it
would follow that darkness would be perceived by the
mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions].
4
Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion
must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the
absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence
of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the
quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and
the idea of separation is connected with the absence of
conjunction. And you need not assert that "
this absence
of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the
eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
object possessing colour,
5 as we see in the case of a jar's
1 Unless you see the rope you can- dkaka-kriyd. It has that meaning
not mistake it for a serpent. in Kivyaprakds'a, V. (p. 114, 1. i).
2 In p. 1 10, last line, read 'bhdve. 4 The mind perceives dlofo-jftdna,
9 Read in p. no, last line, anava- therefore it would perceive its abdhdnddishu.
Vidhipratyaya properly sence, i.e., darkness, but this last is
means an imperative or potential perceived by the eye.
affix implying
" command ;
" but the 6
I.e., light possesses colour, and we
pandit takes vidhi here as bhdvabo- cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.
THE VAISESHIKA OR AULUKYA DARSANA. 159
absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz.,
that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object,
it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence,
it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on
light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive
this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
that " the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light]
necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence
resides [and this will require light]," as such an assertion
is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to
have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a
conception of the place where the absence resides, else
we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound,
as is implied in such an expression as
" the tumult has
ceased." l Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind,
the venerable Kanada uttered his aphorism [as an ipse
dixit to settle the question] :
"
Dravya-guna-karma-nishpatti-
vaidharmydd abhdvas tamas" (Vati. SM. v. 2, 19),
" Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to
the production of substances, qualities, or actions." The
same thing has been also established by the argument that
darkness is perceived by the eye
2
[without light, whereas
all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence
of light as well as of the eye to be visible].
Non-existence (dbhdva) is considered to be the seventh
category, as established by negative proofs. It may be
concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate
relation, is not intimate relation ;
3 and this is twofold,
"
relative non-existence
" 4 and "
reciprocal non-existence."
1 Sound resides in the impcrcep- eva vd tamah sydt, vdhydlolcapragratible
ether, and cessation is the ham antarena cliakahwkd no, grihdhvamsdbhdva,
or "emergent non- yeta."
existence." 3 Intimate relation has also no
2 The reading pratyayavedyatvena, mtimate relation.
seems supported by p. no, last line,
4 "Relative non-existence" (4091-
but it is difficult to trace the argu- aargdbhdva) is the negation of a
xnent ; I have, therefore, ventured relation ; thus " the jar is not in the
hesitatingly to read pratyaksliave- house" is ** absolute non-existence,"
dyatvena, and would refer to the "
it was not in the house "
is
" antecommentary
(Vais. Sut. p. 250), cedent," and "
it will not be in the
"
yadi hi nlla-rupavan nftarp, rupam house "is "emergent," non-existence.
160 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent,"
and " absolute."
" Antecedent "
is that non-existence
which, though without any beginning, is not everlasting;
"emergent" is that which, though having a
beginning, is everlasting ;
" absolute
"
is that non-existence
which abides in its own counter-entity ;
l "
reciprocal nonexistence
"
is that which, being different from "
absolute,"
has yet no defined limit [i.e., no terminus ad quern nor terminus
a quo, as " antecedent
" and "
emergent
"
have].
If you raise the objection that " '
reciprocal non-existence
'
is really the same as ' absolute non-existence/
" we
reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's
highroad ; for
"
reciprocal non-existence
"
is that negation
whose opposite is held to be identity, as "ajar is not cloth;"
but " absolute non-existence
"
is that negation whose
opposite is connection, as " there is no colour in the air." 2
Nor need you here raise the objection that " dbhdva can
never be a means of producing any good to man," for we
maintain that it is his summum bo&um, in the form of
final beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute
abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the category
of dbhdva]. E. B. C.
1
I.e., the absolute absence of the jdti ghafatva which resides in the
jar is found in the jar, as, of course, jar.
the jar does not reside in the jar,
a The opposite is " there is colour
but in the spot of ground, it is the in the air."
161
CHArTEE XL
THE AKSHAPiDA (OR NYiYA) DAK^ANA.
THE principle that final bliss, i.e., the absolute abolition of
pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a
certain sense universally accepted], is established in a .
special sense as a particular tenet l of the Nyaya school,
as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words
"
proof, that which is to be proved, &c., from knowledge
of the truth as to these things there is the attainment of
final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the Nyaya
Sastra. "Now the Nyaya Sustra consists of five books,
and each book contains two "daily portions." In the
first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gotama
discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with
"
proof," and in the second those of the remaining seven,
beginning with "discussion" (vdda). In the first daily
portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses
the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested
objections to their being instruments of right knowledge;
and in the second he shows that "
presumption," &c., are
really included in the four kinds of
"
proof
"
already given
[and therefore need not be added by the Mimamsakas as
separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third
book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their
objects; in the second, "understanding" (buddhi), and
" mind "
(manas). In the first daily portion of the fourth
book he examines "volition" (pravritti), the "faults,"
1 Cf. Nydya Stitras, I tg.
162 THE SARVA-PARSANA-SANGRAHA.
"transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and "final
liberation ;
"
in the second he* investigates the truth l as
to^ the causes of the "
faults," and also
" wholes
" and
"
parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth book he
discusses the various kinds of futility (jdti), and in tlie
second the various kinds of
" occasion for rebuke "
(nigrar
hasthdna, or " unfitness to be argued with ").
In accordance with the principle that "to know the
thing to be measured you must first know the measure,"
"proof" (pram&na) is first enunciated, and as this must
be done by defining it, we have first a definition of "
proof."
"Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right
knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from
the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the
site of knowledge [i.e., the soul] ;
2 and this definition thus
includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyaya School that God
is a source of right knowledge,
8 as the author of the
aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68),
" and the fact
of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells
and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit
one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher
Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of
logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the Kusumanjali:
"
Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right
knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is,
according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all
absence thereof.
"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably
united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets,
the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,
all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away
1 In p. 112, line 16, of the Cal- (vishaya), as these are, of course,
cutta edition, I read doshanimitta- connected with right knowledge.
tattva for dotkanimittakatva (compare
8
fa*vara is a cause of right know-
Nyaya Sdt iv. 68). ledge (pramdna) according to the
3 Without this last clause the definition, because he is pramdyd
definition might include the objects dsrayah.
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 163
by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
slightest want of observation in Him, He, $iva, is my
authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as
tJieir authority must ever be with rising doubts ?
"
" Proof
"
is fourfold, as being divided into perception,
inference, analogy, and testimony. The "
thing to be
proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve
kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, understanding,
mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain,
and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose
nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being
caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are
common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive,
or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own,
which do not help us in determining the particular point
in question,
1 or by conflicting testimony. The thing which
one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is
" a
motive" (prayojana) ; this is twofold, i.e., visible and
invisible.
" An example
"
is a fact brought forward as a
ground for establishing a general principle, and it may
be either affirmative or negative.
2 A "
tenet
"
(siddhdnta)
is something which is accepted as being authoritatively
settled as true ; it is of four kinds, as being
" common to
all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant
assumption
"
[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion],
and "an implied dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of
a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an
inference for the sake of another ; and these are five, the
proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and
the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (tarka, i. 39) is
the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates
the admission of a false major
3
(cf. Sut. L 39, and
1 On this compare Siddhdnta- the smoke, is the confutation of there
Muktdvali, p. 115. being no fire in the hill" (Ballan-
1 a On these compare my note to tyne). Or, in other words, "the
Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 315. mountain must have the absence-of-
1 " Our coming to the conclusion smoke (vydpaka) if it has the abthat
there can be no smoke in the sence-of-fire (the false vydpya").
bill if there be no fire, while we tee
164 - THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
iv. 3) ; and this is of eleven kinds, as vydghdta, dtmdfraya,
itaretardSraya, &c.
" Ascertainment
"
(nirnaya, i. 40) is right knowledge or
a perception of the real state of the case. It is of
foijT
kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or
testimony.
" Discussion
"
(vdda) is a particular kind of
conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth
(i. 41). "Wrangling" (jalpa) is the talk of a man only
wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments
for either side of he question (i. 42).
"
Cavilling
"
(vitandd)
is the talk of a man who does not attempt to
establish his own side of the question (i. 43).
"
Dialogue
"
(katkd) is the taking of two opposite sides by two disputants.
A "
fallacy
"
is an inconclusive reason which is
supposed to prove something, and this may be of five
kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain,"
the "unproved," and the "precluded" or "mistimed"
(Slit i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (chhala) is the bringing
forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in
an ambiguous sense ; this is of three kinds, as there may
be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a metaphorical
phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" (jdti) is a selfdestructive
argument (i. 58). This is of twenty-four kinds
(as described in the fifth book of the Nyaya aphorisms
(1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant
loses his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two
kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms,
44-67). We do not insert here all the minute sub-divisions
through fear of being too prolix, they are fully
explained in the aphorisms.
But here an objector may say,
" If these sixteen topics,
proof, &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has
received the name of the Nyaya astra, [as reasoning, ie.,
Nydya,oi logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics
which it treats of ? "] We allow the force of the objection;
still as names are proverbially said to be given for some
special reason, we maintain that the-name Nyaya was
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 165
rightly* applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a
predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of
l^powledge, and from
its^ being a necessary means for every
kind of pursuit. So it has been said by Sarvajna,
" This
is the pre-eminent science of Nyaya from its establishing
our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
action ;
" l and by Pakshila Swamin,
" This is the science
of reasoning (dnvikshiM) divided into the different categories,
'proof/ &c. ; the lamp of all sciences, the means
for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious
duties, well proved in the declarations of science." 2
But here an objector may say,
" When you declare that
final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do
you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this
knowledge being attained ?
" We reply,
"
No," for it is
said in the second Nyaya aphorism,
"
Pain, birth, activity,
faults, false notions, on the successive annihilation of
these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next
before it," by means .of this knowledge of the truth. Now
false notions are the thinking the body, &c., which are
not the soul, to be the soul ;
"
faults
"
are a desire for those
things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to
those things which seem disagreeable to it,
3 though in
reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the
soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
"
faults
"
the stupid man desires and the desiring man is
stupid ; the stupid man is angry, and the angry man is
stupid. Moreover the man, impelled by these faults, does
those things which are forbidden: thus by the body he does
injury, theft, &c. ; by the voice, falsehood, &c. ; by the mind,
malevolence, &c. ; and this same sinful "activity" produces
demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by
1 Action (pravfitti) follows afterthe 3 The printed text omits the third
ascertainment of the truth by nydt/a. fault,
" a stupid indifference, moha"
3
Op. Vdtsyayana's Comment., p. which is however referred to pre-
6. The Calcutta edition reads pra~ sently.
klrtitd for parttehitd.
166 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
his body, as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking,
upright counsel, &c., by his voice, and guilelessness, &c.,
by his mind; and this same right "activity produces merit.
But both are forms of activity^ and each leads to rfi
similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation
; and while this birth lasts there arises the impression
of
"
pain," which we are conscious of as of something that
jars against us. Now this series, beginning with "false
notions" and ending with "pain," is continually going
on, and is what we mean by the words " mundane existence,"
which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his
previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a
great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is
only a scene of pain and bound up with pain, he recognises
that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the
ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced it.
1
Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the
objects of right knowledge divided into the four sciences,
2
there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in
other words, a right view of things as they are ; and from
this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear. When
false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
them ceases "
activity ;
" and with it ceases " birth ;
" and
with the cessation of
" birth
" comes the entire abolition
of "
pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its
absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that
which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly
said in the second aphorism of the Nyaya Sutras :
"
Pain,
birth, activity, faults, false notions, since, on the successive
annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
1 In p. 1 1 6, line 3, I would read the causes of the stability of the
tannirvartakam for tannivartakam. world "
(cf. Manu, vii. 43). It
* This refers to the couplet BO occurs in K&mandaki's Nttisdra, 11
often quoted in Hindu authors, 2, and seems to be referred to in
"Logic, the three Vedas, trade and Vdtsyayana's Com. p. 3, from which
agriculture, and the eternal doctrine Mtfdhava is here borrowing,
of polity, these four sciences are
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 167
the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the
last of them] final beatitude."
"But is not your definition of the summum bonum,
liberation, i.e.,
' the absolute abolition of pain/ after all
as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to
the tongue ;
l why then is this continually put forth as if
it were established beyond all dispute ?
" We reply that
as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition,
as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools,
may well be called the royal highway 2 of philosophy.
No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without
the individual's activity. Thus even the Madhyamika's
opinion that *' liberation consists in the abolition of soul/'
does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it
is the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that
the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just
like the body, &c., we reply that this does not hold, since
it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by
" the soul/' (a.) the continued succession of cognitions, or
(&.) something different therefrom ? (a.) If the former, we
make no objection, [since we Naiyayfkas allow that cognition
is evanescent,
8 and we do desire to abolish cognition
as a cause of pravritti or action 4
], for who would oppose
a view which makes for his own side ? (&.) But if the
latter, then, since it must be eternal,
6 its abolition is
impossible ; and, again, a second objection would be that
no one would try to gain your supposed "summum bonum;"
for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate
the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the prin-
1 Compare the English proverb, first moment, remains during the
" As soon as the cat can lick her second, and ceases in the third,
ear."
4 See Nyaya But. i. 2.
2
Literally the "bell- road," i.e.,
6 As otherwise why should we
" the chief road through a village, require liberation at all ? Or rather
or that by which elephants, &c., the author probably assumes that
decorated with tinkling ornaments, other Naiydyikas have sufficiently
proceed." Wilson's Diet. established this point against its
8 The cognition is produced in the opponents, of. p. 167, line 1 1,
168 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
ciple that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as
"
liberated,"
[and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or
abolition]. &
" But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the
doctrine of pure intelligence [i.e., the Yogacharas and the
Sautrantikas *], that ' the summum bonum '
is the rising of
pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the conscious
subject ?
" To this view we object that there is an
absence of means ; and also it cannot be established that
the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For
the former, if it is replied that the well-known fourfold
set of Bauddha contemplations
2 are to be accepted as the
cause, we answer that, as [according to the Bauddha tenet
of the momentary existence of all things] there cannot be
one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will
necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued
at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce
any distinct recognition of the real nature of things.
And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions
when accompanied by the natural obstacles 8 is said
to be "
bound," and when freed from those obstacles is
said to be "
liberated," you cannot establish an identity
of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say
that the very same being which was bound is now
liberated.
Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that " Liberation
is the releasing from all '
obstructions/
"
a path entirely
free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our
Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by
"
obstruction
"
?
4 If he answers "
merit, demerit, and error/' we
readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that
" the body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is
the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the
1 See *upra, pp. 24-32. 8 In the form of the various Tdeias
* All is momentary, all is pain, er "afflictions."
all is ut generis, all is unreal 4 Avaraqa, cf. pp. 55, 58.
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 169
body's annihilation, as of a parrot released from its
cage," then we must inquire whether this said soul
possesses form or not. . If it possesses form, then has it
parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the wellknown
definition of an atom will apply here as "that
which has form without parts/' it will follow that the
attributes of the soul are, like those of an atom, imperceptible
to the senses.1 If you say that it has parts, then
the general maxim that "whatever has parts is noneternal,"
would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal ;
and if this were conceded, then two grand difficulties
[against the Providential course of the world] would burst
in unopposed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at
its cessation, perish with it [and thus fail of producing
the proper fruit], while it would have reaped during life
the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
which happened to it would not be the consequences of
its actions in a former birth]. If, on the other hand, the
Jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all,
then how can he talk of the soul's
"
upspringing," since
all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent
possessing form ?
2
Again, if we take the Charvtika's view " that the only
bondage is dependence on another, and therefore independence
is the true liberation," if by ' (
independence
" he
means the cessation of pain, we have no need to controvert
it. But if he means autocratic power, then no sensible
man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of
being equalled.
8
Again, the Sankhya opinion, which first lays down that
nature and soul are utterly distinct, and then holds that
1 But the Nydya holds that the is difficult, but I believe that pratiattributes
of the soul, as happiness, bandha.means here vydpti, as it does
desire, aversion, &c., are perceived in Sdnkhya Sutras, i. 100.
by the internal sense, mind (Bhashd
3 The true summum lonum must
P. 83). be niratifaya, incapable of being
1 The reading miirtdpratibandhdt added to.
i;o THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
"
liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after
nature* [on being known] has withdrawn," even this
opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain ; but
there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
the distinction between nature and soul resides in the
soul or in nature. It is not consistent to say that it
resides in the soul, since the soul is held to be unchangeable,
and this would seem to involve that previously it
had been hampered by ignorance ; nor can we say that it
resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or
inactive ? If the former, then it follows that there can be
no liberation at all, since the spontaneous actions of things
cannot be set aside ; and if the latter, the course of mundane
existence would at once cease to go on.
Again, we have the same recognition of our " abolition
of pain
"
in the doctrine of Bhatta Sarvajna and his
followers, that "Liberation is the manifestation of an
eternal happiness incapable of being increased ;
" but here
we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
come within the range of definite proof. If you allege
Sruti as the proof, we reply that fruti has no place when
the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception ;
l or
if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede
the existence of such things as floating stones.2
"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the
manifestation of happiness/ and then accept such a view
as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain,
does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic
patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour ricegruel?"
Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter
for some speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical
argument]. The truth is that all happiness must
1
YogydnupalaJbdhi is when an "grdvdnah plawnti," see Uttara
object is not seen, and yet all the Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase
usual concurrent causes of vision are atmdnah plavanti occurs in Shadv.
present, as the eye, light, &o. Br. 5, 12.
9 Alluding to the Vedic phrase,
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 171
be included under the category of pain, since, like honey
mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by pain,
either as admitting of increase,
1 or as being an object of
perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences,
or as involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds
of instruments for its production. Nor may you retort on
us that we have fulfilled the proverb of "seeking one
thing and dropping another in the search," since we have
abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some incidental
pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite
alternative is one which no one can consider desirable.
For the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness
as the summum lonum, since it is inevitably accompanied
by various causes of pain, is only like the man who
would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion
that it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got
together by rightful means, we may find many firefly-like
pleasures; but then how many are the rainy days to drown
them ? And in the case of those got together by wrong
means, the mind cannot even conceive the future issue
which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own
conscious experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as
indisputable that for him, pre-eminent among his fellows,
who, through the favour of the Supreme Being, has, by
the regular method of listening to the revealed Sruti, &c.,
attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the soul,
for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.
But it may be objected,
" Is there any proof at all for
the existence of a Supreme Being, i.e., perception, inference,
or Sruti ? Certainly perception cannot apply here,
since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c., must be beyond
the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
universal proposition or true middle term which can
apply.
2 Nor can Sruti, since neither of the resulting
1 Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed.'*
* Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.
172 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
alternatives can be sustained ; for is it supposed to reveal,
as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal ? Under the former
view an established tenet of our school would be contradicted
[viz., that the 'Veda is non-eternal] ; under thp
latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.1 As for
comparison and any other proof which might be adduced
[as that sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need
not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter
is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.2
Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as unreal as a
hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need excite
no flurry iu the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c.,
must have had a maker from their possessing the nature
of effects just like a jar." (a.) Nor can our middle term
[possessing the nature of effects] be rejected as uuproved
(asiddha), since it can be established beyond a doubt by the
fact of the subject's possessing parts.
" But what are we to
understand by this '
possessing parts
'
? Is it
'
existing in
contact with parts/ or ' in intimate relation with parts
'
?
It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to
such eternal things as ether,
8 &c. ; nor can it be the
second, since this would prove too much, as applying to
such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, which abides
in intimate relation with the individual threads. It therefore
fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply,
that it holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as
"
belonging to the class of those substances which exist in
intimate relation." 4 Or we may adopt another view and
1 Since the Veda, if non-eternal, tact with the parts of everything, as
must [to be authoritative] have e.g., a jar.
been created by God, and yet it 4 The whole (as the jar) resides
is brought forward to reveal the by intimate relation in its parts (as
existence of God, the jar's two halves). But the eter-
3 The Nydya holds presumption nal substances, ether, time, the soul,
to be included under inference, and mind, and the atoms of earth, water,
comparison is declared to be the fire, and air, do not thus reside in anyascertaining
the relation of a name thing, although, of course, the cateto
the thing named. gory vitesha does reside in them by
3 Since ether is connected by con- intimate relation. The word " subTHE
AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 173
maintain that it is easy to infer the "
possessing the nature
of effects
"
from the consideration of their possessing intermediate
magnitude.
1
% (6.) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
(viruddha)? since there is no such acknowledged
universal proposition connected with it as would
establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism
[i.e., that they must have had no maker], (c.) Nor is our
middle term too general (anaikdnta), since it is never
found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the
mpaksha in the argument,
" The mountain has fire because
it has smoke "]. (d.} Nor again is it precluded (bddhita
or kdldtyayopadishta), for there is no superior evidence to
exercise such a precluding power, (e.) Nor is it counterbalanced
(sat-pratipakshita\ for there does not appear to
be any such equally valid antagonist.
If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism,
"The mountains, &c., cannot have had a maker, from the
fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the
case with the eternal ether," this pretended inference
will no more stand examination than the young fawn can
stand the attack of the full-grown lion ; for the additional
words "
by a body
"
are useless, since " from the fact that
they were not produced" would be a sufficient middle
term by itself [and the argument thus involves the fallacy
called vydpyatvdsiddhi]? Nor can you retort,
"
Well, let
this then be our middle term ;
"
for you cannot establish
it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise the
stances" excludes tantutva, and "ex- older Naiya*yikas maintained that
isting in intimate relation" excludes the argument
' the mountain has fire
ether, &c. because it has blue smoke,' involved
1 Intermediate between infinite the fallacy of vydpyatvdsiddhi, beand
infinitesimal, all eternal sub- cause the alleged middle tenn was
stances being the one or the other. unnecessarily restricted (see Sid-
2 The viruddha-ketu is that which dhanta Muktdv.p. 77). The moderns,
is never found where the major term however, more wisely consider it as
is. a harmless error, and they would
1 This and much more of the rather meet the objection by assertwhole
discussion is taken from the ing that there is no proof to establish
Kusumafijali, v. 2, and I extract my the validity of the assumed middle
note on the passage there. "The term."
174 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be
liable to limitation by any suggested condition (upddhi),
1
[such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to
limit our old reason " from having the nature of effects
"J,
because we have on our side a valid line of argument to
establish our view, viz.,
"
If the mountains, &c., had no
maker, then they would not be effects
"
[but all do acknowledge
that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
of any series of concurrent causes. And this
series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker ;
and I mean by "being a maker" the being possessed of that
combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of
the proper means, which sets in motion all other causes,
but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold
that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the
necessity of the action of all the other causes would be
simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent
thereon ; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine
that effects could be produced without any cause at all
There is a rule laid down by ^ankara-kifikara which
applies directly to the present case
" When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument
to establish its validity,
"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition
on account of the [supposed] non-invariable
concomitance of the major tetm."
If you maintain that there are many sound counterarguments,
such as
"
If the Supreme Being were a maker,
He would be possessed of a body," &c., we reply, that all
such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow
that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.2
1 For the upddhi cf. pp. 7, 8. itself non-existent, cannot be the
3 As in the former case it would be locus or subject of a negation (cf.
clear that it is a subject for separate Kusumanjali, iii. 2). "Just as that
discussion ; and in the latter you subject from which a given attribute
would be liable to the fault of dfray- is excluded cannot be unreal, BO
diddhit a '* baseless inference," since neither can an unreal thing be the
your subject (or minor term), being subject of a negation."
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 175
As has been said by Udayana Acharya [in the Kusumaiijali,
iii. 5]
"
If $ruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument
fails from being precluded ; if they are fallacious,
our old objection of a ' baseless inference '
returns stronger than ever.'*
Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction
to our argument, since it would be overthrown by
either alternative of God's being known or unknown.1
"
Well, let all this be granted ; but the activity of God in
creating the world, what end did it have in view? His own
advantage or some other being's ? If it was for the former
end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to
avoid something not desired ? It could not be the first,
because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
possesses every possible desire gratified ; and for the same
reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the
latter end [the advantage of another] it would be equally
incongruous ; for who would call that being
" wise
" who
busied himself in acting for another ? If you replied that
His activity was justified by compassion, any one would at
once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and
not checkered with misery, since this militates against
His compassion ; for we define compassion as the disinterested
wish to avoid causing another pain. Hence we
conclude that it is not befitting for God to create the
world. This has been said by Bhattacharya
" Not even a fool acts without some object in view ;
"
Suppose that God did not create the world, what end
would be left undone by Him ?
"
We reply, thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be
1 If God is known, then His exis- pardJtatatvdt, and then begin the
tence must be granted ; if He is not next clause with sydd etat. The
known, how can we argue about printed text, vikalpapardkwtah sydt
Him? I read lines 15, 1 6, in p. tad etat, seems unintelligible.
1 20 of the Calcutta edition, wkalpa176
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes,
and to consider the following suggestions. His action in
creation is indeed solely caused by compassion ; but the
idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is
inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot
but arise eventual differences from the different results
which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings
who are to be created. Nor need you object that this
would interfere with God's own independence [as He
would thus seem to depend on others* actions], since there
is the well-known saying,
" One's own body does not
hinder one ;
"
nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims ;
l
and for this there is authority in such passages of the
Veda as that (in the Sveta^vatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There
is one Rudra only; he admits 2 not of a second," &c.
" But
then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning
in a circle ? [for you have to prove the Veda by the
authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
existence by the Veda "]. We reply, that we defy you to
point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do
you suspect this
"
reciprocal dependence of each," which
you call
"
reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being
produced or in regard to their being known ?
3 It cannot
be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there
is no possibility of His being produced ; nor can it be in
regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge
of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be
learned from some other source ; nor, again, can it be in
regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by
1 The aggregate of the various * The usual reading is tasthur for
subtile bodies constitutes Hiranya- tasthe.
garbha, or the supreme soul viewed 8 For these divisions of the anyonin
His relation to the world as creator, ydbraya fallacy, see Nydyavutra vritti,
while the aggregate of the gross i. 39 (p. 33).
bodies similarly constitutes his gross
body (viraj).




Om Tat Sat

(Continued ..)


(My humble salutations to the lotus feet of Madhavacharya and my humble greatfulness to
Sreeman K B Cowell  for the collection)